IDENTIFYING MODERATES IN BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001552

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR ASEC KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: IDENTIFYING MODERATES IN BAGHDAD

REF: BAGHDAD 1537

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha for reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable. This cable is
the first of a series describing political moderates in
Baghdad and efforts to encourage and empower moderates.


2. (C) Summary: Baghdad Province is home to many people who
reject violence as a means to achieve political ends, respect
the rule of law, believe in human rights for all regardless
of sect, ethnicity or creed, and want to see a Baghdad that
is again respected for its history, culture, prosperity, and
progressive spirit. Many leaders representing this
population risk their lives daily to participate in local
government, academia, business and civil society
organizations. Empowering this moderate population will help
create a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern
itself, defend itself, sustain itself, and be an ally in the
war on terror. Baghdad PRT has regular interaction with many
of these moderate figures and is positioned to identify and
empower moderate politicians and movements. End summary.

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BACKGROUND TO MODERATE POLITICS IN BAGHDAD
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3. (C) Baghdad has experienced immense political turbulence
since 2003. The confluence of Coalition activities,
inter-Iraqi factional conflict and regional meddling have
complicated efforts to achieve a stable governance system
that satisfactorily provides essential services to the
province's inhabitants while redressing their perceived or
actual historical grievances. This turbulence has generally
empowered extremists and created an environment in which
moderates have been marginalized, discredited, or silenced.
The entrenchment of organized political parties closely
associated with militias, and the existence of few credible
political parties that are not the outgrowth of armed
opposition or insurgent organizations has predisposed
political activity in Baghdad since 2003 toward intolerant,
extremist and winner-take-all behavior.


4. (C) Despite the preponderance of these extremist
viewpoints and organizations, a population of moderate
political and civic leaders can be identified in Baghdad.
Baghdad PRT interacts with these moderates in a number of
ways. Many are members of Baghdad's local councils. Some are
moderate members of the political parties on Baghdad's
Provincial Council. Others work in academia, business and
civil society organizations.

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LOCAL MODERATES VS. PARTISAN HARDLINERS
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5. (C) In mid-2003, a local council system was established in
Baghdad through the efforts of Coalition forces, local Iraqi
leaders and USAID's Local Governance Program (LGP I). In
nearly 100 neighborhoods of Baghdad's metropolitan core area
and 20 outlying villages, hundreds of local citizens stepped
forward to create a transparent system of democratic input
into a governance system that was opaque and dictatorial just
a year earlier. Local council members were primarily
responsible for voicing concerns about local essential
services provision to technical authorities, but saw their
roles expand by hosting town-hall meetings, responding to
community needs and disseminating information in their
neighborhoods. From regular interaction between these
leaders and Embassy and Coalition partners over the past four
years, we estimate that a significant portion of the roughly
1300 local council members serving in Baghdad are politically
independent, moderate, and responsive to the local
constituency that they represent.


6. (C) The January 2005 elections brought a new political
body into being in Baghdad without any local constituencies.
The new Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) was the result of a
single-district party-list election, which resulted in a body
of 51 members dominated by the major Shia parties, with SCIRI
holding 28 of 51 seats. Because Sunnis boycotted the
elections, there are no Sunni political parties represented
on the council, and only one ethnic Sunni Arab -- a member of
the Communist Party. PC members are not beholden to
geographically determined constituents in the province; they
follow the directives of their party leadership. In their
governance of the province over the past two years, they have
proved largely unresponsive to local council leaders and to
the concerns of many Baghdad residents. As 'representatives'
from areas such as Abu Ghraib, Mahmoudiya or Taji do not sit
on the council, those largely Sunni areas have seen little
attention from Baghdad's Shia-dominated provincial government.

BAGHDAD 00001552 002 OF 003




7. (C) Conflict between the local councils, still populated
with volunteer local leaders, and the SCIRI-party-dominated
PC began almost the moment the PC first met as a body in
March 2005. The PC declared invalid the charters granting
operational authority to the local councils, and declared
that the only law relevant to provincial governance was
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 71, which gave
the PC wide and vague latitude. Throughout 2005 and much of
2006, the party-dominated PC did everything within its power
to reduce the authority of local council leaders and to
marginalize their activities. The PC dissolved the Baghdad
City Council, a body made up of representatives from the
District Councils, and installed a SCIRI PC member as the
Mayor of Baghdad. The PC also replaced independent moderates
with partisan loyalists in the leadership positions of Deputy
Mayor for Municipalities, Deputy Mayor for Administration and
Deputy Governor. Between 2005 and 2006, nearly all major
provincial positions shifted from independent or technocrat
to SCIRI or Sadrist. Ambiguities in governance law
complicated political tensions between party loyalists at the
PC and independent local council leaders. Differing
interpretations of CPA Order 71, the selective use of
historical Iraqi law, and uncertainty about future
Constitutional or legislative initiatives provoked conflict
as the PC struggled to exert its ill-defined authority and
local councils feared outright dissolution.

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MODERATES FIND COMMON GROUND WORKING ON COMMITTEES
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8. (C) In recent months, Baghdad PRT has developed a closer
relationship with the Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) and has
encouraged more outreach from that body to local council
leaders, particularly through activities on their functional
committees. Observing the interaction of PC members and
local council members during joint sessions of their
committees has allowed PRT to identify key moderates on both
the PC and the local councils.


9. (C) The Economic committees of the nine District Councils
and six Qada Councils of Baghdad have met regularly with Dr.
Kamel al-Shabibi, the Provincial Council Economic Committee
Chair and the PC's budget director. During recent sessions
the members have engaged in substantive debate on budget
execution, and have launched microfinance offices across
Baghdad to generate economic growth. Dr. Shabibi is a SCIRI
party member, but often finds himself at odds with other
members of his party for his outreach to the local councils
and his cooperation with the PRT. Moderate members of the
Sadr City District Council tell PRT that their work on
economic development issues provides them one of the few
outlets to engage with other like-minded moderates in the
city. Directed not to engage directly with Coalition or
Embassy personnel by Sadrist leaders on their council, the
Sadr City moderates continue to attend sessions of this joint
economic committee in defiance of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
threats (reftel).


10. (C) A joint Civil Society committee session May 5 brought
together Tariq al-Mondalawy (Da'wa) of the PC with over 20
members of Baghdad's local councils and a number of civil
society organization leaders. The meeting provided an
opportunity for charitable and social organizations to
address their provincial leaders directly, who responded with
pledges to commit resources to improve the welfare of Baghdad
citizens. Several attendees were surprised by the candor
expressed between the PC members and the local council
leaders; they said that they expected the meeting to be far
more contentious and far less productive.

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ACADEMICS STRUGGLE TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE
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11. (C) PRT hosted an Academics Roundtable April 14 where
professors from several Baghdad universities discussed their
politics, their profession and their daily clashes with
intolerance in Baghdad. Despite their varying backgrounds,
ethnicities and ideologies, these academics found common
ground in rejecting the option of violence as a means to
solve Baghdad's problems. As educators, they said they view
themselves in the vanguard of bringing Baghdad towards a
better future. As intellectuals, they know the price of
making a stand against extremism.

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SOME PARTY MEMBERS ARE READY FOR A CHANGE
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12. (C) Members of the major political parties on Baghdad's
Provincial Council have candidly expressed their

BAGHDAD 00001552 003 OF 003


disillusionment with their political leadership and
frustration with a political environment that is intolerant
to compromise and collaboration. Prominent PC member Mazin
Makiya has left Da'wa because of that party's overly
'religious' agenda and incompetent leadership. He holds his
SCIRI colleagues in contempt due to their association with
Iranian interests. Since his departure from Da'wa he has
tried to build a coalition of others who share his passion to
see a change in Iraqi politics. According to Mazin, every
major political party is 'discriminatory' in nature -- and
that fact is preventing real political progress. He said
that he believes that voters should choose leaders based on
their ideals, not their sectarian identity.


13. (C) Baghdad PRT continues to meet regularly with
moderates in Baghdad, assessing ways to empower them and to
increase the political space available for progressive,
moderate and effective leaders.
CROCKER