Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1649
2007-05-20 17:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
how-toVZCZCXRO0722 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #1649/01 1401707 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 201707Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1253 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0582
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001649
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PREL UN IZ
SUBJECT: CLARIFYING THE UN ROLE IN IRAQ
REF: BAGHDAD 1554
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001649
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PREL UN IZ
SUBJECT: CLARIFYING THE UN ROLE IN IRAQ
REF: BAGHDAD 1554
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Acting Special Representative to the
Secretary General (SRSG) Michael Schulenburg told the
SIPDIS
Ambassador May 18 that UNAMI urgently needs a new UN
resolution to update and expand its mandate. Schulenburg
described what he termed a lack of political will at the UN
as the most significant obstacle to a new resolution. As
part of its new mandate, he proposed that UNAMI mediate the
dispute over the status of Kirkuk and the boundaries of the
Kurdish region. A new resolution must also stipulate
provision to UNAMI of much-needed resources, including air
assets and secure office and housing structures. Schulenburg
also argued vehemently against referenda on Kirkuk and the
constitution, and against early provincial elections. END
SUMMARY.
--------------
CLARIFYING THE UN ROLE IN IRAQ
--------------
2. (C) Schulenburg told the Ambassador May 18 that the United
Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) urgently requires
a new United Nations (UN) resolution to update and clarify
its mandate. Resolution 1546, Schulenburg explained,
delineates a temporary role for UNAMI during Iraq's
transition to sovereignty, which has come to an end. He
argued that a new resolution could elucidate UNAMI's role and
establish its independence from coalition forces.
3. (C) Schulenburg proposed that a new resolution address
three key questions:
-- What is the proper role for the UN in Iraq?
-- How can the UN improve its credibility in Iraq?
-- What infrastructure does the UN require to accomplish its
mission in Iraq?
He then proceeded to answer these questions. The UN can
serve as a mediator for seemingly intractable disputes, such
as the status of Kirkuk. It can offer technical expertise
for difficult procedures, such as voter registration. It can
support the reconstruction and reconciliation activities of
coalition partners, such as UN provincial reconstruction
teams (PRTs) to complement coalition PRTs.
4. (C) Successful accomplishment of these roles would improve
UN credibility in Iraq, Schulenburg said, but he stressed
that UNAMI cannot succeed without improved infrastructure. A
new resolution must stipulate provision to UNAMI of
much-needed resources, including air assets and secure office
and housing structures. The UN currently pays one million
dollars per month to rent a Danish C-130, which has proved
inadequate for UNAMI's needs. Currently, Schulenburg said,
UNAMI staff members require approximately 10 - 12 days to
enter or leave Iraq, since they often rely on transportation
from coalition forces. More importantly, Schulenburg
explained, UNAMI staff members lack the capacity to travel
around Iraq to carry out their work.
5. (C) The Ambassador concurred that "we need a UNAMI here
that is more robust, better resourced, better staffed, and
more expansive." He expressed support for a new UN
resolution. "If a new resolution would help solidify
thinking about UNAMI in New York," he said, "then it's
another reason to support it."
--------------
OBSTACLES TO A NEW UN RESOLUTION
--------------
6. (C) Schulenburg described what he termed a lack of
political will as the most significant obstacle to a new
resolution. He averred that some UN officials and
delegations continue to view the crisis in Iraq "as an
opportunity to create a failure" for the USG. This attitude,
he said, has caused the steady deterioration of UNAMI
resources and staffing. He said that some officials have
used security concerns as an excuse to weaken UNAMI. "Our
reaction to security is sometimes a cover for political
motives." Nonetheless, the UN has failed to meet UNAMI's
basic security needs. Schulenburg requested funding to
provide UNAMI safer buildings. Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno and Under-Secretary-General
for Management Alicia Barcena Ibarra told him that they would
send his request to the General Assembly for decision.
Schulenburg expressed contempt for this answer, which he said
will significantly delay decision. He worried that the UN
will keep UNAMI in place without supporting
it.
BAGHDAD 00001649 002 OF 003
7. (C) Schulenburg proposed that the UN, UK and US missions
in Iraq hold regular "tripartite" meetings. He suggested
that this group could produce first draft of a new resolution.
-------------- -
KIRKUK: UN MEDIATION SHOULD PRECEDE REFERENDUM
-------------- -
8. (C) Schulenburg said that the Government of Iraq (GOI)
must answer four central questions before it can administer a
fair and credible referendum on the status of Kirkuk:
-- What specifically will the referendum ask people?
-- How will the referendum define "disputed territories?"
-- Who will vote? (Only residents of "disputed territory?"
Or all citizens of Iraq?)
-- What size majority will decide the outcome? (Will it be
51 percent? A two-thirds majority?)
It remains unclear, Schulenburg said, who will answer these
questions. He described the planned referendum as a "hostile
referendum" because it comes at the beginning rather than the
end of a political process. "It is winner takes all," he
said. "A referendum would be far more effective if it come
after a negotiation process, to affirm the results."
9. (C) Nonetheless, Kurdish leaders fear that if they
postpone the election then it will never take place. "We
need to help them let go of the referendum by offering them a
Plan B," Schulenburg said. His "Plan B" involves UN
mediation. He argued that by negotiating the status of
Kirkuk and granting concessions rather than seeking total
control, the Kurds will attain less power in Kirkuk than they
currently seek, but they will retain linguistic and cultural
influence in the city. A UN-brokered agreement could help
ensure that Turks, Iranians, and Arabs will not contest the
Kurdish presence in the city. The agreement will also derive
international sanction from the UN role as mediator. This
same process could help establish the final administrative
boundaries of the Kurdish region.
10. (C) Schulenburg asked to know the US position on the UN
role as mediator for Kirkuk. The Ambassador said the US has
not yet taken a firm position on how to proceed with Kirkuk.
The Ambassador acknowledged the challenges inherent in
holding a referendum by the end of the year, but also cited
the difficulties faced by Kurdish leaders who equate delay
with denial of their right to a referendum.
11. (C) The Iranians, Schulenburg claimed, have said they
would welcome a constructive UN role in resolving the Kirkuk
impasse. The Turks, however, appear divided on the issue.
Turkish diplomats in New York said they supported the idea of
UN mediation, according to Schulenburg. The Turkish
Ambassador to Iraq, however, expressed hostility to a UN
role; the Ambassador did not give reason for his opposition,
Schulenburg said. Turkey's Special Representative to Iraq
Oguz Celikkol also expressed opposition to a UN role, warning
Schulenburg that "the UN should not burn its fingers by
getting involved in Kurdish issues." (NOTE: Schulenburg
reported that Celikkol will be visit Iraq May 25. END NOTE.)
-------------- --------------
CONSTITUTION: REFERENDUM COULD UNDERMINE RECONCILIATION
-------------- --------------
12) (C) Reconciliation, Schulenburg said, depends on creation
of a sound constitution. He expressed concern, however, that
a referendum on the constitution could prove divisive if one
group rejects it. He cautioned against an early referendum
while urging progress with the constitutional process, and
offered UNAMI assistance with technical-level discussions.
--------------
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: DELAY THE VOTE
--------------
13. (C) Schulenburg also warned against early provincial
elections. He worried that provincial elections, if not
properly organized, could "fly in your face" and open "a
Pandora's box" of violence and fragmentation. National
elections, he said, generally prove easier to organize than
do provincial or local elections. "The smaller the units in
an election the tougher it is to carry out," he explained.
The GOI has not maintained the public distribution system
(PDS) in the face of massive population displacement;
Schulenburg estimated that 20% of the population has fled
their homes. He asserted that the technical problem of
registering voters could undermine the credibility of early
provincial elections. Provincial elections in Baghdad, he
said, will be "extremely difficult" to organize.
BAGHDAD 00001649 003 OF 003
CROCKER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PREL UN IZ
SUBJECT: CLARIFYING THE UN ROLE IN IRAQ
REF: BAGHDAD 1554
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Acting Special Representative to the
Secretary General (SRSG) Michael Schulenburg told the
SIPDIS
Ambassador May 18 that UNAMI urgently needs a new UN
resolution to update and expand its mandate. Schulenburg
described what he termed a lack of political will at the UN
as the most significant obstacle to a new resolution. As
part of its new mandate, he proposed that UNAMI mediate the
dispute over the status of Kirkuk and the boundaries of the
Kurdish region. A new resolution must also stipulate
provision to UNAMI of much-needed resources, including air
assets and secure office and housing structures. Schulenburg
also argued vehemently against referenda on Kirkuk and the
constitution, and against early provincial elections. END
SUMMARY.
--------------
CLARIFYING THE UN ROLE IN IRAQ
--------------
2. (C) Schulenburg told the Ambassador May 18 that the United
Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) urgently requires
a new United Nations (UN) resolution to update and clarify
its mandate. Resolution 1546, Schulenburg explained,
delineates a temporary role for UNAMI during Iraq's
transition to sovereignty, which has come to an end. He
argued that a new resolution could elucidate UNAMI's role and
establish its independence from coalition forces.
3. (C) Schulenburg proposed that a new resolution address
three key questions:
-- What is the proper role for the UN in Iraq?
-- How can the UN improve its credibility in Iraq?
-- What infrastructure does the UN require to accomplish its
mission in Iraq?
He then proceeded to answer these questions. The UN can
serve as a mediator for seemingly intractable disputes, such
as the status of Kirkuk. It can offer technical expertise
for difficult procedures, such as voter registration. It can
support the reconstruction and reconciliation activities of
coalition partners, such as UN provincial reconstruction
teams (PRTs) to complement coalition PRTs.
4. (C) Successful accomplishment of these roles would improve
UN credibility in Iraq, Schulenburg said, but he stressed
that UNAMI cannot succeed without improved infrastructure. A
new resolution must stipulate provision to UNAMI of
much-needed resources, including air assets and secure office
and housing structures. The UN currently pays one million
dollars per month to rent a Danish C-130, which has proved
inadequate for UNAMI's needs. Currently, Schulenburg said,
UNAMI staff members require approximately 10 - 12 days to
enter or leave Iraq, since they often rely on transportation
from coalition forces. More importantly, Schulenburg
explained, UNAMI staff members lack the capacity to travel
around Iraq to carry out their work.
5. (C) The Ambassador concurred that "we need a UNAMI here
that is more robust, better resourced, better staffed, and
more expansive." He expressed support for a new UN
resolution. "If a new resolution would help solidify
thinking about UNAMI in New York," he said, "then it's
another reason to support it."
--------------
OBSTACLES TO A NEW UN RESOLUTION
--------------
6. (C) Schulenburg described what he termed a lack of
political will as the most significant obstacle to a new
resolution. He averred that some UN officials and
delegations continue to view the crisis in Iraq "as an
opportunity to create a failure" for the USG. This attitude,
he said, has caused the steady deterioration of UNAMI
resources and staffing. He said that some officials have
used security concerns as an excuse to weaken UNAMI. "Our
reaction to security is sometimes a cover for political
motives." Nonetheless, the UN has failed to meet UNAMI's
basic security needs. Schulenburg requested funding to
provide UNAMI safer buildings. Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno and Under-Secretary-General
for Management Alicia Barcena Ibarra told him that they would
send his request to the General Assembly for decision.
Schulenburg expressed contempt for this answer, which he said
will significantly delay decision. He worried that the UN
will keep UNAMI in place without supporting
it.
BAGHDAD 00001649 002 OF 003
7. (C) Schulenburg proposed that the UN, UK and US missions
in Iraq hold regular "tripartite" meetings. He suggested
that this group could produce first draft of a new resolution.
-------------- -
KIRKUK: UN MEDIATION SHOULD PRECEDE REFERENDUM
-------------- -
8. (C) Schulenburg said that the Government of Iraq (GOI)
must answer four central questions before it can administer a
fair and credible referendum on the status of Kirkuk:
-- What specifically will the referendum ask people?
-- How will the referendum define "disputed territories?"
-- Who will vote? (Only residents of "disputed territory?"
Or all citizens of Iraq?)
-- What size majority will decide the outcome? (Will it be
51 percent? A two-thirds majority?)
It remains unclear, Schulenburg said, who will answer these
questions. He described the planned referendum as a "hostile
referendum" because it comes at the beginning rather than the
end of a political process. "It is winner takes all," he
said. "A referendum would be far more effective if it come
after a negotiation process, to affirm the results."
9. (C) Nonetheless, Kurdish leaders fear that if they
postpone the election then it will never take place. "We
need to help them let go of the referendum by offering them a
Plan B," Schulenburg said. His "Plan B" involves UN
mediation. He argued that by negotiating the status of
Kirkuk and granting concessions rather than seeking total
control, the Kurds will attain less power in Kirkuk than they
currently seek, but they will retain linguistic and cultural
influence in the city. A UN-brokered agreement could help
ensure that Turks, Iranians, and Arabs will not contest the
Kurdish presence in the city. The agreement will also derive
international sanction from the UN role as mediator. This
same process could help establish the final administrative
boundaries of the Kurdish region.
10. (C) Schulenburg asked to know the US position on the UN
role as mediator for Kirkuk. The Ambassador said the US has
not yet taken a firm position on how to proceed with Kirkuk.
The Ambassador acknowledged the challenges inherent in
holding a referendum by the end of the year, but also cited
the difficulties faced by Kurdish leaders who equate delay
with denial of their right to a referendum.
11. (C) The Iranians, Schulenburg claimed, have said they
would welcome a constructive UN role in resolving the Kirkuk
impasse. The Turks, however, appear divided on the issue.
Turkish diplomats in New York said they supported the idea of
UN mediation, according to Schulenburg. The Turkish
Ambassador to Iraq, however, expressed hostility to a UN
role; the Ambassador did not give reason for his opposition,
Schulenburg said. Turkey's Special Representative to Iraq
Oguz Celikkol also expressed opposition to a UN role, warning
Schulenburg that "the UN should not burn its fingers by
getting involved in Kurdish issues." (NOTE: Schulenburg
reported that Celikkol will be visit Iraq May 25. END NOTE.)
-------------- --------------
CONSTITUTION: REFERENDUM COULD UNDERMINE RECONCILIATION
-------------- --------------
12) (C) Reconciliation, Schulenburg said, depends on creation
of a sound constitution. He expressed concern, however, that
a referendum on the constitution could prove divisive if one
group rejects it. He cautioned against an early referendum
while urging progress with the constitutional process, and
offered UNAMI assistance with technical-level discussions.
--------------
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: DELAY THE VOTE
--------------
13. (C) Schulenburg also warned against early provincial
elections. He worried that provincial elections, if not
properly organized, could "fly in your face" and open "a
Pandora's box" of violence and fragmentation. National
elections, he said, generally prove easier to organize than
do provincial or local elections. "The smaller the units in
an election the tougher it is to carry out," he explained.
The GOI has not maintained the public distribution system
(PDS) in the face of massive population displacement;
Schulenburg estimated that 20% of the population has fled
their homes. He asserted that the technical problem of
registering voters could undermine the credibility of early
provincial elections. Provincial elections in Baghdad, he
said, will be "extremely difficult" to organize.
BAGHDAD 00001649 003 OF 003
CROCKER