Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1700
2007-05-23 09:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

KURDISH LEADERS DISCUSS POLITICAL PROGRESS,

Tags:  PGOV PREL IR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO3732
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1700/01 1430958
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230958Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1320
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001700 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: KURDISH LEADERS DISCUSS POLITICAL PROGRESS,
SETTING STAGE FOR OIL NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001700

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: KURDISH LEADERS DISCUSS POLITICAL PROGRESS,
SETTING STAGE FOR OIL NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a May 21 meeting with the Ambassador, DCM
and Econ Counselor, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, KRG
PM Nechirvan Barzani, and former DPM Rowsch Shaways discussed
the mood in Washington and the need for political progress in
Iraq. The meeting was also attended by several KRG
ministers. Saleh said Maliki agreed to form a kitchen
cabinet and the Ambassador discussed the importance of
President Talabani's initiatives on the "Council of Four" and
the Political Council for National Security (PCNS).
Separately, the DCM heard that the meetings between the KRG
delegation and the Prime Minister have set the stage for the
real hydrocarbon negotiations to begin. Participants also
discussed Maliki's relations with Iran and the Arab states,
the PKK, and Baghdad security. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador and Barham Saleh agreed that the
American people needed to see meaningful progress toward
political reconciliation. This is why progress on
hydrocarbon legislation is so important. The Ambassador told
Nechirvan that unless the US saw progress before September
our current policy would be unsustainable. The Kurds should
be under no illusion: there is no Plan B. We will not be
maintaining a military presence only to protect the north.
He emphasized that the US would not simply shift its forces
or their posture in Iraq; they would leave. Nechirvan
responded nonchalantly, perhaps not believing what he was
hearing. Saleh emphasized to him that this was the reality
he had seen while in Washington the past two weeks. He tried
to make this clear to Nechirvan as he had made it clear to
Prime Minister Maliki earlier.


3. (C) Saleh said he recounted his trip to Washington to PM
Maliki, explaining how serious the mood was in Congress. He
thought the PM recognized the need for significant progress
to change US attitudes. Saleh pressed him on power sharing
as well, securing Maliki's agreement to form a kitchen
cabinet. Originally he intended to include 10 people but
Saleh talked him down to 5-6. Saleh did not discuss who

would be in the kitchen cabinet, but he did discuss
ministerial changes. He told the PM he should choose a
diverse group of technocrats - a Christian, a Turkoman, etc.
The PM replied that this was a political impossibility, but
admitted that Sami al-Askari would be withdrawn as the
candidate for transportation minister.

--------------
PCNS and Power Sharing
--------------


4. (C) Shaways told the Ambassador the next Political Council
for National Security (PCNS) meeting would be on May 24. He
said they had decided to keep the PCNS and advisory body for
now. He later stated frankly that as a purely advisory body
the PCNS did "nothing." The Ambassador emphasized to all
attending that the Embassy supported President Talabani's
initiatives to strengthen the PCNS and establish the "Council
of Four," including the Presidency and the Prime Minister.
He said power sharing and hydrocarbons legislation are key
components of national reconciliation. In Shaways' view, all
of the political players are trying to strengthen their own
position. The Ambassador said this is exactly what they need
to work on fixing.

--------------
Meetings Set Stage for Oil Negotiations
--------------


5. (C) The DCM, in a separate meeting with Maliki's chief of
staff, Dr. Tarik Abdullah, was told that the initial meetings
between Nechirvan and the PM were purely protocol - they
would set the stage for real negotiations to begin later.
The PM and Nechirvan also agreed that, instead of KRG Oil
Minister Ashti Hawrami and GOI Oil Minister Hussayn
al-Sharistani going at it, Vice President Abdel Mehdi,
Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and Nechirvan would meet in a
small group to negotiate the principles before the technical
and legal teams came in to work out the details. Dr. Tarik
also told the DCM that he was pleased Nechirvan had committed
to staying in Baghdad until they finished the law, though he
said their next meeting was not yet set.


6. (C) EconCouns heard from Hawrami and others that the
mechanisms contained in the USG proposed draft revenue
management law were something they could live with, and that
using the USG draft would be a good starting point for
negotiations.

--------------
Maliki's Relations with the Neighbors

BAGHDAD 00001700 002 OF 002


--------------


7. (C) Nechirvan noted that Maliki was clearly upset with the
Iranians over their continued funneling of money to
terrorists and continued support for violence and attacks.
Still, he is focused on the hostility he faces from the Arab
states such as Saudi Arabia. Saleh advised the PM to reach
out to Arab states in spite of his frustration, and to focus
on the Iraqi internal situation. Nechirvan discussed the
need to support the PM and noted that the real reason the
Arabs hate Maliki is because he is a true Shia believer.

--------------
Nechirvan Dismisses PKK Issue
--------------


8. (C) Nechirvan told the Ambassador he thought the PKK would
hold their ceasefire. He thought Turkey would conduct
limited cross-border operations but was dismissive of the
suggestion of a wider conflict.

--------------
Baghdad Security: Some Progress
--------------


9. (C) Asked about the Baghdad Security Plan, Shaways said
that he had seen some progress, but many people were afraid
that as soon as the forces pull back the trouble will begin
again, the terrorists will return. He said the Shia are
afraid the Sunnis will use this as an opportunity to move in
and regain some of their power. Shaways said it is no longer
party against party; it has turned into Sunni against Shia.
He said the decrease in sectarian violence in Baghdad has
also led to an increase in insurgent activity in other
provinces, in particular Mosul and Kirkuk. But he said
generally in Baghdad it is better.
CROCKER