BAGHDAD: SUNNIS IN AMERIYA ATTACK AQI -- WHY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001866

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR ASEC KDEM PTER IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD: SUNNIS IN AMERIYA ATTACK AQI -- WHY
THERE? WHY NOW?

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT GILCHRIST FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: An uprising in the Sunni-predominant Baghdad
neighborhood of Ameriya continued June 4, after five days of
fighting between Sunni residents and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
This unexpected uprising offers insight into the process of
securing Baghdad, including the nature of Sunni-on-Sunni
violence; the impact of concrete barriers constructed around
Sunni neighborhoods and Shia markets; the role of militias
and insurgents in providing security and services to
Baghdad's neighborhoods; and the challenge of linking Sunnis
opposed to AQI to Iraqi governance institutions. The revolt
parallels a similar development in Abu Ghreib and may portend
additional Sunni-AQI conflicts elsewhere in Baghdad. END
SUMMARY.

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SUNNIS TAKE BACK THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD
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2. (S) The Ameriya uprising began May 30 when two prominent
Sheikhs used loudspeakers at their mosques to exhort the
people of Ameriya to rise up against Al Qaeda, according to
EPRT reports. By the time the Second Brigade Combat Team
(2BCT) of the First Infantry Division arrived in the area,
small arms fire had erupted. The Sheikhs contacted the
brigade to inform them that they had attacked AQI operatives
and soon claimed to have killed two high-value targets -- a
claim which later reports refuted. Ameriya residents
reported already by May 31 that the local fighters, whom the
Sheikhs refer to as the "Baghdad Patriots," had killed
approximately 40 AQI members. Gradually, the Sheikhs began
to seek material assistance from 2BCT, beginning with medical
evacuations of injured fighters, and developing into sharing
of actionable intelligence about AQI members, weapons caches,
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A neighborhood
whose residents rarely, if ever, provided such information
suddenly dispatched numerous high-value tips. 2BCT
dispatched May 31 four platoons to fight AQI in Ameriya, and
the Iraqi Army sent a battalion as well. The battle soon
reached an intensity level that attracted widespread media
attention. 2BCT suffered the loss of a soldier, and dozens
of Baghdad Patriots were also killed. The EPRT reports that
cooperation between 2BCT and Ameriya residents reached a new
high.


3. (S) EPRT and 2BCT told PolOff that, prior to the
uprising, Ameriya had turned into a primary base of
operations for AQI in Baghdad. 2BCT recently encountered
fierce resistance in the neighborhood -- in May, insurgents
and/or AQI in Ameriya killed 10 soldiers and an interpreter.
On May 19, in the deadliest single attack that the 2BCT has
endured, an IED killed six soldiers and an interpreter.
Ameriya, a predominantly Sunni neighborhood, contains
approximately 32,000 residents, including an estimated 4,000
recent migrants from other areas of Baghdad. It is located
in west Baghdad, in the southwest corner of Mansour District,
adjacent to the "Airport Road" (known by the local brigade as
"Route Irish").


4. (S) The EPRT reports that Ameriya's Sunni residents had
distanced themselves from the central Shia-led Government of
Iraq and from major city institutions, including the
Shia-dominated Amanat; the Provincial Council; and the
Mansour District Council. Ameriya had also long proved
reluctant to cooperate with American forces and officials.
Partially as a result of this reluctance, the neighborhood
lacks infrastructure support and essential services. It has
not proved possible thus far to establish even one
functioning bank in the neighborhood. Residents have
reportedly relied upon the insurgency and AQI to provide
financial support and basic services. These same extra-legal
groups have also sought to defend the neighborhood against
attack by roving death squads from the Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM).

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CONCRETE BARRIERS PUT AQI ON THE DEFENSIVE
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5. (S) The concrete barriers that enclose sections of the
Ameriya neighborhood may have contributed to the recent
uprising against AQI, according to the EPRT. As part of its
"safe neighborhoods" project, MND-B erected security
structures in and around Ameriya during April, completing
their work on April 30. MND-B designed the safe
neighborhoods project in Baghdad to diminish a key
vulnerability of, respectively, Sunni and Shia neighborhoods:
Sunni areas are vulnerable to invasion and displacement by
Shia militias, while Shia areas are exposed to vehicle born
IEDs (VBIEDs) and suicide bombers. In response to these
respective vulnerabilities, MND-B constructed T-wall barriers

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to protect Shia areas where groups of people gather together
in public (such as markets),and to protect Sunni
neighborhoods susceptible to Shia militias that seek to
expand their control. In deciding where to place these
structures, MND-B identified "sectarian fault lines" -- areas
that divide warring neighborhoods and often also serve as
dumping locations for murder victims. Press reports have
focused on the structures in a Sunni neighborhood in the
Adhamiya District, and the barriers around a mixed-sect
market in Dora.


6. (S) In the assessment of the EPRT, the barriers in Ameriya
limited the capacity for AQI operatives to transport kidnap
victims into the area by tightening entry and exit controls.
Having lost the revenue generated through kidnapping and
extorting ransom from Shia areas of the district, AQI began
to look for victims in Ameriya itself. Victims reportedly
included relatives of the two Sheikhs who have led the recent
uprising. These recent abductions allegedly turned the tide
against AQI in Ameriya. (NOTE: Local kidnaping victims also
included two foreign service nationals employed at the
Embassy. Also note that the barrier figures as a distinctive
feature of this uprising, since Ameriya is one of only three
Sunni-dominated areas partly enclosed by security structures.
MND-B has begun placing barriers around 12 other Sunni and
mixed communities in Baghdad. END NOTE.)

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OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE UPRISING
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7. (S) EPRT reports that another significant factor in the
uprising included the mid-April arrest and continued
detention of Sheikh Omar Hussein Al-Dulaymi, the hard-line
imam of Ameriya's Muliki Mosque and a stronger enforcer of
AQI's will in Ameriya. Following Al-Dulaymi's arrest, the
community grew increasingly disenchanted with the lifestyle
strictures AQI imposed as part of its harsh interpretation of
Sharia law. At the same time, AQI failed to provide
sufficient security or essential services to residents of
Ameriya, while Coalition and Iraqi forces increased their
protection of the isolated Sunni community from invasion by
marauding Shia militants. In addition, approximately 4,000
new residents arrived recently in Ameriya from formerly mixed
areas of Baghdad, possibly diluting the local control of AQI
militants. (NOTE: In most cases, Shia militiamen ejected
these new arrivals from their former homes, and the
comparative safety of a barrier-protected Sunni neighborhood
may have attracted them to Ameriya. END NOTE.) Also,
Ameriya reportedly has the highest percentage of foreign AQI
fighters in the city; local residents likely find it easier
to attack fighters of foreign origin than to attack AQI
members recruited locally.

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COMMENT
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8. (S) The same catalyst spurred the uprisings against AQI
in both Ameriya and Abu Ghreib: AQI operatives abducted the
relatives of prominent local families, and thereby crossed an
invisible line in both communities. Other lingering
hostilities may have contributed to the revolts in both
instances. In fact, the EPRT reports that Sunni "volunteers"
from Abu Ghreib asked 2BCT May 31 to facilitate their
transportation to Ameriya in order to assist in the fight
against AQI; although 2BCT refused to transport them, some
Abu Ghreib fighters may have traveled to Ameriya on their
own. Whether these scenarios can or will be duplicated in
other areas of Baghdad remains an open question, although
Embassy contacts have noted that tense conditions in east
Rashid, and several other areas, resemble conditions in
Ameriya and Abu Ghreib before their respective attacks
against AQI. Meanwhile, the EPRT Team Leader covering
Ameriya reports that he will work immediately, upon cessation
of hostilities, to connect the neighborhood to essential
services. The EPRT and 2BCT plan to provide Ameriya
residents the security and services that AQI denied them.
Efforts will also be made to link the neighborhood to the
broader institutions of government at the municipal,
provincial and national level.
CROCKER