MG FASTABEND'S MAY 8 MEETING WITH IRAQI VP HASHEMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001572

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PTER MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: MG FASTABEND'S MAY 8 MEETING WITH IRAQI VP HASHEMI

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a May 8 meeting with Iraq's Sunni VP Tariq
Hashemi, MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Operations
MG Fastabend underscored MNF-I support for Anbar province
volunteers to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition
efforts to look into problems with recruits' pay; explained
MNF-I reaction to an attack against Iraqi Security Forces in
Samarra; and urged VP Hashemi not to pull his Sunni Tawafuq
bloc out of the GOI. Hashemi complained about not having
anything to show the Sunni community for its involvement in
the GOI, adding that a Tawafuq pullout was not yet decided
but he was seriously considering it. However, the PM had
recently met with Hashemi and promised to change some of his
policies. Hashemi said his Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) is
losing political ground to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) among
Sunnis, and implied that MNF-I is releasing AQI detainees
under "suspicious" circumstances. Hashemi expressed
frustration at the lack of releases of Sunni detainees in
MNF-I custody. End Sum
mary.

MNF-I Response to Samarra Attack
--------------


2. (C) MG Fastabend told Hashemi that the DCM had passed to
GEN Petraeus his concerns about Shia militia presence in the
Bayaa neighborhood in Baghdad's al-Rashid district.
Fastabend told Hashemi MNF-I is aware of the sectarian
challenges in that neighborhood and is working to eliminate
all militia elements and would appreciate any information
Hashemi could provide that would help.


3. (C) MG Fastabend also addressed Hashemi assertions that
the U.S. military is blocking the authorization necessary to
pay two battalions of ISF volunteers in the Al Qaim and
Fallujah areas of heavily-Sunni Anbar province. MG Fastabend
reminded Hashemi of our strong record of support for the
Anbar ISF volunteers, and our intent to continue that
support. He asked Hashemi for more information reference our
alleged non-support; Hashemi referred him to the Governor's
office and PJCC.


4. (C) MG Fastabend told Hashemi GEN Petraeus is offended
because of allegations Hashemi made to Ambassador Speckhard
that MNF-I stood by and did nothing during the 06 May attack
on police headquarters in Samarra, in heavily-Sunni Salah ad
Din province, which resulted in the death of the police
chief. Fastabend showed Hashemi a map and diagram of the
attack, and detailed the attack and MNF-I response - minute
by minute -- which resulted in Coalition Forces killing five
attackers and incurring two U.S. soldiers wounded in action.
MG Fastabend closed by reminding the Vice President that all
armies have pride and our Army was offended by the
implication that we stood and watched as our brothers were
attacked. Hashemi seemed to accept MG Fastabend's
explanation and replied "the message has been delivered."

Tawafuq and Hashemi in the GOI
--------------


5. (C) MG Fastabend told Hashemi the CG is also concerned
about Hashemi's recent public statements that Tawafuq would
withdraw from the GOI; this could escalate Sunni violence,
and only served to marginalize his own role in finding a
political solution. Fastabend noted that Hashemi's fellow
bloc leader Adnan Dulaimi had recently called Fardh al-Qanoon
(FAQ) "a sword on the neck of the Sunnis." On the contrary,
Fastabend told Hashemi, MNF-I is working hard to protect
Sunnis, as demonstrated by our efforts in Ghazaliyah,
Ameriyah, Mansour and Adhamiyah. MG Fastabend noted that
Shia also complained FAQ operations targeted them unfairly.


6. (C) Hashemi said he made his comments reluctantly but felt
compelled to do so because Sunnis had not achieved anything
in the political process that they could point to as having
benefited Sunnis. All Tawafuq leaders agreed they are being
left out of real governance. Hashemi said he felt
"meaningless and invaluable" in the GOI and "people ask me
'why the hell are you keeping your position?'" Hashemi
called a Tawafuq pullout from the GOI "an option," said
Tawafuq is still undecided about it, but is "seriously
considering" it. Hashemi claimed that during a recent
telephone conversation, President Bush "acknowledged the
reasons behind my hard feelings" and taken them seriously.


7. (C) However, Hashemi acknowledged he had met very recently
with the PM, and felt that they had the first positive
meeting in months. The PM promised "to change his policies
in various aspects." Hashemi said "I am waiting to see if he
produces."


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Hashemi on AQI
--------------


8. (C) MG Fastabend asked what MNF-I could do to help in this
situation. Hashemi claimed MNF-I did not think of his IIP as
partners in the fight against AQI. MNF-I had failed to act
on information IIP gave about AQI, instead arresting IIP
leaders based on false information. Hashemi said MNF-I has
not supported IIP in Baghdad or Anbar, although support was
good in Diyala. Hashemi accused MNF-I of "dealing with AQI
suspiciously": when MG Fastabend asked what he meant by that
statement, Hashemi said some AQI suspects - known bad actors
-- had been released a few hours after being arrested.


9. (C) If the US wants to defeat AQI, Hashemi advised, the
key is political: help Sunnis politically. Military means
should only be a catalyst in a broader menu of actions that
bring Sunnis into the political process. He said the US
should not confuse Sunni insurgents, who have no
"international agenda," with AQI. Sunnis are frustrated, and
when they compare AQI with what the IIP produces for them,
many choose AQI. The labeling of all Sunnis as "terrorists,"
morever -- particularly by senior individuals in the
Government -- makes reconciliation impossible.

Detainees
--------------


10. (C) Hashemi expressed frustration at the lack of releases
of Sunni detainees in MNF-I custody. The majority are
innocent, he claimed, following with the non sequitur that
"they could be brought back into the political process."
Hashemi offered to give "guarantees" upon their release. He
claimed visiting Senator Graham had told him he was worried
about a "scandal" at MNF-I's Bucca detention facility, where
many Sunni detainees are held.


11. (C) Hashemi said he sent 250 names of detainees he hoped
would be released and for who he would give guarantees.
Hashemi claimed former Ambassador Khalilzad promised all
would be released, but only seven were. He also claimed that
in June he had been promised that 1500 detainees would be
released every month, but PM Maliki ordered this stopped, and
the US abided by Maliki's wishes without consulting Hashemi.
CROCKER