Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1539
2007-05-09 10:20:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQ-IRAN - THE SHATT AL ARAB BORDER DISPUTE

Tags:  PREL MOPS MARR PINS PNAT PINR IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9762
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1539/01 1291020
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091020Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1082
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001539 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PINS PNAT PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ-IRAN - THE SHATT AL ARAB BORDER DISPUTE

REF: BAGHDAD 01359

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001539

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PINS PNAT PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ-IRAN - THE SHATT AL ARAB BORDER DISPUTE

REF: BAGHDAD 01359

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Iran's detention of 15 British naval
personnel in March highlighted long-standing tensions along
the Iraq-Iran maritime boundary and the importance of helping
Iraq develop the diplomatic and military tools necessary to
defend its frontiers against intrusion and infiltration. The
dispute over the Shatt al Arab -- Iraq's only outlet to the
Gulf from the Euphrates River -- has important economic,
political and military implications. The 1975 Algiers Accord,
an UN-registered treaty, remains in force as the legal
instrument outlining the land and river boundary between the
two countries; however, political contention, treaty
ambiguities and thirty years of alterations to the coastline
call into question the Accord's current relevance. In
addition, beyond the Shatt al Arab limit, Iran and Iraq have
no maritime boundary. Instead, the U.S. Military and
Coalition partners patrolling the northern Persian Gulf have
created an Operational Line (OPLINE) marking the limit of
Coalition vessels' movements. Iraqi leaders' posture on this
issue has been muted by Iraq's more immediate security crises
and by its current inability to enforce its territorial
waters. We have begun to engage with Iraqis on how they can
better assert Iraq's sovereignty. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Current Provisions Insufficient to Address Disputes
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The late March detention of fifteen British sailors
and marines was the latest in a long series of aggressive
moves by Iran in the disputed territorial waters of the Shatt
al Arab. During a mid-April meeting of the Ministerial
Council for National Security (reftel),Iraqi Joint
Headquarters Commander General Babakr al-Zebari complained
that the Iranians were increasingly "creeping" into Iraqi

territorial waters. In response, PM Maliki said the GOI
needed to tell Tehran to stop these incursions.

--------------
The Algiers Accord
--------------


3. (C) In 1975, Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran signed
the Algiers Accord, defining their common land and river
boundary. The Accord, which was registered with the UN in
1976, granted Iran concessions along the Shatt in exchange
for Iran's agreement to end support for the Kurdish revolt
inside Iraq. The conditions of the treaty have not been
consistently implemented, however, resulting in an alignment
today that deviates from the original definition of the
boundary. Saddam unilaterally repudiated the Accord in 1980,
three days before invading Iran, but reconfirmed it 10 years
later in an attempt to win Iranian support following Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. Many Iraqis view the Accord as a betrayal
by Saddam that gave too much control of the river to Iran
while constraining Iraq's security and economic independence.
Neither country, however, has ever requested that the UN
terminate the treaty and it - according to the UN - remains
in force.

--------------
The Thalweg Problem
--------------


4. (C) The Accord draws the river boundary in the Shatt al
Arab in accordance with the thalweg principle, fixing the
boundary in the center of the deepest navigable part of the
waterway. The land boundary enters the Shatt al Arab near the
Iranian city of Khorramshahr and stretches down to the mouth
of the river, ninety kilometers downstream. The boundary
continues another 12 kilometers in a straight line through
the usually submerged mudflats of the river delta and out to
the Persian Gulf. The Algiers Accord identifies the boundary
terminus as "Point R." This area between the mouth of the
Shatt and Point R constitutes the two states' internal
waters; the other side of Point R indicates international
waters.


5. (C) The Accord provides for a boundary commission to
conduct periodic surveys to determine the location of the

BAGHDAD 00001539 002 OF 003


thalweg, which has moved appreciably both upstream and in the
mudflats, but there has been no reassessment since the
original 1974 survey. Silt deposits have shifted the mouth of
the river in the mudflats westward, shrinking Iraq's
coastline by almost a kilometer in Iran's favor. When Iran
captured the British vessel in March, State Department
geographers initially thought Iran was claiming the boundary
had moved south with the river channel. The British vessel
was located just southwest of Point R, placing the capture
point clearly within Iraqi internal waters, according to the
Accord. When the UK challenged Iran on this, however, Tehran
promptly broadcast new coordinates, placing the vessel north
of the Algiers Accord line and clearly in Iranian waters.
While Iran has implied it has its own views on the current
boundary line, Iran did not use the March incident to
directly challenge the boundar
y location of the original Accord line.

--------------
Iran and the "Operational Line"
--------------


6. (S) Beyond Point R, Iran and Iraq have never established a
boundary separating their territorial sea claims, which
extend out twelve nautical miles and overlap in the cul de
sac that forms the northern Persian Gulf. Without a clear
boundary line to guide them, U.S., UK, and Australian
maritime forces have established an "Operational Line"
(OPLINE) to provide a clear northern coastal limit within
which Coalition Forces could operate assured that they were
in Iraqi waters, particularly as they carried out their
mission to protect Iraq's two oil platforms. The OPLINE is
not intended to separate Iran and Iraq's territorial
sovereignty. The OPLINE continues out as a straight-line
tangent from the Accord line at Point R for twelve nautical
miles, passing just north of the Khawr Al Awar Oil Terminal
and well within Iraq's territorial waters.


7. (C) Iran has never publicly articulated where it perceives
its territorial waters separate from Iraq's beyond Point R.
Instead, Tehran has exploited the territorial ambiguity to
its advantage, arresting hundreds of fishermen for operating
within areas it asserts are Iranian. Some of these areas are
close to, and sometimes cross, the OPLINE, according to
military and press reports. According to the Coalition,
Islamic Revolutionary Guard craft have also encroached into
Iraqi maritime space and challenged Coalition forces in the
vicinity of the Iraqi oil platforms.

-------------- --
Limited Military Capabilities to Enforce Border
-------------- --


8. (S) During a 23 April meeting with the Pol-Mil Counselor
and MNF-I leaders, Iraqi Rear Admiral Jawad Kadhum, Head of
Navy (HoN),acknowledged that Iranian military vessels
regularly crossed the Algiers agreed boundary, as well as the
OPLINE. He conceded, however, that the Iraqi Navy had neither
the strength nor the will to enforce either line on its own,
adding as a joke that the Navy leadership is half-Iranian.
Jawad noted he had discussed this with former Iraqi Prime
Minister al-Jaffari, who agreed there was a problem, but
stressed that it was not time to address the issue. Jawad
said that Iraq was still not in a position to challenge Iran
and that he had specifically ordered his sailors not to fire
on intruding Iranian vessels, maintaining instead a "peaceful
reaction." He warned that the Iranians are trying to provoke
a Coalition reaction that could then be exploited by their
media as an example of foreign invaders victimizing the
Iranian people.


9. (C) Iraq has two maritime forces in the southeast: the
Iraqi Coast Guard's Inland Waterways Division enforces the
law along Iraq's rivers, while the Iraqi Navy forces patrol
Iraq's territorial waters beyond in the Persian Gulf.
Responsibility for the northern mudflats of the Shatt al
Arab, including the site where the British were detained, is
unclear due to the contentious border, as well as the
location's inaccessibility for Iraqi Navy and NAVCENT forces.
Based on our general understanding of their jurisdictions,
the Coast Guard should patrol this area, but limited
Coalition presence in southern Iraq prevents visibility into
the Coast Guard's structure or reliability. Of the 14 Border
Transition Team requirement identified by MNC-I, only one

BAGHDAD 00001539 003 OF 003


three-man Border Transition Team supports the whole MND-SE
area of responsibility.

--------------
Economic Implications
--------------


10. (C) Poor internal security and the lack of maritime
agreements with Iran prevent the development of any clear
shipping and security treaties along Iraq's border with Iran,
inhibiting the development of legal trade and fostering an
increase in smuggling. Smugglers move freely along the river
and across the submerged mudflats, using illegal docks along
the waterway in operations that often involve whole villages.
Great volumes of smuggled oil and refined product are
purportedly often sold to waiting oil tankers, costing the
Iraqi government millions in lost revenue.


11. (C) Additionally, threats of attacks and bribes deter
many foreign shippers from entering Iraqi waters and using
Iraqi ports. Because the Shatt has been poorly maintained,
commercial shippers also face dangers from shipwrecks,
shallow water, unexploded ordnance, and a lack of
navigational aids. Accurate maps are scarce, and mariners
often share navigational information by word of mouth,
following maritime courses that appear to run over land on
outdated nautical charts.


12. (C) Iraqi leaders have expressed interest in working with
Iran to re-dredge the Shatt and remove wrecks; U.S.
assistance in setting up this arrangement would be considered
valuable. Admiral Jawad told Embassy officers that a
committee from Basrah University had received funding from
the Ministry of Higher Education and the Basrah governorate
to conduct a survey to determine how far the thalweg had
shifted. While it is useful for Iraq to take the initiative,
results from an Iraqi university survey may not be recognized
by Iran. Participation by an independent third party could
bolster this initiative and provide an internationally
recognized picture of the waterway that could be used to
clearly redefine Iraq and Iran's maritime boundary.

--------------
Comments
--------------


13. (C) The Embassy is trying to elicit a clear understanding
of the GOI's position toward to the Algiers Agreement, as
well and whether it shares the U.S.'s interpretation of the
treaty. In addition to Admiral Jawad, we have begun to
engage Iraqi political leaders on the issue of territorial
sovereignty. The Embassy and MNF-I have also raised the
related issue of Iranian drilling activities in disputed
territories along the land boundary between Iran and Iraq. On
April 27, Econ Counselor and MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for
Strategic Operations MG Fastabend presented Deputy PM Barham
Saleh with information on Iranian drilling near Fort Goteyba.
The DPM, who was scheduled to visit Tehran, responded
positively to the request to raise these violations with the
Iranians. Saleh also volunteered the view that with the shift
in the thalweg in the Shatt al Arab, the Iranians many
technically be correct in asserting the UK mariners were in
Iranian waters. Saleh explained that he did his doctoral
dissertation on coast
al engineering, so he has a personal interest in the question
of where the boundary might actually be.


14. (S) We should also consider whether to unite our
comparative advantage in naval power with Iraqi resentment of
Persian encroachment. The U.S. military could share
information with Iraq on the regular incursions by Iran and
the costs of constant oil and weapons smuggling as motivation
to act on the issue. We can work with the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to protest all future incursions and conduct
an info campaign aimed at building popular Iraqi resentment
over the Shatt al Arab maritime dispute.
CROCKER