PRT TIKRIT: SAMARRA'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001571

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: SAMARRA'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
STRUGGLING AMIDST DETERIORATING SECURITY

REF: BAGHDAD 969

Classified By: PRT Lead Steven R. Buckler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. It has been
cleared by the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division
(3/82) Brigade Combat Team (BCT),which is the Coalition
Forces (CF) task force with responsibility for the province
of Salah ad Din (SaD).


2. (C) SUMMARY. Amidst a deteriorating security situation
with the killing of the city's Police Chief on 6 May,
Samarra's political leadership is struggling to stay afloat.
While tribal dynamics define politics in Samarra, the
provincial government has recently taken a greater role in
supporting Samarra's political leadership. Al Qaeda in
Iraq/The Islamic State of Iraq (AQI/ISI) continues to exploit
pre-existing tribal tensions to foment violence and undermine
efforts to maintain security in the city. The recent killing
of the city's Police Chief underscores the spike in attacks
over the past two months. Suspicions that the National
Police (NP) coming to assist in securing the city and protect
the Golden Dome Mosque during its reconstruction will be
predominantly Shia have raised tensions, which National
Police (NP) Battalion leader and Samarra native General Adnan
Thabit will have to address before the NP's scheduled
June/July arrival. END SUMMARY.

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All Politics Are Local and Tribal
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3. (C) Well-known for its enduring tribal tensions, Samarra
and its politics are defined by tribal affiliations, and the
deteriorating security situation has left the city's
political leadership struggling to stay afloat. Reportedly
for security reasons, City Council President (CCP) Asad Ali
Yassin al Abasi moved in March 2006 to Baghdad, where he has
strong political ties and has assumed an unknown position in
the GOI. Recently a Deputy City Council President (DCCP),
Mizhur Flayyih Hasan Muhammed al Abassi, was put in place
through unknown means. While it appears that most provincial
and city officials recognize him as the DCCP, he struggles to
garner political influence. In a May 8 meeting, the Governor
intimated that he may fire the city's current mayor, Mahmoud
Khalaf Ahmed al Bazi, who is often absent from the city
working on efforts to reconstruct the Golden Dome Mosque (AKA
Ali al Hadi Shrine, al Askariya Shrine). Mayor Mahmoud has
been the GOI and UNESCO's sole contact in Samarra on mosque
reconstruction initiatives. In his place, the Governor said
he may appoint Mohammed Abdullah Salih, reportedly a former
Border Patrol. Ostensibly for security reasons, the City
Council does not meet regularly. Many contacts report that
political authority lies in the hands of tribal sheikhs and
religious imams, and city officials generally lack influence
outside their personal tribes. (reftel)


4. (C) With the PRT and BCT's encouragement, SaD Governor
Hamad Hamoud al Shakti al Qaisi and Deputy Governor Abdullah

H. M. Ajabarah al Jabouri have recently made efforts to
support the city's political leadership. On May 3, the
Governor hosted a meeting in Tikrit to demonstrate his
support for the city government. However, only the Mayor and
a few city technocrats attended, with the tribal sheikhs,
religious imams, and city council members notably absent.
The Mayor's inability to assemble the city's key figures
likely prompted the Governor to consider replacing the Mayor.
(NOTE: The DCCP, who normally would have been present, was
unable to attend for logistical reasons. END NOTE.)


5. (C) At the May 3 meeting, the Governor took a hard-line
approach on establishing a functional city government so that
"security and municipal services could return." He said that
the provincial government would withhold city council
members' salaries if they did not begin attending meetings
and working for the city. Additionally, he said that unless
the security situation in the city improved, no
reconstruction projects would be done and the
Samarra-budgeted money would be spent elsewhere in the
province. The provincial leadership intends to hold a second
meeting in the coming week, where they hope to ensure
participation by tribal sheikhs and religious imams. Owing
to the boycott of the 2005 elections, Samarra has no
representation in the provincial government, and that has
previously limited the Governor and Deputy Governor's sway in
the city.

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AQI/ISI in Samarra
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6. (C) Al Qaeda in Iraq/The Islamic State of Iraq (AQI/ISI),

BAGHDAD 00001571 002 OF 002


which has been deepening its roots in the Samarra area since
October 2006, has successfully exploited pre-existing tribal
tensions to foment violence and undermine efforts to maintain
security in the city. In the city's leading tribes, the al
Badri have largely sided with AQI/ISI, and the al Abasi,
though not pro-CF, have largely supported the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF). Disputes among other minor tribes also
complicate the city's politics and security situation.


7. (C) Attacks in Samarra, against both the CF and ISF,
significantly increased in March and April over the previous
three months, likely in part due to the Baghdad Security Plan
(septel). Of note, Samarra's Iraqi Police (IP) Chief, COL
Jaleel, who was generally considered to be effective, was
killed in a bombing at an IP station in Samarra on May 6. A
curfew remains on the city.

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The Coming National Police
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8. (C) According to Mayor Mahmoud, the National Police (NP)
who will be coming to Samarra to secure the Golden Dome
Mosque reconstruction site in June/July are rumored to be
predominately Shia and, in the Samarra mind, by extension
associated with Shia militias. These perceptions, along with
the Governor's reported comments during a May 6 visit to
Samarra about the NP not being welcome in the city, have
raised tensions in the city. While the NP battalions are to
be under the direction of well-liked Samarra native General
Adnan Thabit, most Samarra residents are extremely
apprehensive about the NP's arrival. (COMMENT: The NP's
success in securing the Golden Dome Mosque reconstruction
site and in helping maintain security in the city will
largely depend on General Adnan's leadership and direct
engagement. END COMMENT.)

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Comment
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9. (C) Mayor Mahmoud has been the only Samarra official
engaged on the Golden Dome Mosque reconstruction project and
in regular contact General Adnan Thabit and UNESCO. The
Governor's consideration to replace him, if legally possible,
with a former Border Patrol may be an attempt to put a
stronger security figure in the center of Samarra's political
structure. With AQI/ISI active in the area and with the
coming attention related to the reconstruction of the Golden
Dome Mosque, the provincial government's leadership in
supporting Samarra's political leaders will be crucial. The
PRT and BCT will continue to facilitate the provincial
government in taking a positive, constructive role in
Samarra. END COMMENT.


10. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad
Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit.
CROCKER