Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1528
2007-05-08 10:18:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

UNAMI - AN OPPORTUNITY TO REPLACE LEADERSHIP AND

Tags:  PREL UN IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8576
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1528/01 1281018
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081018Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1064
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001528 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017
TAGS: PREL UN IZ
SUBJECT: UNAMI - AN OPPORTUNITY TO REPLACE LEADERSHIP AND
MANDATE

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 1432

B. B) BAGHDAD 1434

C. C) USUN 325.

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001528

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017
TAGS: PREL UN IZ
SUBJECT: UNAMI - AN OPPORTUNITY TO REPLACE LEADERSHIP AND
MANDATE

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 1432

B. B) BAGHDAD 1434

C. C) USUN 325.

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).


1. (S) Summary. The August renewal of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) mandate and expiration of
Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) Ashraf
Qazi's third term in office provide an opportunity to expand
UNAMI's contribution to reconciliation, especially in the
areas of constitutional review, Kirkuk, disputed border
resolution, and national dialogue. The UNAMI mandate should
explicitly reference these new missions, while continuing
existing capacity building and reconstruction in the areas of
electoral assistance, civil society, rule of law, and
humanitarian aid. In selecting the leader for this renewed
effort, a non-Muslim SRSG may be the best positioned to
escape perceptions of bias and gain the confidence of the
Government of Iraq (GOI).
End Summary.

--------------
A ROCKY HISTORY, BUT OPPORTUNITIES TO LEAD
--------------


2. (S) SRSG Qazi's UNAMI mission has had a rocky presence in
Iraq over the past three years. In August 2004 SRSG Qazi
inherited a UNAMI still reeling from the shock of the August
19, 2003 Canal Hotel bombing which killed 22 people,
including SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello. Under Qazi's cautious
hand, UNAMI provided limited assistance to the GOI in five
core areas: (1) technical assistance to the Constitutional
Review Committee (CRC),(2) electoral assistance to the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC),(3)
humanitarian aid and protection to IDPs and refugees, (4)
protection of human rights and rule of law, and (5)
development and reconstruction of civil society.


3. (S) Unfortunately, UNAMI activities have stagnated over
the past two years as enthusiasm has evaporated. Staffing
was reduced from 104 to 55 in the fall of 2006, UNAMI
headquarters were split between Amman and Baghdad, and most
humanitarian and civil society functions have been moved to
Amman. Although technical assistance to the CRC and IHEC
continue, humanitarian efforts, capacity building and
reconstruction of civil society have all but vanished. There
has also been a lack of political will at UNAMI to actively

pursue or attempt to broaden their mission.


4. (S) UNAMI has the opportunity to play a much more
substantive role in Iraq by tackling in a constructive manner
some of the most sectarian issues dividing the country.
These include some or all of the following: (1) arbitrate the
status of Kirkuk, (2) arbitrate provincial border disputes
beyond Kirkuk, (3) broker the constitutional review, (4)
guide a national dialog on reconciliation, and (5) engage in
governorate capacity building. Deputy SRSG for Political
Affairs Michael Schulenburg has drafted several papers
proposing these areas of engagement.

--------------
OBSTACLES TO A DEEPER ENGAGEMENT
--------------


5. (S) When pressed on the staff drawdown and missed
opportunities, UNAMI interlocutors revealed a number of
issues they feel block greater engagement. These include an
outdated and soon expiring mandate that focused primarily on
the transition period prior to GOI sovereignty, a perception
of antagonism from the GOI for the scandal-ridden Oil for
Food program, a perception by Iraqis that UNAMI has a Sunni
bias, low risk tolerance at the Department of Political
Affairs at UN headquarters in New York, logistical
difficulties to travel around the country, the lack of
permanent facilities, a headquarters function split between
Amman and Baghdad, conflict between the Deputy SRSG for
Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP Iraqi leadership, and an SRSG
who is completing a three year tour, making him the longest
serving SRSG at any UN mission.


6. (C) In recent weeks UNAMI momentum has been further
disrupted with the resignation of Deputy SRSG for
Humanitarian Affairs Jean Marie Fakhouri and the mishandling
of the release of the first quarter 2007 Human Rights Report.



7. (S) However, a number of supposed obstacles cited by SRSG
Qazi are not credible and would not block efforts backed by
sustained political will. For example, Chief Electoral
Advisor Sandra Mitchell is leading the largest engagement of

BAGHDAD 00001528 002 OF 002


electoral assistance and capacity building for the IHEC,
despite the clear expiration of UNAMI's previous mandate to
support the 2005 elections. Mitchell operates under a GOI
letter of invitation from Council of Representatives Speaker
Mashhadani, which she secured on her own initiative.
Mitchell surmounts the UNAMI staffing cap by entering into
arrangements to place excess team members in local NGOs.


8. (S) Post and our colleagues at the UK Embassy agree that
an opportunity now exists to address some of these obstacles
to a more robust and constructive UNAMI engagement.
Specifically, it may be productive to pursue changes in the
UNAMI mandate and install fresh leadership. This may unleash
a stronger political will within UNAMI that should overcome
many of the remaining perceived obstacles and heal the
distrust by the GOI for greater UNAMI engagement.

--------------
A REVISED MANDATE
--------------


9. (S) The current UNAMI mandate (UN Security Council
Resolution 1700) expires August 10, 2007. A new mandate
should expand UNAMI's role to focus on more substantive
issues of national reconciliation, as well as continue
current electoral assistance, humanitarian aid, and civil
society reconstruction. National reconciliation
opportunities exist to broker the constitutional review
process, arbitrate provincial boundary disputes, and lead a
national dialog on reconciliation. UNAMI could also play a
useful role in finding a solution to Kirkuk, if Iraqi
political parties allow it. SRSG Qazi has repeatedly told
poloffs, however, that he will not pursue these topics unless
they are explicitly affirmed in a new mandate. To be
effective, any renewal or expansion of UNAMI's mandate should
be preceded by a letter of invitation from the GOI.

--------------
FRESH LEADERSHIP
--------------


10. (S) SRSG Qazi's current term expires on August 10, 2007.
First appointed on July 14, 2004, Qazi's three years make him
the longest serving SRSG in any UN mission. However, post
and our UK colleagues observe that Qazi's risk aversion has
grown as his term has progressed. UNAMI staff members told
poloffs that Qazi repeatedly squashes attempts to increase
project staffing, and Deputy SRSG Schulenburg has stated that
UNAMI "does not have a vision." In addition, the mishandling
of the UNAMI human rights report reinforced the Prime
Minister Office's impression that UNAMI has a pro-Sunni bias
and that Qazi may not have full control over his
organization. The recent resignation of Deputy SRSG for
Humanitarian Affairs Jean Marie Fakhouri revealed that the
Amman portion of the UNAMI mission operates amid considerable
internal dissension and accusations of pro-Sunni bias.


11. (S) The expiration of Qazi's term and renewal of the
UNAMI mandate present an opportunity to install fresh
leadership, which could heal the rift between UNAMI and the
Government of Iraq. Prime Minister advisors have told
poloffs that only a non-Muslim SRSG will fully escape
perception of sectarian bias.
SPECKHARD