Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1650
2007-05-21 00:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQ'S PARLIAMENT SPEAKER SITES COOPERATION DEFICIT

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0768
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1650/01 1410041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210041Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1256
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001650 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S PARLIAMENT SPEAKER SITES COOPERATION DEFICIT

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001650

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S PARLIAMENT SPEAKER SITES COOPERATION DEFICIT

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker
Mahmoud Mashhadani relayed the full slate of Sunni Tawafuq
bloc complaints to the Ambassador May 19, noting the
challenges facing the CoR as pressure builds for it to take
on hydrocarbons and de-Ba'athification reform laws, which he
stressed he could do nothing about until they were actually
in the CoR -- nor was he sanguine about GoI implementation of
laws in general. A weak cabinet in dire need of expert
"technocrats" in key ministries, compounded by poor
coordination between elements of the GoI, further hampers the
governance process. The CoR is a pivotal player in solving
these issues, emphasized the Ambassador, and should show
leadership as it takes on key legislative initiatives.
Mashhadani expressed concern about the Sadrist's ability to
garner 144 signatures on an anti-MNF petition and skepticism
about whether the constitutional review process will tackle
serious issues. End Summary.

Tawafuq woes and political squabbles
--------------


2. (C) Speaker Mashhadani told the Ambassador that Tawafuq
was running out of patience with the political process, to
which the Ambassador called for strategic patience in light
of the clear, albeit limited, progress that Iraq has made in
the last four years. In a pessimistic and reflective mood,
Mashhadani said times were tough for a political bloc that
saw little benefit from participation in the current
government; the Speaker himself is stuck between Tawafuq
wanting him to represent its interests and his role as
Speaker "representing all Iraqis." He cited well-worn
Tawafuq complaints about raids on houses of political
figures, long-term detainees, few ministerial portfolios, a
million displaced Sunnis, the lack of an authoritative role
for VP al-Hashemi, and Iran's increasing influence.


3. (C) Citing discord between various political blocs within
the CoR, Mashhadani said each reported problems to him but
none offered a way forward -- although they paid lip service
to the democratic process. Rumors of withdrawal by various
parties continued to hinder constructive dialogue. Many

blocs are also "divided against themselves," he lamented.
Discussing high-stakes laws like the hydrocarbons package
will add pressure to a CoR already burdened by internal
squabbles, against the backdrop of a larger GoI with limited
influence.

Need a strong GoI with closer coordination
--------------


4. (C) A strong cabinet of experts is needed, the Speaker
emphasized repeatedly, rather than ministers tied to
political interests. He had pressed the PM to take advantage
of the opening created by a Sadrist withdrawal from the
cabinet. Nonetheless, the PM "chooses ministers from Najaf
and Karbala" rather than seeking out experts; no nominees
hail from the large province of Diyala, for example, which
certainly has qualified technocrats. The answer is not to
replace the PM, he asserted, but to work with him to install
an appropriately experienced cabinet.


5. (C) The CoR is powerless without a strong executive
branch, Mashhadani stated, and cannot produce laws
effectively without confidence in their implementation; "I as
an individual cannot do much." Further lamenting the poor
coordination between the CoR and other elements of the GoI,
he said relations relied on paperwork back and forth and that
President Talabani had never called him directly during the
CoR's first full year of operation. The GoI response to the
April 12 suicide bombing at the CoR had been very weak, he
said, and now the GoI is slow to even present the
all-important hydrocarbonslaw to the CoR. After passage of
that (or any other) law, it is the GoI which must ensure
implementation "tomorrow and ten years down the road," so
success is not a function of the CoR passing a piece of paper
forward. Success is in the implementation.


6. (C) "What can we do" about the hydroicarbons law when it
has not been submitted to the CoR, said the Speaker. Others
should not blame the CoR for slow progress when the ball is
in another court. Additionally, the GoI should discuss the
CoR schedule (and summer recess) with CoR leaders directly,
not through the media, he opined. As further evidence of
faulty GoI coordination, he said the CoR had been given the
"wrong text" of a Ministry of National Security Affairs law,
which was read in the April 25 session (but has been put on
hold).


7. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the importance of the CoR as
a legislative institution and the Speaker as its leader,
pressing Mashhadani to focus on his responsibility to ensure

BAGHDAD 00001650 002 OF 002


GoI progress on key reconciliation initiatives. The
hydrocarbons law was undergoing serious negotiations and
would be with the parliament soon, at which point it needed
timely attention. A draft law on de-Ba'athification reform
was also anticipated soon. The Ambassador emphasized the
legislature's pivotal role in producing a legal framework for
reconciliation. The withdrawal of any political bloc at this
sensitive time would be a disaster, he stressed.

Unhelpful political maneuvers
--------------


8. (C) Mashhadani cited the 144 CoR members who signed a
petition calling for a time-table for MNF withdrawal at a
time when others (including him) agree with the ongoing
surge. Internal political struggles stifle productive
debate. The Sadrists seek to create a security vacuum into
which the Jeish al-Mahdi (JAM) can intervene, and Mashhadani
was agitated that this 30-member grouping could rally the
signatures of 144 members from a cross-section of the CoR,
thus "hijacking" the institution. People talk as if the
issues they discuss are a distant concern ("are we on the
moon?") when in fact the issues impinge on urgent security
needs. The "parliamentary culture" requires that the voice
of CoR members be heard, said Mashhadani, regardless of
merit. He added that 120 members were calling for his
removal and that and majority of the CoR could even topple a
government.

A complex agenda in less than ideal circumstances
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Compounding the problems already articulated, the
Speaker said parliamentarians feared for their safety.
Discussions were difficult in any scenario, but focused
consideration of de-Ba'athification reform will be further
hampered by JAM obstructionism. On constitutional reform,
Mashhadani said agreement was being reached on the easier
elements, but that issues of the nation's identity,
federalism, handling of Kirkuk, and authorities of the PM
("is he an Emperor?"),would be difficult. He was not
optimistic about finding timely solutions and said Tawafuq
was monitoring progress of the debate without participating
productively. Mashhadani agreed that a Tawafuq withdrawal
would be a disaster, but added that the status quo may be
worse.
CROCKER