Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1511
2007-05-06 19:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON INTERMEDIATE RECONCILIATION

Tags:  PGOV KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #1511 1261953
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061953Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1042
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001511 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON INTERMEDIATE RECONCILIATION
MEASURES FOR PM MALIKI

REF: BAGHDAD 1499

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001511

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON INTERMEDIATE RECONCILIATION
MEASURES FOR PM MALIKI

REF: BAGHDAD 1499

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (C) Reftel identified intermediate measures PM Maliki
could take to keep momentum on reconciliation. We offer
three additional thoughts. First, the PM's office should
focus on making certain all reconciliation efforts are
announced publicly and well-publicized when they happen, both
in national and regional media. The PM has tended to
downplay details of his reconciliation efforts in order to
avoid antagonizing his Shia followers; however, national
reconciliation requires broad public support, and regional
governments need to see evidence of the GOI's outreach to
Sunnis. For example, GOI disbursal of funds to a province
should be accompanied by an announcement including the
amount, the province for which funds are destined, and the
use to which they will be put. The GOI should also draw
attention to the GOI's national-level works in heavily-Sunni
provinces.


2. (C) Second, the PM should consider appointing an ombudsman
who could help citizens seek exemptions or other remedies
currently available to those who have been subject to
de-Baathification orders. While the PM could not overturn
de-Baathification orders, he could lend the support of his
office to identifying procedural remedies that could help in
some cases.


3. (C) Third, the PM should accelerate -- and of course
publicize -- ongoing measures to compensate victims of the
Saddam regime, including Shia, Sunni, and Kurds, reminding
Iraqi citizens that they all suffered under Saddam. It
should also help condition Iraqis to accept the reversal of
some de-Baathification measures if they see that Saddam's
victims were receiving help as well as those that benefited
from Baath Party membership.
SPECKHARD