Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1755
2007-05-27 14:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
FORMER PRIME MINISTER JA'FARI LAMENTS LACK OF
how-toVZCZCXRO7778 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #1755 1471406 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271406Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1394 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001755
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER JA'FARI LAMENTS LACK OF
TECHNOCRATS IN CABINET
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001755
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER JA'FARI LAMENTS LACK OF
TECHNOCRATS IN CABINET
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) In a May 23 meeting, former Prime Minister and current
Council of Representatives member (Shi'a Coalition, Dawa)
Ibrahim al-Ja'fari hailed President Bush's decision to topple
Saddam Hussein as a historic and strategic decision that
Iraqis will view as "an Iraqi national decision." He listed
the accomplishments of the new Iraq but warned that the
government was suffering from a lack of technocratic
ministers. "The ministers need to be connected to the Prime
Minister and the Council of Ministers, not allocated by sect
or to the political parties." On the positive side, he
observed a greater convergence between Shi'a, Sunni, and
Kurdish views. Ja'fari said that he was hosting a weekly
meeting for CoR members to promote this convergence and
develop greater support for the Prime Minister. (Comment:
We do not believe Ja'fari has attended the CoR once since
March, leading us to wonder if his efforts would not be
better placed at the CoR itself. End comment.)
2. (C) Ja'fari commented that there could be no
reconciliation with al-Qaeda but that there needed to be
greater clarity on what reconciliation meant for "resistance"
groups, both in terms of what they would give and what they
would get. Acknowledging that deBaathification reform would
play a role in reconciliation, he argued that there needed to
be a transition from "purging Baathists" to "purging
criminals." He criticized the GOI for being "reactive" on
regional issues, noting that the GOI needed to follow-up with
its neighbors after the Sharm conference. Ja'fari said that
the most important things the US could do to support Iraq
were to continue to insist on Iraq's democratic institutions,
convince neighboring Arab countries to support Iraq, and
support reconstruction efforts as permitted by the security
situation.
3. (C) The Ambassador assured Ja'fari of President Bush's
continued commitment to Iraq's democracy. He noted that the
Baghdad Security Plan, although only half-implemented to
date, had shown promising signs in reducing sectarian
killings and in increased participation from Iraqi security
forces. Political steps were necessary as well, the
Ambassador said: "People in the US want to see clear
indications of progress; that is our message to Iraqi
leaders." The Ambassador told Ja'fari that progress in the
next three months on the hydrocarbons law, deBaathification
reform, and constitutional review was critical to supporting
President Bush's commitment to Iraq. He noted to Ja'fari
that the purpose of Vice President Cheney's recent visit to
the region was to convince Iraq's Arab neighbors to do more
to support Iraq. The positions of Iran and Syria, the
Ambassador observed, did not make sense: by taking actions
to destabilize Iraq and support al-Qaeda and militia activity
inside Iraq, Iran and Syria risked a disaster on their
borders.
CROCKER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER JA'FARI LAMENTS LACK OF
TECHNOCRATS IN CABINET
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) In a May 23 meeting, former Prime Minister and current
Council of Representatives member (Shi'a Coalition, Dawa)
Ibrahim al-Ja'fari hailed President Bush's decision to topple
Saddam Hussein as a historic and strategic decision that
Iraqis will view as "an Iraqi national decision." He listed
the accomplishments of the new Iraq but warned that the
government was suffering from a lack of technocratic
ministers. "The ministers need to be connected to the Prime
Minister and the Council of Ministers, not allocated by sect
or to the political parties." On the positive side, he
observed a greater convergence between Shi'a, Sunni, and
Kurdish views. Ja'fari said that he was hosting a weekly
meeting for CoR members to promote this convergence and
develop greater support for the Prime Minister. (Comment:
We do not believe Ja'fari has attended the CoR once since
March, leading us to wonder if his efforts would not be
better placed at the CoR itself. End comment.)
2. (C) Ja'fari commented that there could be no
reconciliation with al-Qaeda but that there needed to be
greater clarity on what reconciliation meant for "resistance"
groups, both in terms of what they would give and what they
would get. Acknowledging that deBaathification reform would
play a role in reconciliation, he argued that there needed to
be a transition from "purging Baathists" to "purging
criminals." He criticized the GOI for being "reactive" on
regional issues, noting that the GOI needed to follow-up with
its neighbors after the Sharm conference. Ja'fari said that
the most important things the US could do to support Iraq
were to continue to insist on Iraq's democratic institutions,
convince neighboring Arab countries to support Iraq, and
support reconstruction efforts as permitted by the security
situation.
3. (C) The Ambassador assured Ja'fari of President Bush's
continued commitment to Iraq's democracy. He noted that the
Baghdad Security Plan, although only half-implemented to
date, had shown promising signs in reducing sectarian
killings and in increased participation from Iraqi security
forces. Political steps were necessary as well, the
Ambassador said: "People in the US want to see clear
indications of progress; that is our message to Iraqi
leaders." The Ambassador told Ja'fari that progress in the
next three months on the hydrocarbons law, deBaathification
reform, and constitutional review was critical to supporting
President Bush's commitment to Iraq. He noted to Ja'fari
that the purpose of Vice President Cheney's recent visit to
the region was to convince Iraq's Arab neighbors to do more
to support Iraq. The positions of Iran and Syria, the
Ambassador observed, did not make sense: by taking actions
to destabilize Iraq and support al-Qaeda and militia activity
inside Iraq, Iran and Syria risked a disaster on their
borders.
CROCKER