STRATEGIC SECURITY DIALOGUE WITH ISCI CONTINUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001837

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS MCAP MARR PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC SECURITY DIALOGUE WITH ISCI CONTINUES


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: At a May 27 meeting of the joint
Coalition - Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (ISCI) Security
Committee, Badr Organization leader (and CoR Security and
Defense Committee Chairman) Hadi al-Amri told MNF-I Deputy
Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects MG Winfield Scott that
over seventy-percent of Sadr City residents do not support
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and that ISCI could help in building
support for the Coalition within the area. He added that
while operation Fardh Al Qanoon (FAQ) was making progress,
the Coalition must better protect Baghdad's numerous bridges,
seal off the city, and arm local tribes to fight insurgents.


2. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Al-Amri asserted that
ISCI Security forces should be allowed to possess machine
guns to defend their offices and requested the Coalition's
permission. MG Scott stated that GOI policy explicitly
banned heavy weapons. He added that Iraqi and Coalition
policy does not allow Iraqi Army or Coalition Forces to guard
political party facilities. He also informed al-Amri that
the list of ISCI detainees presented at the previous meeting
was still being reviewed. Concluding, Al-Amri reaffirmed
ISCI desires to become partners with the Coalition. The
Committee will meet again on Sunday June 2 for further
discussions on these topics. END SUMMARY.

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Improving FAQ
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3. (C/REL MNF-I) As part of an on-going series of meetings to
advance the Coalition-ISCI strategic security partnership,
Badr Organization leader and CoR Security and Defense
Committee Chairman Hadi al-Amri met with MNF-I Major General
Winfield Scott, members of his staff, and Emboffs. Al-Amri
emphasized the importance of FAQ, saying that if it were
successful, the rest of the country would follow. He
asserted that despite its initial success, FAQ had several
flaws, especially its failure to fully control entry/exit
into Baghdad, and emphasized that plans for the "Baghdad
berm" must be fully implemented and include equipment to
detect explosives. He added that Baghdad's bridges were a
strategic target and that their security must be improved. He
said he had spoken to Baghdad Operational Commander Abbud
regarding this.


4. (C/REL MNF-I) Al-Amri argued that the introduction of
non-local troops into Baghdad was a mistake because these
units do not know Baghdad and would only serve to antagonize
the population. He advised that non-local forces be used only
to conduct raids and guard sensitive areas, while local
forces police the city. Al-Amri criticized the sequential
nature of FAQ's clearing operations as a "cat and mouse"
game, saying that when Coalition and ISF "search Shaab, they
(the insurgents) go to Sadr City; when Bayaa is searched,
they go to Hay al Amel."


5. (C/REL MNF-I) Al-Amri concluded by advocating the arming
of tribes against the insurgents, saying that the government
must create additional Anbar Salvation Council-type
organizations. He said that any such tribal groups must be
under the command of MOD or MOI, emphasizing that these
groups must not be permitted to develop into militias. (Note:
Al Amri commented that Saddam Hussein skillfully used tribes
against his opposition, adding that he had learned this
through "hard personal experience.") MG Scott agreed with
al-Amri's comments on tribes, adding that the recent success
in Anbar/Abu Ghraib was due to tribal leaders supporting the
government against insurgents.

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MG Scott: FAQ is focused on the Long-term
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6. (C/REL MNF-I) MG Scott stated that FAQ was different from
previous security efforts because it focused on maintaining a
permanent security presence in Baghdad's neighborhoods. In
addition, the GOI was working to build public trust and
confidence by removing trash, repairing infrastructure, and
working to generate small businesses. Scott said that good
progress had been made in reducing sectarian deaths, but
acknowledged that spectacular bombings had increased. He
added that the Coalition was working to destroy car and
suicide bomb cells. Scott emphasized that the surge of
coalition troops was not yet complete and that judgments on
FAQ's success would take time.

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Arming ISCI Office Guards
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7. (C/REL MNF-I) Al-Amri expressed concern that insurgents
frequently threaten ISCI offices, noting that two had
recently been burned down. He added that while this risk was
increasing, Coalition Forces were arresting ISCI guards and
confiscating their weapons, further increasing their
vulnerability. To redress this, he requested that ISCI
offices be allowed to maintain both AK-47s and machine guns
for self defense. Coalition Forces, he emphasized, would
have the right to inspect ISCI offices at any time to verify
the weapons' identification data. MG Scott replied that GOI
policy, for good reason, explicitly banned heavy weapons such
as machine guns.

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Most in Sadr City Do Not Support JAM
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8. (C/REL MNF-I) Al-Amri claimed a number of JAM members had
once served in Saddam's intelligence apparatus. He said that
these JAM members were now conducting sectarian attacks aimed
at destabilizing the government. He added that many
criminals groups claim JAM membership as cover for their
activities. As a result, much of the population (he
estimated over seventy percent) had turned against JAM. On
the other hand, he said that the Sadr City population was
still very distrustful of the Coalition. Al-Amri suggested
that ISCI might be able to help build support for the
Coalition in Sadr City, since it was gaining influence within
the area. He concluded by reaffirming ISCI's desire to be
partners with the Coalition in such efforts.


9. (U) The next meeting is scheduled for June 3.
CROCKER