Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1759
2007-05-27 14:31:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQIYYA MP PACHACHI DISCUSSES WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7782
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1759/01 1471431
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271431Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1399
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001759 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQIYYA MP PACHACHI DISCUSSES WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1622


B. BAGHDAD 848

C. BAGHDAD 941

D. BAGHDAD 1666

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001759

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQIYYA MP PACHACHI DISCUSSES WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1622


B. BAGHDAD 848

C. BAGHDAD 941

D. BAGHDAD 1666

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: Former Iraqi Governing Council
(IGC) President and cross-sectarian secular Iraqiyya party
member Adnan Pachachi met with Ambassador May 22 to discuss
Iraqiyya's plans to form a cross-sectarian opposition bloc.
Ambassador welcomed Pachachi back to Iraq after long and
frequent absences, and pressed him to remain in Baghdad and
use his influence as a member of the Council of
Representatives (CoR) with a national reputation to help the
GOI achieve key reconciliation benchmarks. Pachachi seems to
have returned for the purpose of gauging USG views on
Iraqiyya head and former PM Ayad Allawi's effort to form an
opposition bloc as an alternative to the Maliki government.
Having not received our support or encouragement, Allawi's
return may not be imminent, despite President Talabani's
claim to have convinced him to return to Baghdad to
participate in the GOI (ref A). End summary and comment.

--------------
No Confidence in Maliki Government
--------------


2. (C) Former ICG President and current MP Adnan Pachachi met
with Ambassador May 23 accompanied by fellow Iraqiyya MP
Maysoon al-Damluji. Ambassador welcomed Pachachi back to
Baghdad, saying his prolonged absences from the Iraqi
political scene created a gap. (Comment and background:
Since losing the 2005 election, Allawi and Pachachi have
preferred to spend their time outside of Iraq courting Arab
capitals in a bid to form an opposition bloc and replace the
Maliki government. During Allawi and Pachachi's last
month-long visit to Baghdad in February-March, neither
remained in Iraq to work within the GOI to achieve key
reconciliation goals, nor did they prove willing to use their
influence within the CoR toward that end. Allawi announced
then his attempt to form a cross-sectarian CoR bloc with a
"moderate, nationalist agenda," negotiating with the Sunni
Tawafuq bloc, Shia Fadhila party and others. This effort
failed, according to many, due to Allawi's insistence that he
be named the head of any new bloc. He has continued in this

effort from outside of Iraq. End comment and background.)


3. (C) Pachachi reviewed Iraqiyya's complaints against the
GOI -- that it is not a government of national unity but of
sectarian interest, and that Iraqiyya, despite its five
ministries, was marginalized by The Shia UIA bloc from the
beginning and refused positions of influence or participation
in GOI decision making. He explained that Maliki never
responded to Allawi's March 2 letter to the PM threatening to
withdraw from the government unless certain conditions were
met including, among other demands, cleansing the Iraqi
security forces of militia infiltration, suspending the High
National Council for Debaathification pending
Debaathification reform, and ending the practice of sectarian
quotas for government positions (ref B).

--------------
Iraqiyya Leadership Prefers Opposition Role
--------------


4. (C) Pachachi asked Ambassador for the USG position on
Iraqiyya's on-going efforts to from a cross-sectarian,
moderate bloc (ref C),reporting that he had heard in Cairo
and Abu Dhabi that the U.S. was opposed to Iraqiyya's
withdrawal from the GOI. "We will take your position into
account," he told Ambassador. Making clear it was Iraqiyya's
unquestionable, democratic right to withdraw from the
government, Ambassador strongly urged Pachachi against such a
move, saying that in our view it is a disastrous time for
Iraqiyya to withdraw from the GOI. Given the domestic
pressure for quick GOI political progress and the heavy price
we are paying to create the conditions in which
reconciliation can proceed, the Ambassador made clear the USG
view that all political efforts should be directed toward
helping the GOI gain momentum in meeting political benchmarks.


5. (C) Pachachi retorted that such a view presumed that PM
Maliki is serious about reconciliation vice pursuing
sectarian interests, adding that a real democracy
necessitates real opposition -- why not try to form a new
government that is competent, moderate and non-sectarian, he
asked. Pointing to the differences in the "Iraqi and
American clocks," Ambassador suggested that the time needed
to form a new government would be unacceptable to Congress
and the American public. As for Maliki's sincerity,
Ambassador directed Pachachi to the PM's May 22 speech with

BAGHDAD 00001759 002 OF 002


its strong message of unity and reconciliation. Everything
that can be does to support the PM in this efforts needs to
be done, and it needs to be done now, Ambassador urged
Pachachi.

--------------
Just Because You're Paranoid...
--------------


6. (S) Pachachi also raised Maliki's speech, accusing the PM
of using the occasion to threaten Allawi. (Note: Mostly
likely referring to Maliki's statement that "any Iraqi
political entity that seeks support from abroad will be
making a terrible mistake." End note.) Given the vagueness
of the statement, Ambassador suggested it could just as
likely refer to Iran as to Allawi's contacts with Arab
governments; he noting that while Iranian interference was
the most egregious, all of Iraq's neighbors are a problem.
(Comment: The PM may well have intended to send a shot
across Allawi's bow, and in fact complained to Ambassador May
17 that the Arab neighbors are conspiring against him by
supporting other Iraqi political figures, noting Allawi (ref
D). End comment.) As for Talabani's claim that while in
London he convinced Allawi to return to Baghdad to
participate in the GOI, Pachachi hinted that Allawi's
presence in Baghdad should not be expected in the Short term,
saying that Allawi had not returned due to Iranian threats
against his life passed by Gulf intelligence agencies.

-------------- --------------
Iraqiyya MP's in Baghdad Not All on Board with New Bloc
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Not all 25 Iraqiyya MPs are on board with the Allawi
camp. Local press reported May 24 that Iraqiyya list
minister have decided to continue in their posts even as
Allawi calls for bloc members to pull out of the government.
Hamid Majid Musa, a Communist MP in the Iraqiyya bloc told
PolCouns May 19 that Iraqiyya had made no decision to
withdraw from the GOI and that in his view and many others
such a move would serve only to isolate them from the
government and their constituents. "We see Ayad as outside
the Iraqiyya program," said Musa, referring to his efforts to
ally with Sunnis parties against UIA, "which does not support
Iraqiyya's cross-sectarian basis." Musa also criticized
Allawi for encouraging Gulf countries to play a negative role.


8. (C) Comment: While Pachachi clearly got the message that
the USG does not encourage Allawi to lead his bloc in a
withdrawal from the GOI, judging from his reticence, it
appears unlikely that either he or Allawi will abandon life
abroad as critics of Iraq's leadership to join in the
difficult reconciliation tasks at hand. At the end of his
conversation with Ambassador, Pachachi requested that the
Embassy help him arrange a visit to Washington to meet with
senior officials including POTUS. He clearly has not
internalized how his refusal to remain in Baghdad and
participate in government has weakened his influence. End
Comment.
CROCKER