SADRIST COR MEMBER CALLS FOR TRUST-BUILDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001833

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS IZ
SUBJECT: SADRIST COR MEMBER CALLS FOR TRUST-BUILDING
MECHANISMS BETWEEN U.S. AND SADRISTS


Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) In a May 28 meeting with the DCM, Sadrist Council of
Representatives (CoR) member Baha al-Araji (protect) said
that Muqtada al-Sadr was not in full control of his
organization, which was falling prey to "small groups with
regional support." Describing the trust between the U.S. and
the Sadrists as "below zero," al-Araji called for measures to
build trust at the practical and political levels. He
suggested the coalition work with him "behind the scenes" to
improve security in Kadhamiya and that there be an agreement
on a timetable for withdrawal, "even if it were to begin in
four years." Al-Araji expressed his disillusionment with the
CoR and the GOI, saying that Maliki needed to be freed from
his constraints. The DCM emphasized to al-Araji that the
coalition did not target Sadrists, but rather those who acted
outside of the law. He said that the U.S. appreciated
Muqtada's conciliatory words toward the Sunnis and that the
U.S. would be watching Muqtada's rhetoric and actions closely
in the coming weeks to see if he indicated any tacit
acceptance of MNF-I's status in Iraq. While thanking
al-Araji for the confidence-building measures he proposed,
the DCM noted that the surest way for the Sadrists to help
MNF-I reduce its footprint in Kadhamiya and elsewhere in Iraq
would be to oppose all activities outside of the law. End
summary.

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Muqtada's Dilemma
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2. (C) Al-Araji began by describing Muqtada as a "true
patriot" whom others "have not dealt well with." The
Sadrists, he said, were "exploited by small groups with
regional support and regional agendas." While Muqtada did
not accept these agendas, al-Araji claimed, he did not have
enough control over Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) leaders to reign
them in. Al-Araji gave the example of Qais al-Khazali,
noting that "Muqtada never asked for him back." Muqtada
planned to develop a list of several hundred "criminal
elements" (presumably within JAM) over the next several
weeks, al-Araji said.

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Proposals for Building Confidence
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3. (C) Describing the level of trust between the U.S. and
the Sadrists as "below zero," al-Araji called for new
mechanisms to build trust between the groups. "We need to
calm down the Shi'a-majority areas so the U.S. can focus on
fighting the terrorists." He proposed starting practical
cooperation in Kadhamiya, which he said was a "peaceful
place" until people began to react badly to MNF tactics,
which opened the door for JAM. He offered to broker a
behind-the-scenes agreement with Kadhamiya leaders under
which MNF would not enter the old area of Kadhamiya and in
return the area's leaders would ensure that the area was not
a safe-haven for criminals or weapons storage. The U.S.
could help with service provision. If this model was
successful, al-Araji concluded, it could be replicated in
Shu'la and then Sadr City.


4. (C) On the political level, al-Araji noted that many
people in the United States were discussing MNF withdrawal,
as were the Sadrists. "Let's agree on a schedule for
withdrawal," he proposed. "It does not even need to begin in
one or two years. You can say 4 years." Al-Araji claimed
that agreement on such a schedule for withdrawal would mean
that there would not be the same level of opposition from
Muqtada to coalition presence. "And if there are reasons you
should stay and if you have built trust with the people, then
we could revisit the agreement before you begin withdrawing."
(Note: Al-Araji, who chairs the legal committee at the CoR,
is the CoR member most closely identified with the proposal
circulating in the CoR to set a timetable for withdrawal of
MNF. End note.)

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Disillusioned with the Government
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5. (C) Turning to government performance, al-Araji said he
had no confidence in the CoR or the GOI. The elections had
not brought the right people into government, he said. He
complained about the staff around Maliki, saying "he needs to
be freed from his constraints." Al-Araji said he regularly

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wrote Maliki letters of advice but that it was never taken.
He criticized the ministers brought in through the government
formation process. On the latest round of six new ministers
proposed by Maliki, he again criticized Maliki's process for
choosing them but said that the nominees for health and
agriculture were "OK," the nominee for transportation "very
bad," and the other three inconsequential because they were
for ministries of state rather than full ministries. "You've
put a lot of effort into forming a government, but we need to
be building a state." He said he was disillusioned enough
that he was thinking of "leaving Iraq in a few weeks or
months if the situation does not improve."

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U.S. and Sadrists: Coalition Cannot be the Scapegoat
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6. (C) The DCM thanked al-Araji for meeting with him and
noted that there were a number of areas where the Sadrists
and the U.S. might agree. Both would agree on the importance
of getting rid of Saddam, for example; both wanted to see a
strong Iraq and neither were satisfied with the current level
of services provided to the Iraqi people. The DCM noted that
the coalition does not target political groups but does
target those acting outside of the law. The DCM noted that a
number of JAM members were involved in sectarian violence and
other acts outside the law, and that JAM was associated with
Muqtada, even if sometimes individuals acted against his
stated orders.


7. (C) On the issue of coalition withdrawal, the DCM
observed that if the coalition left quickly, before Iraqi
security forces (ISF) were ready, a far larger conflict would
likely erupt. He told al-Araji that it was important that
the Sadrist trend, in its relationship with other segments of
Iraqi society, continue in the direction of Muqtada's most
recent sermon, in which he called for all elements to work
together for Iraq. He emphasized that the coalition would be
watching Muqtada's rhetoric over the coming period for an
indication of tacit approval of MNF-I as a security partner
invited by the GOI. "We appreciate Muqtada's conciliatory
words toward the Sunnis," he said, "but we do not want to see
him make the coalition the scapegoat." The DCM said that,
while he agreed with al-Araji on the importance of finding
ways to build trust, MNF and the GOI could not relinquish the
right to conduct security operations in a given area of
Baghdad: "We have to treat all areas of the city equally.
We've also found that the bad elements have a way of finding
the areas we aren't concentrating on." On Kadhamiya, the DCM
noted that if local leaders found a way of reducing violence
and criminal behavior, there would be less of a need for MNF
operations and the footprint would be reduced.

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Legislative Priorities
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8. (C) The DCM asked al-Araji briefly about major
legislative initiatives. Al-Araji offered his view that the
CoR should finish the provincial powers law before turning to
the elections law. He said that people believed the
hydrocarbon law was developed by the U.S. On
deBaathification reform, he warned against the U.S. applying
too much pressure, which might cause people to reject it. A
better tactic, he said, would be the merger of the draft
currently in the deBaathification committee with "your
draft." The DCM stressed that the hydrocarbon and
deBaathification laws were Iraqi laws.

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Comment
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9. (C) Al-Araji has the reputation of being a loose cannon
and does not speak for the Sadrists. His statement that
Muqtada is trying to reassert control over his organization
comes as no surprise. The conversation reflected the
slightly more pragmatic approach that at least some members
of the Sadrist trend seem to be taking to coalition presence:
al-Araji effectively conceded the need for coalition
presence at present, though with the caveat that the
coalition take a lighter approach in areas where it could
develop reliable partners (such as al-Araji, naturally
enough, in al-Araji's opinion). End comment.
CROCKER