Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1632
2007-05-20 08:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT TIKRIT: DEPUTY GOVERNOR CALLS FOR

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PINR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0620
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1632/01 1400845
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200845Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1232
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001632 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: DEPUTY GOVERNOR CALLS FOR
RECONCILIATION TIMELINE WITH ODIERNO, LAMB

REF: A. BAGHDAD 507


B. BAGHDAD 540

Classified By: PRT Team Lead Steven R. Buckler for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001632

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: DEPUTY GOVERNOR CALLS FOR
RECONCILIATION TIMELINE WITH ODIERNO, LAMB

REF: A. BAGHDAD 507


B. BAGHDAD 540

Classified By: PRT Team Lead Steven R. Buckler for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din (SaD) cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. Salah ad Din (SaD) Deputy Governor Abdullah

H. M. Ajabarah al Jabouri called for the GOI to commit to a
"reconciliation timeline" in a May 16 meeting with MNC-I CG
LTG Odierno and MNF-I Deputy CG LTG Lamb. Saying "the GOI
knows what it needs to do but is not mature enough to do it,"
Abdullah said Sunnis are looking for movement in four major
areas for reconciliation: amendment of the Constitution,
de-baathification reform, change in the elections process,
and ethnic balance on national bodies like the Central
Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI). Remarking that violence had
increased in the province since the beginning of the Baghdad
Security Plan (Operation Fardh al Qanoon),he said that
reform in those areas would quell "most Sunni violence."
Referring to successes in reducing violence in other
predominately Sunni areas, LTG Odierno said initiatives like
tribes coalescing to fight al Qaeda (AQI) were important to
the reconciliation process. Such efforts, he suggested,
demonstrated to the GOI that the Sunnis are against violence
and for participation in the political process, making the
GOI more likely to act on reconciliation initiatives in the
political arena. Odierno agreed that through its numerous
trips to Baghdad, the SaD provincial government had made good
faith efforts to improve the province's relationship with the
GOI and that a visit to the province by PM al Maliki would
communicate the GOI's commitment to including Salah ad Din in
political process. END SUMMARY.

--------------
A Follow-On Meeting on Reconciliation
--------------


3. (C) In a side-bar meeting on May 16 during the MND-North
Governors Conference (septel),MNC-I CG LTG Odierno, MNF-I
Deputy CG LTG Lamb, and 3/82 Commander COL Owens met with
Salah ad Din (SaD) Deputy Governor Abdullah H. M. Ajbarah al
Jabouri to discuss the way forward on reconciliation and
curbing violence in the Sunni heartlands. The meeting was a

follow-on to February discussions between Odierno, the Deputy
Governor, and the Grand Mufti (reftels).

--------------
Where the SaD Sunnis Stand on Reconciliation
--------------


4. (C) Indicating that his opinion was the result of much
discussion with members of the "resistance," the Deputy
Governor began by reiterating that "the solution to Iraq's
problem is a political one, not a military one." He said,
"The GOI knows what it needs to do on reconciliation, but it
is not mature enough to do it." As evidence, he said that PM
al Maliki hardly mentioned reconciliation in his address at
the recent Sharm al Shaykh summit on Iraq. Admitting there
is no clear leader or goals among resistance groups, he said
the Sunni resistance, with Jaysh al Islami, Jaysh al
Mujahadin, and Ansar al Sunnah recently unified under the
umbrella organization "The Front for Jihad and
Reconciliation," was not opposed to dialogue with the USG and
the GOI. He, however, conceded that in order to bring
resistance groups into the political fold there would have to
be a commitment to change in the political process. He said
reconciliation must be implemented by the current GOI, and
not a future one, in four major areas: amendment of the
Constitution to allow equal political participation for all
groups, de-baathification reforms, change of the elections
system to allow direct election of candidates, and ethnic
balance in the major national bodies like the Central
Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI). He specifically noted that
the CCCI has no Sunni representation. He said that unless
the USG wants to see more time wasted that it must hold the
GOI to a reconciliation timeline, with clear benchmarks. If
the GOI does not meet that timeline, Ayad Allawi should lead
Iraq, as he is accepted by all Iraqis; he is Shia but
sectarian. Remarking that violence had increased in the
province since the beginning of the Baghdad Security Plan
(Operation Fardh al Qanoon),he said that reform in those
areas would quell "most Sunni violence."


5. (C) Noting the complexity of Iraq's problems, the Deputy
Governor asserted that many issues are being played out in
Iraq: tensions between Iran and the US, the problem between
the Kurds and Turkey, the question of democracy in the Arab
Gulf States, and issues between Syria and Israel. He said,
unfortunately, the Coalition Forces and Iraq were paying the
price. Highlighting Kurdish issues, he said the Article 140

BAGHDAD 00001632 002 OF 002


process has serious potential for violence. If the Kurds
take Kirkuk, he suggested, there will be a Kurd-Arab war.


6. (U) The Deputy Governor gave the following list of numbers
for individuals from the former Iraqi Army from Salah ad Din
who have been removed from their positions or disallowed from
their pensions. To his knowledge none of them have been
given offers to join the new Iraqi Army.

GEN: 1
LTG: 12
MG: 104
BG: 497
COL: 560
LTC: 775
MAJ: 716
CPT: 1,026
1LT: 543
LT: 1,297
NCO: 6,972
MoD Civilians: 372
Total: 12,875

--------------
Communicating Seriousness on Reconciliation
--------------


7. (C) LTG Odierno said that much of the GOI's hesitation on
reconciliation was a result of fear that the Baathists seek a
return to power, with many Shia seeing "a Baathist behind
every tree, or in Iraq, behind every berm." Odierno said
that the GOI has been surprised by recent Sunni tribal
efforts in al Anbar and Abu Graib to fight AQI. These
efforts, he said, are forcing the GOI toward reconciliation
by demonstrating that the majority of Sunnis are against
violence and AQI and for participation in the political
process. Odierno acknowledged that the situation in SaD was
more complicated because of the Article 140 and Kurdish
factor.


8. (C) Recognizing that many of the political reforms in the
reconciliation process would take time, the Deputy Governor
agreed small intermediate steps needed to take place and
noted that through its numerous trips to Baghdad, the SaD
provincial government had made good faith efforts to improve
the province's relationship with the GOI. Odierno agreed and
acknowledged that a visit to the province by PM al Maliki
would communicate the GOI's commitment to including Salah ad
Din in the political process.


9. (C) The Deputy Governor also suggested the CF/GOI should
buy back weaponry and explosives in order to make it more
difficult for terrorists to have access to the material
necessary to commit acts of terrorism. He said Saddam had
weapons buy-back centers opened in 1991 and cleaned up the
country in three months.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) SaD provincial officials have no faith in the al
Maliki administration's commitment to reconciliation, and
they continue to be frustrated by the PM's lack of follow
through on initiatives he has publicly announced. That said,
they are still open to dialogue and bring up reconciliation
issues every time they visit Baghdad. A visit by PM al
Maliki to the province may help to keep the lines of
communication between Baghdad and Salah ad Din open. END
COMMENT.


11. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad
Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit.
CROCKER