MALIKI SAYS NEIGHBORS AND JAM ARE SERIOUS THREATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MCAP PTER MARR PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI SAYS NEIGHBORS AND JAM ARE SERIOUS THREATS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told
General Petraeus and the Ambassador May 17 that he was
frustrated with his neighbors' continued treachery against
him and Iraq. Maliki also expressed distress over Jaysh
al-Mahdi and said he intended to act more aggressively
against them in Sadr City and in southern provinces. Maliki
lamented that increasing security of places like Karbala may
not be possible given the insufficient level of forces and
equipment, a causality rejected by Petraeus. Maliki also
questioned his military's ability to take on Al Qaeda since
so many MOD officials were Baath'ists working with this
enemy. Maliki agreed to review Petraeus' proposal to
incorporate locally recruited men from Abu Ghuraib into the
Iraqi security forces and to work with MNF-I and Ministry of
Justice to address the surging detention population. END
SUMMARY.

The Neighbors: They Are Against Me, Not With Me
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2. (C/REL MNF-I) Prime Minister Maliki told General Petraeus
and the Ambassador that Iraq's neighbors were conspiring to
unseat him and destroy his country. While these nations'
leaders publicly state their goodwill toward Iraq, Maliki
said, they denounce him as a sectarian leader and finance his
country's enemies in an attempt to foment civil war. He added
that his neighbors were also trying to undermine his
government by supporting Iraqi political figures such as
Salih al-Mutlak and Ayad Alawi. General Petraeus said the
USG understood his concern and was enjoining diplomatically
the neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates,
to address them. He cited Vice President Cheney's recent
visit to the region as an example of our efforts. Petraeus
stressed to Maliki that Iran was a particularly nefarious
actor, using its intelligence agencies to support both Sunni
and Shia militia activities in Iraq.

Taking on JAM in a new bold way
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3. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki started the meeting by stating that
he had "blown all bridges with those who will not go along
with Fardh al Qanoon" and told the Shia that they must now
stand for Iraq. Upset about recent JAM shelling of the IZ
and actions in An Nasiriyah, Maliki said he was ready to take
more aggressive action against Jaysh al-Mahdi in both Sadr
City and the southern provinces. In a recent conversation
with Minister of Interior Bulani, Maliki said Bulani proposed
surrounding Sadr City with additional Iraqi police, emergency
reaction units, and Special Forces. This force would be used
to launch a large attack; arresting and killing JAM members,
confiscating unauthorized weapons, and seizing the "hundreds
of government vehicles" that JAM uses to carry out their
terrorism. Petraeus cautioned against such an approach
saying it was unrealistic given the limited number of troops
in Baghdad. He said it would take an enormous force, heavy
fighting, and many weeks to clear out Sadr city, noting it
took 19 days to go through Mansoor, a neighborhood much
smaller than Sadr City. Petraeus recommended, instead,
focusing on targeting the secret cell leaders and, at some
point, a few of the worst Sadr City neighborhoods while
continuing joint action in the currently targeted areas
surrounding Sadr City.

Southern instability keeps me awake at night
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4. (C/REL MNF-I) In terms of the southern provinces, Maliki
said he wanted to increase operations against JAM and other
enemy forces in Dhi Qar, Basra, and Karbala. He said the
security situation in these provinces was intolerable. He so
feared an attack against the Karbala holy shrine that he was
not sleeping at night. Petraeus recommended Maliki contact
the provincial political and security authorities and order
them unequivocally to improve protection in the region.
Maliki said he had discussed his concerns with the Ministers
of Defense and Interior, local politicians, police chiefs and
area army commanders but they said the lack of weaponry and
trained forces hindered their abilities to take on the enemy.

Again, it's really about the lack of forces and weaponry
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5. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki said in order to increase security
operations against JAM and other enemies he needed more Iraqi
security forces and weaponry, especially AK-47s. Petraeus
rejected this assessment, countering that what the ISF really

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needed were better leaders and more courage. Petraeus
questioned the need for rifles, pointing out that in the past
three years, MNF-I had distributed over 350,000 AK-47s to the
ISF. Petraeus said that this contribution was in addition to
the thousands of AK-47s that the Iraqis had purchased with
their own funds, adding that some of these were probably
still in Iraqi warehouses. (Comment: Petraeus checked on the
availability of weapons in Iraqi warehouses and found tens of
thousands of AK-47s and 40 million rounds of AK-47 ammo that
Maliki could use if he chooses to, and he conveyed that to
Maliki.) Petraeus told Maliki that if he still felt Iraqi
security forces need additional weapons he should direct his
security ministers to use their own budgets to make additiona
l purchases.

That Baath'ist Ministry of Defense
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6. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki complained that another major
hindrance to success was the high level of sectarianism
within the security forces, particularly in the Ministry of
Defense. According to Maliki, the MOD is riddled with
Baath'ists who cooperate with Al Qaeda. General Petraeus
cautioned that loyalty problems were not limited to Sunnis,
and Shi'a-led sectarianism appeared to be more of a problem
within the Shia-dominated Ministry of Interior.

But how about that Shia-militia Ministry of Interior?
-------------- --------------


7. (C/REL MNF-I) Petraeus cited MOI's Major General Mehdi
Sabih Hashim al-Gharaqqi and Adnan al-Assadi as sectarian
actors involved in militia activities and attacks on Sunnis.
Petraeus said that despite the evidence he has provided to
Maliki and other Iraqi leaders, these men remain in power.
Maliki responded that he planned to get rid of Mehdi "when
the time is right" and that his assistant Major General
Rashid Flayyah Mohammed al-Halifi was worse than Medhi. As
for Assadi participating in wrongdoing, Maliki said "it's
impossible." Petraeus complained that bad guys such as this
were kept in power while effective leaders such as Major
General Bashar Mahmoud al-Youb, a Sunni and the former ninth
division commander, were dismissed by the Prime Minister on
unfounded charges of coup plotting.

Iraqi Army and local force: Can't they just get along
-------------- --------------


8. (C/REL MNF-I) Petraeus requested Maliki to tell the Iraqi
Army Commander in Abu Gharaib, Brigadier General Nasir Ahmad
Ghanim Daoud al Hayti to stop "picking fights" with the
Coalition's locally recruited security force operating in the
area. Petraeus said this local force, known as an Emergency
Response Unit was comprised of men willing to fight Al Qaeda
and should be supported by the Iraqi army, not criticized,
sidelined, or arrested. Maliki praised BG Nasir's overall
performance and questioned the legitimacy of the ERU. He
said that neither he nor BG Nasir could support what appeared
to be militia. Petraeus said the engagement of tribes was
critical to the fight and offered to brief Maliki on the
Coalition's plan to integrate the ERU into the formal
security force structure. (NOTE: Maliki and Defense Minister
Abd al-Qadir have frequently registered their opposition to
the Coalition-created ERUs that were established in the west.
Both argue these ERUs are nothing more than Sunni militias.
END NOTE.)


Detainee population crisis: more beds, more guards needed
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9. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki agreed with Petraeus' assessment that
the surge in ISF detainee population needed immediate
attention. Petraeus pointed out his grave concern with
detainee conditions and the lack of trained Iraqi Corrections
Service guards. Maliki said he was scheduled to meet with
Iraqi Chief Judge Medhat al Mahmood and Ministry of Justice
personnel in the coming days to develop a plan to speed up
the investigations and trials, if necessary, of detainees in
Baghdad. Petraeus recommended Maliki also direct the
Ministry of Justice to spend its budget on the employment and
training of more prison guards, noting that the Rule of Law
Green Zone and the al Baladiyah prisons could not fill their
cells without trained guards. Petraeus said that $10 billion
was not spent last year by the Government of Iraq and so they
should be able to find the funds to pay for 5000 corrections
officers.
CROCKER