ISCI POLITICAL COMMITTEE DIALOGUE FOCUSES ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001848

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI POLITICAL COMMITTEE DIALOGUE FOCUSES ON
CAUSES OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH

REF: BAGHDAD 1672 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The conversation in the third meeting of the
ISCI-U.S. political committee focused on causes of violence
in Iraq's central and southern provinces and how to encourage
moderates. While recognizing violence in Shi'a-majority
areas as a problem, ISCI participants urged the U.S. to focus
on al-Qaeda and the Baathists as the most pressing security
challenges. In the center and south, they argued for a
combination of picking strong leaders for the Iraqi security
forces; expanding the Najaf governance model (led by ISCI);
and supporting the marja'iya. The DCM urged ISCI to play a
more active and public role as a moderating influence in the
center and south. End summary.


2. (C) The meeting took place on May 29. Vice President
Adel Abdel Mehdi and ISCI parliamentarians Humam Hamoudi and
Jalal al-Din al-Saghir participated from the ISCI side. The
U.S. side included the DCM, Legal Advisor, Regional Affairs
Officer, PolOff, and Staff Assistant.


3. (C) The DCM opened the session by noting U.S. concern
with the recent violence in Basrah, Diwaniya, Dhi Qar, and
elsewhere in the Shi'a-majority central and southern
governorates. He noted that the U.S. does not have all the
tools to address the causes of this violence and that the
U.S. looked to ISCI to provide a moderating influence. The
issue of violence in the south, the DCM continued, was also
closely related to several topics Abdel Mehdi had proposed,
including federalism and Iraq's neighbors.

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Abdel Mehdi: Focus on AQI and the Baathists
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4. (C) Abdel Mehdi noted that the long history of violence
and oppression in Iraq had conditioned Iraqis to learn the
ways of violence. Developing moderation, he argued, required
strong leaders and support for them. Abdel Mehdi noted
parenthetically that the U.S. had initially "punished" ISCI
in Iraq because of its ties to Iran. "We told you you cannot
combat extremism by making moderates weak." Abdel Mehdi said
that to deal with extremists "you have to open a political
dialogue and at the same time be decisive with all those
outside the law." He argued that particular attention be
paid to al-Qaeda and the Baathists, as these groups presented
challenges that could not be solved by the political process.

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Hamoudi: Support Marja'iya and Beware Contradictory Messages
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5. (C) Hamoudi offered two pieces of advice for preventing
extremism in Iraq. First, he argued for "moral and practical
support" for the Shi'a marja'iya in Najaf. The long
education and training necessary before a Shi'a cleric could
pronounce fatwas, Hamoudi argued, made the marja'iya a force
for moderation that even someone like Muqtada al-Sadr had to
respect, at least on the surface. He suggested undercutting
Shi'a extremism by emphasizing Muqtada al-Sadr's
subordination to the marja'iya. Second, he argued that the
U.S. should be careful about giving "contradictory messages"
to extremists. On the one hand the U.S. called extremists
"terrorists" and fought them, Hamoudi continued, but the U.S.
then made the mistake of calling the same people "the
resistance" and trying to respond to their political demands,
e.g. on de-Baathification. Thus, the U.S. gave extremists a
further incentive to use violence, Hamoudi argued. He closed
by criticizing the Baghdad Security Plan for giving a similar
message because "you do not see U.S. troops in the areas
where the violence is coming from."

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Al-Saghir: Replicate the ISCI-Led Najaf Model
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6. (C) Noting ironically that he was considered an extremist
by many, al-Saghir said that the Shi'a population, poor and
undeveloped as it was, unfortunately offered fertile ground
for extremists to exploit. ISCI, he said, presented its
moderate side but also recognized the need to "enter into the
environment" of the extremists in order to learn how to deal
with them better. Moderate Iraqi leaders needed to create an
alternative to extremism, al-Saghir argued. He pointed to
ISCI-led Najaf governorate as a place that offered such an

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alternative. He urged support for Najaf so that it can
become a model for getting results ) to show how moderation
can be successful.


7. (C) The DCM thanked Abdel Mehdi, Hamoudi, and al-Saghir
for their presentations, saying that the U.S. agreed the door
had to be left open for political dialogue while at the same
time giving a consistent message that there is no room to use
violence to solve political problems. He urged ISCI to play
a more public role in bringing groups into the political
process and stressed the importance of continuing work on
improving rule of law institutions. PolOff noted that U.S.
officials indicated their deep respect for the marja'ia in
Najaf in public and private settings and welcomed concrete
suggestions from ISCI for making this support practical as
well as moral. PolOff also noted the contrast between
Diwaniya, also an ISCI-led province, and Najaf, and suggested
that ISCI leadership develop ideas for improving the
situation in Diwaniya.


8. (C) Abdel Mehdi concluded that a general problem in the
south was soft security. Security responsibility, he
claimed, "has been given to weak individuals." He argued for
a better selection process for ISF leaders in the south,
suggesting that the model by which the Iraqi Special
Operations Forces (ISOF) was built should be replicated on a
larger scale.
CROCKER