PART 2 OF 3: MODERATES ENDURE IN SADR CITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001537

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS IZ
SUBJECT: PART 2 OF 3: MODERATES ENDURE IN SADR CITY COUNCIL

Classified By: Classified by Deputy PolCouns Charles O. Blaha, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) This is the second of three cables on the
relationship between the Sadr City District Advisory Council
(DAC) and the Sadrists located in the Office of the Martyr
Sadr (OMS). On May 4, poloff conducted a protracted
interview with Heyder S. Zedan and Suaad A. Allami, two
leading moderates on the Sadr City DAC, following their
meeting with the Adhamiya-Sadr City EPRT. Septel described
the Sadrist take over of the Sadr City DAC between 2003 and
2006, this cable examines the moderates' recent "push back"
against the Sadrists. The final cable (septel) will provide
detailed information about contemporary life in Sadr City,
including a Sadrist extortion racket and available healthcare
facilities.


2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Sadr City DAC Members Heyder S.
Zedan and Suaad A. Allami told poloff May 4 that they figure
among the nine moderates who contend with 30 Sadrists on the
39-member Sadr City DAC. Over time, these moderates have
gained power in the DAC through competence, expertise, and
tactical thinking, culminating in their leadership of 11 of
the DAC's 13 committees. By leading DAC committees,
moderates can sometimes initiate meetings, projects and
relationships independent of Sadrist control (such as
meetings with USG officials). They can also steer DAC policy
in key areas where Sadrists generally seek total control.
The Sadrists, an ostensibly confession-based party, even
allow moderates to control the Religion Committee. Political
pragmatism appears to have trumped religious ideology on the
Sadr City Council. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

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TACTIC 1: DEMONSTRATE COMPETENCE AND EXPERTISE
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3. (C) Zedan and Allami, respectively a doctor and a lawyer,
described the Sadrists as generally "uneducated" and
unqualified for their jobs on the DAC. Nonetheless, they
claimed to have developed good relationships with every
member of the DAC, including the 30 Sadrists. (NOTE: The DAC
began in 2003 with 41 members, but DAC members have not
replaced the original Chairman, who was killed, or another
member, who fled the country before resigning. Thus the
membership now stands at 39. END NOTE.) The moderates have
focused their energy on demonstrating their competence and
expertise on specific issues. By emphasizing efficiency over
ideology, they claim to have acquired the power to influence
their Sadrist colleagues, occasionally, to vote based on the
merits of each decision instead of explicit instructions from
OMS. (NOTE: The Chiarman of the DAC is a staunch Sadrist who
will not meet with USG officials. It is unclear the extent
to which other Sadrists on the DAC can act independently of
OMS. Zedan and Allami claimed that this freedom exists, but
did not specify its extent, or any other details, such as
implicit or explicit red lines that OMS may have established.
END NOTE.)

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TACTIC 2: TAKE CHARGE OF COMMITTEES
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4. (C) The moderates' demonstrated competence and expertise
has translated into control of 11 out of 13 DAC committees
(some of the nine moderates lead more than one committee).
According to Zedan, OMS simply does not have qualified
candidates to place on the DAC. As a result, Sadrists have
ceded control of all but two committees: the Finance
Committee, and the Oil Committee. OMS clings to these
committees because they have proved most likely to bring the
Sadrists revenue. "If it has money," Zedan explained, "then
they lead it." The 11 committees controlled by moderates
cover the following issues: Health and Environment; Civil
Society; Law; Immigration (into Sadr City); Political
Prisoners; Women and Children; Public Services;
Anti-Corruption; Youth and Sports; Media and Public
Relations; and Religion.

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TACTIC 3: EXPOLIT SADRIST PRAGMATISM
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5. (C) Zedan and Allami described the current DAC Chairman's
bid for re-election as an example of OMS pragmatism. They
said that Chairman Abdel Hassan Al-Jibara has weak leadership
skills and little understanding of key issues. He has lost
popular support even among Sadrists on the DAC, and OMS seems
to have lost confidence in him. He keeps postponing his own
re-election in order to avoid, according to Zedan and Allami,
an inevitable defeat. "Everyone wants someone elected who
can do a good job," Zedan said, including OMS. Zedan and
Allami perceive this pragmatic desire for effective

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governance as a weakness of OMS leaders, because it requires
them occasionally to compromise instead of always imposing
their will. "We will work on every weak point" among the
Sadrists, Zedan said. Zedan and Allami also suspected that
Al-Jibara did not check in with the OMS office often enough,
to ensure that he adhered to their party line. They hope to
exploit the situation by pressing for the re-election of a
former Sadr City DAC Chairman, Hassam Shamar, who is an
independent.


6. (C) When pressed, Zedan and Allami described fissures
within the Sadrists on the Sadr City DAC. Three broad types
of Sadrists serve on the council, they explained: those on
the "right" (hard-line),in the "middle" (moderate Sadrists),
and on the "left" (comparatively amenable to influence).
They said that Al-Jibara's poor performance has increased the
number of Sadrists susceptible to the persuasion of
moderates. Zedan and Allami estimated that the DAC's 30
Sadrists currently break down approximately as follows: 5
right, 5 middle, and 20 left.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) COMMENT: The OMS actions described by Zedan and Allami
raise a key question: why have the Sadrists permitted
non-Sadrists to assume leadership roles in the DAC, namely by
chairing 11 of the DAC's 13 committees? Sadrists clearly
have the power -) through a majority of votes on the
council, and through their traditional intimidation tactics
-- to insist that Sadrists lead every aspect of the DAC's
activities. OMS leaders may have allowed moderates to lead
because the DAC no longer matters to them. The DAC does not
currently threaten their control of Sadr City, and they have
enough alternative revenue streams (see, for example, septel
on OMS extortion rackets) to disregard the USG resources they
might have accessed in the past through the DAC.


8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The opposite argument also seems
plausible: the DAC is so important to Sadrists that they will
permit moderates to lead it. By taking over the DAC when it
had a popular mandate and access to extensive resources, OMS
leaders unwittingly assumed responsibility for the
institution's success. In fact, if the DAC did not matter to
them, the Sadrists could try to shut it down, or refuse to
take part instead of seeking to take control. Instead, they
have exerted energy to install loyal members, and have
accepted the political compromise inherent in permitting
moderates to play a significant role. By leading DAC
committees, moderates can sometimes initiate meetings,
projects and relationships independent of OMS control (such
as meetings with USG officials). They can also steer DAC
policy in key areas -- including women, media, and religion
-- where Sadrists generally seek total control. The
Sadrists, an ostensibly confession-based party, even allow
moderates to control the Religion Committee. Political
pragmatism appears to have trumped religious ideology on the
Sadr City Council. END COMMENT.
CROCKER