FADHILA LEADERS GIVE AMBASSADOR OVERVIEW OF PARTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001773

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: FADHILA LEADERS GIVE AMBASSADOR OVERVIEW OF PARTY
GOALS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a May 24 meeting with the Ambassador,
Fadhila leaders Hassan al-Shammari, Basim al-Sherif, and
Karim al-Yacoubi laid out to the Ambassador Fadhila's
position on key legislative issues. They said there was
political pressure on the Prime Minister to "certify" a vote
of no confidence of dubious legality against the Basrah
Governor. They characterized several currents within the
Sadrists, and al-Yacoubi opined that the Sadrists would pick
up seats in provincial elections. End summary.

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Fadhila's Position on Key Legislation
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2. (C) Al-Shammari opened with a summary of Fadhila's
position on topical issues. He said that Fadhila supported a
schedule for withdrawal of coalition forces, but that should
a withdrawal happen at this point "it would be a disaster."
He pointed to the lack of preparedness of Iraqi security
forces and argued that their loyalties "were not yet fully
with Iraq." On deBaathification, he stated Fadhila's
position that individuals should be judged in courts on the
basis of criminal behavior, not "deBaathified" based on their
level in the Baath party. With the exception of groups such
as the Fedayeen Saddam, al-Shammari said that the new Iraq
should be able to benefit from the experience of people who
worked even in security forces of the former regime after
they had been re-educated. Al-Yacoubi added that law should
also treat the victims of Saddam's regime with justice.


3. (C) On the hydrocarbons law, al-Shammari said that Fadhila
supported investment and participation by U.S. companies
possessing advanced technology. Al-Yacoubi added that
provinces, like regions, should have the ability to sign
contracts in the oil and gas sector subject to approval by
the federal government. On the elections system, al-Yacoubi
noted Fadhila's support for district-based elections of
individuals rather than a province-wide, closed list system.
"The current system is based too much on the parties; people
need to feel that they know their representatives, that they
voted for them, that they are qualified." Al-Shammari and
al-Sherif concluded their presentation of Fadhila's position
on key legislation by characterizing the party as an Iraqi
nationalist party that, unlike several of its rivals,
eschewed militias.

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Politics and Security in Basrah
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4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about the situation in Basrah,
al-Shammari said that the pressure on the governor to step
down resulted not from lack of services but from Fadhila's
withdrawal from the Shi'a coalition. Although the Prime
Minister might want to certify the vote of no confidence in
the governor, al-Shammari continued, the vote was illegal and
regardless the Prime Minister did not have the authority to
certify it. Asked by the Ambassador why Basrah was so
violent given that there was no sectarian violence or
al-Qaeda presence, al-Shammari noted the presence of militias
tied to political parties, many with links to Iran. He gave
the example of Abu Qadir, JAM leader in Basrah. While the
security committee established by the central government
could choose to execute a warrant to arrest him, al-Shammari
continued, it chose not to do so because of Abu Qadir's ties
to the Shi'a coalition (presumably the Sadrists). (Note:
Media reports indicate that British troops killed Abu Qadir
on May 25. End
note.) Al-Sherif said that the Governor of Basrah had asked
the Prime Minister for his help in appointing a new,
independent police chief. According to al-Sherif, the Prime
Minister rejected the person proposed by the Governor
(someone from Kut; no name given) despite prior buy-in from
the MOI.

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The Sadrists: Different Currents
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5. (C) The Ambassador asked what the Sadrists wanted and how
best to deal with them. Al-Shammari said that they wanted a
law that set a timetable for withdrawal, even if the
timetable specified a time several years away for the
withdrawal. He noted the presence of several currents within
the Sadrists: "Some will take weapons even from the outside
(i.e., Iran),and others support the political process but
fear the first group." Al-Shammari put Salah al-Obeidi and
Ahmed al-Sheibani in the latter group. It was impossible to
tell who beyond Muqtada was influential in the Sadrist camp,
he continued, because its political leaders seemed to change

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frequently and no one except Muqtada had decision-making
authority. Al-Shammari and al-Yacoubi debated among
themselves the pluses and minuses of what they expected would
be Sadrist gains in provincial elections, when they took
place. Al-Shammari forsaw problems but al-Yacoubi thought
that as long as district-based elections for individuals took
place, the Sadrist candidates that prevailed would be good
ones.

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Iran, Syria, and Failure in Iraq
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6. (C) Turning to relations with neighboring countries,
al-Shammari noted that Iran and Syria wanted to see the
failure of U.S. policy in Iraq and asked why the US dealt
with groups related to Iran (e.g., ISCI). The Ambassador
responded that four years after Saddam's fall it was not up
to the US to pick who ruled in Iraq. Iran and Syria, he
continued, have to understand that U.S. failure in Iraq will
mean the failure of the new Iraq, which in turn would have
very severe consequences for them. Al-Sherif said that he
thought the Iranians understood this point, as he heard it
from several Iranian officials when he visited Tehran as part
of President Talabani's delegation.
CROCKER