NINEWA'S GOVERNOR FADING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001711

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: PINR PGOV PBTS IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA'S GOVERNOR FADING

Classified By: Ninewa PRT Leader James Knight: 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) message.

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) Ninewa's Governor Duraid Kashmoula has
shown progressively greater mental and physical
impairment over the last several weeks. His
behavior has become unpredictable and
counterproductive; his effectiveness as Governor and
PRT and Coalition interlocutor is now questionable.
However, his continued service as Governor of Ninewa
is considered critical by Ninewa's Kurdish Alliance;
the Alliance is unlikely to permit him to resign
until the Article 140 process for resolution of
areas disputed in Ninewa has concluded.


2. (S/NF) After his unfortunate performance at the
MND-N Governors' Conference 16 May (detailed below
para 6),MNC-I and MND-N offered to facilitate a
medical workup at Coalition facilities in Baghdad in
the hope Kashmoula's increasingly erratic behavior
has a treatable medical cause. He has declined this
offer. End summary.

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Always somewhat difficult . . .
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3. (S/NF) Governor Kashmoula is famously petulant
and known for odd priorities not clearly significant
for Ninewa. A regular example has been regular
last-minute boycotts of PRT and Coalition-
facilitated events outside Mosul. This proclivity
has been especially evident for Tal'Afar. Kashmoula
has also shown progressively poorer judgment in
public statements. For example, on camera he has
recommended Iraqi security forces simply kill
captured insurgents rather than rely on the judicial
process, and -- noting that the GOI in Baghdad has
no interest in Ninewa's problems -- proposed
independence for the province. Both remarks were
tactfully edited from coverage later broadcast in
Mosul by the Iraqi Media Network.

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. . . but facing rising stress . . .
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4. (S/NF) Governor Kashmoula's erratic behavior has
exacerbated since Article 140-related security
incidents in Ninewa leapt in April 2007. Following
a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
(SVBIED) that barely missed Ninewa Vice Governor
(and provincial Kurdistan Democratic Party chief)
Khasro Goran at Tal Usquf on 23 April, Kashmoula
urgently insisted he would resign within the week.
In presenting his resignation decision to the PRT
Team Leader 24 April, he was extraordinarily relaxed
and cheerful, in stark contrast to his unkempt,
frantic appearance the day before. He removed
personal items from rooms in his official residence
in Mosul in preparation for his imminent departure.


5. (S/NF) However, when our PRT Team Leader met
Vice Governor Khasro 29 April to discuss Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) views on Kashmoula's
successor, Khasro insisted that quote we (the KDP)
cannot permit Kashmoula to resign unquote. In the
same conversation Khasro also pointed out that the
Kurdish Alliance opposes provincial elections in
Ninewa since quote we do not want a government
hostile to the Article 140 process in place before
the process concludes unquote. Khasro clearly
believes Kashmoula as Governor -- and the most
reliable Sunni Arab in the Kurdish Alliance --
cannot be spared. At the Team Leader's next meeting
with Kashmoula, Kashmoula said he had changed his
mind, and he will remain in office.

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. . .and now an embarrassment
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6. (S/NF) Since retracting his resignation
decision, Kashmoula has been progressively less
predictable:


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-- At the Ninewa Business Forum held in Baghdad 28
April, he focused his unscripted remarks entirely on
increasing security risks and (unverified) massive
al-Qaeda presence in Ninewa as the major economic
issue, thus aborting the Forum's focus on capital
improvement and investment in Ninewa.

-- At the April Ninewa Provincial Security
Transition Assessment meeting (actually held 3 May
owing to Kashmoula's participation in the Forum)
Kashmoula insisted that 6500 al-Qaeda operatives are
now conducting operations in Ninewa. He broke down
this number by job descriptions. None of the other
participants at the meeting, including Coalition
maneuver commanders, had any information
corroborating this assertion at any level. Ninewa
PDOP MG Wathiq, also in attendance, quickly changed
the subject and brought the brief back to its normal
topics. At a meeting with the PRT Team Leader two
days later, Kashmoula indicated he had received this
information in an e-mail from a source he could not
further identify.

-- Kashmoula attended the MND-N Governors'
Conference at COB Speicher 16 May unshaven and
disheveled. His skin tone was grey, and he had
black circles around his eyes. His appearance was
startling to many individuals in attendance who know
him well -- most assumed he was ill. He behaved
oddly throughout the conference. He cradled his
head on his table and slept at intervals during
remarks, but woke up to engage in an inflammatory
exchange with Vice Prime Minister (VPM) al-Zawba'i
over the situation in Tal'Afar. At the conference's
reconciliation luncheon -- attended only by the
Governors, senior commanders, Ambassador Crocker,
and other senior Embassy staff -- Kashmoula provoked
a strident exchange with al-Zawba'i that shocked
other participants. His contribution to the Article
140 discussion which closed the conference was a
recitation from the Koran and a homily to the effect
that God wants everyone to live in peace.

-- Kashmoula's return to Mosul from the Governors'
Conference was plagued by poor weather -- the entire
Ninewa delegation remained at Speicher until late
the following day. Kashmoula used shockingly
offensive language to express his frustration at the
ongoing delays. The evening of the 16th was marked
by a series of SVBIEDs and complex attacks in Mosul
-- by cell phone, Kashmoula ordered Iraqi forces
responding to the attacks to kill all the insurgents
involved (these orders were ignored).

-- Kashmoula has reignited his vendetta against
Provincial Council (PC) Chair Issa with a vengeance
since withdrawing his intention to resign. The
Governor's contention with the PC Chair has been a
feature of Ninewa's political life since Kashmoula
took office, but he has recently asserted that PC
Chair Issa and PC Finance Committee Chair Francis
Mansour are corrupt and involved in broad fraudulent
expenditures associated with GOI provincial capital-
improvement funds (Accelerated Reconstruction and
Development Fund -- ARDF). He has pushed the
Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) office in Dahuk
to target Issa, Mansour, and other Council members,
in a way which threatens to block further progress
on allocating 2007 and residual 2006 Provincial-
controlled reconstruction funds. (Note:
Irregularities do exist, but this crusade as being
pursued by Kashmoula threatens what has heretofore
been an exceptionally successful provincial capital-
improvement budget execution process. End note.)

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Poor GOI response to Ninewa issues . . .
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7. (S/NF) Kashmoula indicates that his primary
motivation for wishing to resign is the GOI's lack
of interest in or response to Ninewa's pressing
concerns. Only the Prime Minister is now responsive
to him, and even the Prime Minister cannot elicit
action for Ninewa from ministries. Kashmoula cites
the ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Oil dealing
with Ninewa's fuel crisis; meddling of the Minister
of Interior in Ninewa police matters, including
directed hiring of a by-name list of Shi'a recruits
for Tal'Afar's police which may have triggered the
27 March SVBIED and reprisal killings there;
Minister of Trade instructions regarding Public

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Distribution System food deliveries that directed
Minister of Trade employees in Ninewa to ignore the
Governor.

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. . . declining influence . . .
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8. (S/NF) Governor Kashmoula has also been roughly
handled by ministers in Baghdad. On 8 March, he and
PDOP MG Wathiq hoped to discuss with MOI Bulani the
directive to hire Shi'a police in Tal'Afar and the
need for armored vehicles and heavy weapons needs
for Mosul's police. Bulani refused to meet either,
even as they waited outside his office while he
remained at his desk without competing appointments.


9. (S/NF) Kashmoula met Minister of Defense Jasim
and National Security Advisor al-Rubaie with
Provincial Council Chair Issa 28 Mar, after the
Ninewa Development Forum closed. Kashmoula had
three agenda items: holding all Second and Third
Iraqi Army Division units in Ninewa; retaining BG
Mutaa as Commander of the Second Iraqi Army Division
(he is currently Acting); and blocking efforts to
enroll Sunni Arab tribes as independent anti-AQIZ
forces, including providing tribal sheiks with arms
and funds. All three were rudely dismissed. Jasim
barked that the Second IA Division brigade now in
Baghdad was formerly in Erbil, so its deployment
does not affect Mosul. He insisted that BG Mutaa
has never commanded a brigade, and is thus
unqualified as a Division commander. Mutaa's only
virtue is that he speaks English. Accordingly, the
decision has been made to name another division
commander, and that decision is final. NSA al-
Rubaie said that the decision to arm Ninewa's Arab
tribes along the 'Anbar model' has been made and is
also final -- and cut Kashmoula off abruptly when he
tried to object. Kashmoula visibly cringed when al-
Rubaie silenced him.


10. (S/NF) At Speicher VPM al-Zawba'i was warm
toward other MND-N governors, but quite critical of
Kashmoula at the morning session especially
regarding the situation in Tal'Afar. At the closing
session al-Zawba'i was hypocritically sympathetic,
asking the other governors to help Kashmoula (this
statement followed al-Zawba'i's altercation with
Kashmoula at the reconciliation luncheon).

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. . . poor health and deteriorating behavior . . .
-------------- --------------


11. (S/NF) Kashmoula suffers from diabetes which is
monitored by the Combat Support Hospital on FOB
Marez East -- the CSH also provides medication for
Kashmoula's condition. However, he is careless in
his diet. At the Speicher Governors' Conference he
ate several ice cream cones, but no other food. He
may be equally careless with his medication. We
have frequently attributed his now-characteristic
wild mood swings to these habits. He uses an
inhaler frequently, and is a heavy smoker.


12. (S/NF) Kashmoula has become progressively more
prone to inappropriate outbursts. His current
pattern took shape in February when he walked out on
a Provincial Council meeting screaming insults to an
Iraqi Islamic Party member who had questioned a
Kurdish Alliance effort to rig the composition of
key Council committees. He reportedly had several
equally strident encounters with Provincial Council
Chair Issa and other Council members while he
contemplated resignation, most revolving around his
encouragement of heavy-handed CPI investigations of
Council capital-improvement project processing. His
verbal altercation with VPM al-Zawba'i at Speicher
appears to have been of the same nature.


13. (S/NF) Kashmoula has also shown extraordinarily
childish behavior in highly formal environments.
His sleeping at his table at Speicher is one
example. He has occasionally been extraordinarily
disheveled at key meetings, despite the high
standard of dress normal for officials of his
stature in Ninewa. At one meeting with the Team
Leader he was barefoot and unshaven, in a stained
suit.


14. (S/NF) More generally, Kashmoula displays

BAGHDAD 00001711 004 OF 004


progressively more consistent forgetfulness,
paranoia, and obsessiveness. He often forgets the
content of briefs and meetings, and readily forgets
appointments -- even those he has stridently
demanded. He focuses on matters of small
significance to the exclusion of major issues -- at
the Governors' conference at Speicher his major
topic was a minor hiring issue with contractors
engaged by a USAID implementing partner for Ninewa
Woods cleanup. He has repeatedly threatened to
withdraw support for the highly successful Mosul
Major Crimes Court because of delays in
reimbursement for food costs incurred by MCC trial
judge panels. His behavior is uncomfortably
reminiscent of early-onset Alzheimer's disease.

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. . . and no way out
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15. (S/NF) Kashmoula is fully hostage to the KRG.
His family resides in a KRG-provided house in Erbil.
His family home in Mosul has been destroyed -- he
has no refuge other than that provided by the KRG.
A large number of immediate family members have been
casualties of the insurgency, including a son -- he
cannot risk loss of KRG protection.


16. (S/NF) Kashmoula has expressed interest in
fleeing to the U.S. under the Special Benefit Parole
program, and has provided the initial documentation
necessary for processing. However, he will
apparently remain in office until new Provincial
elections following the completion of the Article
140 process and his family is in relative safety in
Erbil. We have offered to pursue this parole when
it is clear that he will in fact leave office; he
appears unable to remember this expectation despite
concurring many times. (Note: One of Kashmoula's
sons is currently attending Drexel University in the
U.S.; we presume he and other family members would
wish to join his son there. End note.)


17. (S/NF) After the events at the Governors'
Conference 16 May, MNC-I proposed facilitation of a
medical visit by Governor Kashmoula to CF facilities
in Baghdad. This offer was extended to Kashmoula by
the PRT 21 May. Kashmoula -- again disheveled and
preoccupied -- declined.

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Comment
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18. (S/NF) Despite these increasing difficulties,
our PRT and partner maneuver commanders continue to
sustain good relations with Governor Kashmoula.
However, his deteriorating behavior is generating
new problems as he alienates his immediate staff and
the Provincial Council.


19. (S/NF) Comment continued: The snowballing
negative impact of the Article 140 process in Ninewa
may be claiming a tragic victim with Governor
Kashmoula. He is ready to leave and his recent
behavior indicates he should -- but he is too
critical to Kurdish control of Ninewa's government
while the process goes forward for his resignation
to be considered by the Kurdish Alliance. End
comment.
CROCKER