MALIKI RESHAPES THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001593

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MCAP PTER MARR PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI RESHAPES THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

REF: BAGHDAD 1517

BAGHDAD 00001593 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's efforts to
reshape the Iraqi national security architecture seem to be
producing increasing centralization of power in the hands of
an inner circle of Shia Islamists at the expense of the
formal chain of command. Defense Minister Abd al-Qadir, a
Sunni, and Commanding General of Iraqi Joint Headquarters
Babaqir Badr-Khan Shawkt al-Zibari, a Kurd, have warned that
Maliki's methods are similar to Saddam's approach to
controlling the military. The increasing power of the Office
of the Commander-in-Chief and the April 25 reading of the
draft Ministry of National Security Affairs legislation -- a
law that we have opposed -- demonstrate that our ability to
shape Iraq's security architecture and decision-making is
increasingly constrained, especially where Maliki sees his
changes as effective means to reverse the Coalition control
over Iraq. In the near term, our best approach to mitigate
excesses may be through the insertion of Coalition advisors
in the OCINC; MNF-I is seeking the GOI's agreement to accept
advisors in the OCINC. Over the medium term, a security
partnership based on shared strategic interests may now be
our best vehicle for shaping Iraqi national security decision
making and influencing Maliki and his key advisors. END
SUMMARY.

Maliki's Paranoid Perspective
--------------


2. (S) Maliki has repeatedly expressed fears of coups and
conspiracies against him and his government. After twenty
years as a leader of an exiled party dedicated to the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Maliki is conditioned to look
for signs of treachery. Maliki's twin betes noires are
Ba'athist resurgence and military coup, and he frequently
evokes these adversaries during conversations with close
interlocutors on security issues. Maliki also seems gripped
by two seemingly contradictory fears regarding the U.S.
military presence; he worries both that we are deliberately
slowing the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraq and
that we might depart prematurely.

Maliki's Office of the Commander-in-Chief (OCINC)
-------------- --------------


3. (S) Within weeks of coming to power, Prime Minister
Maliki, following his predecessor's example, established a
military staff. He appointed former officers, beginning with
Lieutenant General Abud Qanbar al-Maliki -- now the Baghdad
Operations Commander -- to the "Office of the
Commander-in-Chief." This circle has expanded to include
civilian advisors such as Dr. Basima al Jaidri, a Sadr
supporter.

OCINC - An Advisory Group...
--------------


4. (S) The OCINC is now led by Lieutenant General Faruq
al-'Arji, who retired from the military in the 1990s as a
lieutenant colonel and joined the OCINC in 2006. Faruq told
MNF-I Lieutenant General Dempsey that his staff consists of
twenty Shia of various political affiliations and four Sunni.
Faruq claimed his staff advises the Prime Minister on
security operations and intelligence and coordinates the work
of various government security and intelligence organizations.

...That Directs Military Operations
--------------


5. (S) In reality, the Office of the Commander-in-Chief takes
an active role in security operations, circumventing the
formal security command and control structure. Through the
OCINC, Maliki can direct military movements and operations,
pass intelligence-based targets for capture/kill action, fire
commanders and order the release of security detainees.
Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir and Iraqi Joint Headquarters
Commander General Babaqir have told Lieutenant General
Dempsey that Faruq and his staff order the Baghdad Operation
Command to conduct military operations. Coalition advisors
in the Baghdad Operation Command confirm that they have
received military instructions from Faruq's staff and report
that Faruq and Basima, at times bypass the Baghdad Operation
Command completely, contacting ground commanders to deliver
orders, purportedly from the Prime Minister.

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OCINC - Dismisses of ISF commanders
--------------


6. (S) Coalition military advisors have told us that OCINC
staff have directed the firing of a number of Iraqi officers.
A National Police commander, Brigadier General Ghazwab from
the Second Division and an Iraqi Army commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Ahmad Yousif Ibrahim Kjalil from the Sixth Division,
were relieved of duty through Prime Ministerial Directives
for being unable to drive down the violence in their areas of
responsibility. Lieutenant General Abud, the commander of
all forces in Baghdad, was not informed in advance of these
dismissals. Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir, however, told
Lieutenant General Dempsey that he had been informed in
advance by Maliki.

OCINC - Protects Shia Political Interests
--------------


7. (S) Dr. Basima, a Sadrist, uses her position in the OCINC
to protect and promote Shia interests. In March, MNF-I's
Detention Operations office learned that Basima directed
Minister of Interior Jawad Bulani to release three alleged
JAM members detained by Iraqi police in Mosul. In April,
Basima replaced a list of candidates for the formation of the
Samarra National Police Brigade with her own slate. The
original list drawn up by National Police Major General Adnon
Thabit, a Sunni, attempted to create a "balanced force" that
mirrored the sectarian makeup of Samarra's population. The
list was 60 percent Shia and 40 percent Sunni. Basima's
version was 87 percent Shia. On May 6, when General Petraeus
expressed his concern with the revision (ref),Maliki said he
would have Faruq and Thabit review the candidates and decide
on the final composition. (NOTE: We understand Maliki has
personally intervened to ensure the final list reflects the
original one drafted by Thabit and may have acted recently to
reduce the influence and reach of the OCINC).

Maliki's Own Special Forces
--------------


8. (S) After considerable pressure from Maliki, General Casey
in January agreed to shift command and control of the Iraqi
Special Forces from the Coalition to the Prime Minister.
Coalition planners intended to turn command over to the
Ministry of Defense, however Maliki argued that the force
should be under his direct authority so he could effectively
address emergencies. Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir was
vehemently opposed to this concept, arguing such an
arrangement was not constitutional and reminiscent of
Saddam's personal control over his own elite force. Maliki
remains unsatisfied, arguing MNF-I retains too much authority
over Iraq's elite force.

Baghdad Operations Command (BOC)
--------------


9. (S) In January, Maliki insisted that a new command
structure be established for Baghdad that would report
directly to him and remain outside of the chain of command of
the Ministries of Defense and Interior. To lead the new
command, Maliki appointed his OCINC director and distant
cousin, Lieutenant General Abud Kanbar Hisham. Abud's staff
is responsible for planning, directing, and carrying out
joint operations for Baghdad. Personnel are from the Iraqi
Army, National Police, Iraqi Police, and the Coalition.
Coalition and Iraqi military officials originally questioned
the value of the Baghdad Operations Command and opposed
Abud's appointment on the grounds that he did not have the
requisite skills and experience to serve as the Baghdad
ground commander. However, Abud appears to be doing a
credible job by Iraqi standards. Still, Abud's Chief of
Staff, MG Hassan, appears to be heavily influenced by a
sectarian agenda and may be working around LTG Abud to
facilitate the orders of the OCINC.

Replicating the BOC
--------------


10. (S) Pleased with the work of the Baghdad Operations
Command, Maliki has informed the Ministerial Committee for
National Security that he plans to establish similar command
and control arrangements for Diyala, Al Anbar, and Al Basra.
The Diyala Command is currently being developed.


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Maliki Distrusts the INIS...
--------------


11. (S) Maliki seems to have mixed feelings about the Iraqi
National Intelligence Service. While at times he has praised
its intelligence collection efforts against terrorist
targets, he clearly questions the loyalty of its
Sunni-dominated staff, many of whom are former Ba'athists.
His doubts about the INIS's loyalty are magnified by the
Coalition's large role in its founding. Because the INIS and
its charter were established under the authority of CPA Order
No. 69, which gave CPA Administrator Bremer a significant say
in its development, Maliki and some of his advisors question
whether the Service really works for him or for the Coalition.

And Seeks an Alternative Source for Intel
--------------


12. (S) Unable to fully trust the INIS, Maliki has turned to
Minister of State for National Security Affairs Shirwan Waeli
as an alternative source for intelligence collection, as well
as other special security-related projects. Although Waeli's
office has no legal or constitutional standing, Maliki's
political and financial support has turned it into a rival of
both the INIS and the National Security Council. Maliki's
use of the Minister of State for National Security Affairs as
an alternative to the INIS is nothing new; former Interim
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi created the position in 2004 for
the same reason.


13. (S) The Council of Representatives is currently reviewing
legislation that would legalize Waeli's office and elevate it
to the status of a full ministry. We have significant
concerns about the draft law because it mixes intelligence
and law enforcement authorities, creating the possibility of
a police-state security organization. We are not alone in
our concerns. A number of Iraqi leaders, including President
Talabani and National Security Advisor Rubaie, have told us
that they oppose the draft law. Although former Ambassador
Khalilzad discussed our concerns with the GOI, the law had
its first reading in the Council of Representatives on April

25. The alternative Intelligence and National Security Law
-- which we have been consulted on and which would codify a
leading role for the INIS -- has yet to make it out of the
Shura Council.

Surrogates in Security Ministries
--------------


14. (S) Maliki relies on surrogates within the security
agencies to advance his objectives. Minister of Defense Abd
al-Qadir is considered politically weak and is not perceived
as committed to the Prime Minister's Shia political
coalition. As a result, Maliki relies heavily on General
Hafiz Fahad Nasir Mohan to protect his interests in the
ministry. General Mohan, a SCIRI/Badr leadership favorite,
was released from the Ministry of Defense in 2005 because
senior leaders were dissatisfied with his work. In 2006,
however, Maliki appointed him as a military advisor. He
later placed Mohan back in the Ministry of Defense as an
advisor to Minister Qadir. Maliki seems to increasingly turn
to Major General Abdul Aziz Kubaisi in the Minister of
Defense's Joint Headquarters military intelligence office to
carry out his orders. On April 18, Kubaisi's deputy, Staff
Brigadier General Faysal Qadoir Abdallah Haji, reported to
Coalition advisors that he was ordered by Maliki to arrest
and detain six Sunnis living in th
e International Zone on allegations of links to Ba'athists in
Syria.


15. (S) Maliki also has trusted a select team within the
Ministry of Interior, including: Adnan al-Assadi,
Administration Director; Major General Mehdi Sabih Hashim
al-Gharawi, Iraqi Police Advisor; and Ahmed Ali Al-Khafagi,
Director of Support Forces. In April, Maliki directed Assadi
to form a four-battalion brigade to secure the south. Assadi
shifted at least 900 recently trained National Police who had
originally been designated to join the fight in Baghdad -- to
this Unity Brigade. Interior Minister Bulani told General
Petraeus he was neither aware of the Prime Minister's
directive nor Assadi's actions. Mehdi is alleged to have
committed gross human rights violations and extra-judicial
killings during his service as the National Police's Second
Division Commander at the detention facility known as Site 4.
Mehdi has proven valuable enough to Maliki, however, that he
rebuffed our request that he execute an Iraqi warrant for

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Mehdi's arrest. MoI Bulani has also been unhelpful on this
issue. He has told
us that Mehdi was absolved of allegations against him
pursuant to Section 134B of the Iraqi Criminal Code that
allows a Minister to block the implementation of an arrest
warrant if the suspected individual is conducting the
official duties of his office.

Maliki Side-lines Provincial Authorities
--------------


16. (S) Concerned with the deteriorating security conditions
in Basra, Maliki-with Coalition support--established an
emergency security committee in June 2006 to take on some of
the responsibilities of the ineffective and corrupt
provincial council and governor. Significantly, the creation
and composition of the committee also allowed him to reward
some of his political allies. While the Fadilah party
controls both the governorship and provincial council, the
emergency security committee is packed with Sadrists and
SCIRI members, as well as some independent representatives.
Using the Basra committee as a model, Maliki has also
transferred security powers in Diyala and Maysan to
centrally-appointed emergency security committees. These
committees, however, have also proven ineffective in dealing
with the security situation. The Maysan committee has been
disbanded and the Diyala and Basra committees may soon be
replaced with joint operational command structures similar to
the one established in Baghdad.


17. (S) COMMENT: Maliki wants to be a strong leader.
Although his efforts to manipulate the national security
system have met with mixed success, he persists because he
believes he requires full command over the security forces.
Our ability to forestall his advisors may also be
increasingly constrained. While Maliki has told General
Petraeus that the OCINC is only to serve as an advisory body,
it remains to be seen whether he will be willing or able to
prevent it from continuing to intervene in the established
chain of command. With Maliki's strongly held views on
security, our best course of action for mitigating potential
excesses may be to help him better exercise the formal chain
of command. In pursuit of this goal, MNF-I is seeking his
approval to assign Coalition advisors to the OCINC. We might
also begin to have a positive impact on Maliki's thinking on
command arrangements as we continue our discussions with him
on mutual strategic interests.
CROCKER