Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD178
2007-01-17 07:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

NEW PM POLITICAL ADVISOR LAMENTS WEAK POLITICAL

Tags:  PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9600
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0178/01 0170710
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170710Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9131
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000178 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: NEW PM POLITICAL ADVISOR LAMENTS WEAK POLITICAL
PARTY LEADERSHIP


Classified By: Classified Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000178

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: NEW PM POLITICAL ADVISOR LAMENTS WEAK POLITICAL
PARTY LEADERSHIP


Classified By: Classified Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a January 16 meeting, Prime Minister
Maliki's new political advisor George Bakoos outlined changes
in the PM's office and described the obstacles holding back
transfer of provinces to Iraq control (PIC) and cabinet
changes: an under-equipped Iraqi military and weak political
party leadership. Bio note on Mr. Bakoos is provided at the
end. End Summary.

--------------
Expanded Political Department
--------------


2. (C) George Bakoos explained to poloff that Prime Minister
Maliki brought him on board in early January to expand the
political department from one to three advisors. In addition
to the original political advisor Sadik Riqabi and himself, a
third political advisor will be added in the very near
future. Mohammed Salman acts as the Deputy Chief of Staff.

--------------
Delivery of Military Equipment is Too Slow
--------------


3. (C) Bakoos said that transfers of provinces to Iraqi
control (PIC) hinged on properly arming and equipping the
Iraqi Army. The timeline was dependent on receiving
equipment from the U.S., and the PICs could be completed even
faster if deliveries were sped up. There is a perception in
the PM's office that the U.S. is purposefully delaying
re-armament, he explained. "Why do you not trust us?" he
asked.

--------------
Political Parties Need Discipline
--------------


4. (C) Bakoos blamed the delayed cabinet re-shuffling on the
political parties. He explained that the Prime Minister
cannot just replace a minister, he must choose from
candidates submitted by the party blocs (Note: Also, under
Iraq's Constitution, the Council of Representatives (CoR)
must approve any cabinet dismissal. End note). Although the
PM delivered a letter to the party blocs with a deadline for
nominations, the deadline passed and the parties are still
not providing the PM with nominations, he lamented.


5. (C) In Bakoos's opinion, the inability of the party
leaderships to exercise discipline within their own parties
is the root of a number of critical obstacles, including the
lack of quorum in the CoR and progress on the delayed
de-Ba'athification law.


6. (C) Bakoos explained that only Iraqis who lived abroad for
many years are experienced with how political parties should
work. Locals who only knew the Ba'athist regime "were always
told what to do and had no experience with strategic
thinking." The Ba'ath party was not a political party at
all, but "more of a political club, which never required
anyone to show any leadership." This is why, for example,
members of the PM's own government act more as opposition
parties.

--------------
U.S. Pressure Needed
--------------


7. (C) Bakoos said the U.S. should pressure the party leaders
to exercise their responsibilities more seriously.
Specifically, he would like to see the U.S. pressure parties
to provide ministerial nominations and to improve COR
attendance. Poloff responded we were also concerned about
these issues and regularly bring them up in our meetings with
party leaders. Bakoos was unsatisfied: "What else can you
do?" he queried.

--------------
Bio Note
--------------


8. (C) George Bakoos immigrated in 1991 to the U.K. where he
lived until 2003; he holds British citizenship. He was
involved with the Iraqi Reconstruction Development
Commission. In June 2003 he joined the Coalition Provisional
Authority and worked on Baghdad Governate issues. He helped
establish the Baghdad Governing Council and the neighborhood
councils. In October 2004 he moved to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs as a diplomatic counselor. There, by his own

BAGHDAD 00000178 002 OF 002


description, he "worked on American, coalition, and Sunni
issues." In summer of 2005 he moved into business and
established a trading company, with offices in Baghdad and
Amman, to take advantage of the reconstruction. When PM
Maliki came to Amman in 2006 to meet with President Bush,
Bakoos dropped in for a social call. "Within thirty minutes
the Prime Minister asked me to help, and I couldn't say no"
he recounted. He began work in the PM's office in early
January.
KHALILZAD