IRAQI PM OUTLINES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000148

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI PM OUTLINES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN
IMPLEMENTATION


Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd
(d).


1. (C) Summary: On January 13, the PM briefed the
Ambassador on his plans for implementing the new Baghdad
security plan, in the presence of the team he has assembled:
Shiite VP Mehdi, who will coordinate political support;
Sunni DPM Zawbai, in charge of bringing services to cleared
areas; Kurdish DPM Saleh, in charge of economic support; and
Shiite PM spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh, in charge of media
aspects. The PM previewed some of the plan's security
aspects and promised the group a more in-depth briefing. End
Summary.

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PM: Important that GOI and USG Not Disagree Publicly
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2. (C) The PM emphasized that the GOI and USG not disagree
publicly as the Baghdad security plan moves forward. He
expressed concern that USG public statements about deadlines
and timetables were inconsistent with Iraqi sovereignty.

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Four Support Committees
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3. (C) The PM said committees focusing on politics,
services, economics and the media will support the security
plan. The service committee, headed by Sunni DPM Zawbai,
will focus on bringing electricity, water and other municipal
services "right away" to cleared areas. Shiite VP Abdul
Mehdi heads the political committee, tasked with generating
political support for the plan. Kurdish DPM Barham Saleh
heads the economic committee, which will provide financing
and other economic assistance needed for the plan to move
forward. The media committee will be headed by PM spokesman
Ali al-Dabbagh and Yassin Majid, also of the PM's office.
The PM urged Zawbai, Mehdi, Saleh and al-Dabbagh to make sure
their committees include members of all Iraq's ethnic groups.
The final support for the plan, the PM added, is the USG.


4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Embassy had briefed
DPMs Zawbai and Saleh on the types of support the USG could
provide; our comparative advantage is speedy deployment of
resources, the Ambassador added. The PM said Iraqi
resources would come quickly as well; the Ambassador welcomed
this and said the GOI would do well to speed up budget
execution in support of the plan.

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Political Support for the Plan
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5. (C) VP Mehdi emphasized the need for the committees to
include well-known political figures from all ethnic groups.
Part of the political effort will be directed at building
public support in Iraq, the U.S. and regional countries. He
asked to be informed about how long the security plan lasts,
what it would entail, and when it would peak; the PM said
military commanders would brief those details.

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Restoring Services
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6. (C) DPM Zawbai said he had met with U.S. officials,
Baghdad's governor, mayor and provincial council members, and
officials in charge of electricity. Zawbai plans services
operations centers on both sides of the Tigris river, one in
Baghdad's Karkh district, the other in Rusafa. Zawbai said
he had also discussed with the Electricity Minister the
importance of having electricity at night, to help work crews
and help authorities enforce curfews. Zawbai added that he
had met with Embassy DCM and would be forming joint teams
with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO).
Services go hand in hand with security, Zawbai said, and he
would coordinate with military officials to protect personnel
working to restore services. The Ambassador suggested Zawbai
also consider some measures to restore banking services.

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A Realistic Expectation: Changed Trends
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7. (C) DPM Saleh acknowledged the plan would not work
overnight; "changed trends" are a more realistic expectation.
Saleh proposed the group meet weekly. Echoing the PM, he
stressed that the plan's "political faces" must come from ll

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sects, especially Sunni. Saleh urged the PM to direct
ministries on the specific steps needed to implement the PM's
plan, especially the Construction and Health Ministries; he
asked the PM to help with the Health Ministry. Saleh said he
would focus on budget execution, particularly on services.


8. (C) On hydrocarbons, Saleh told the Ambassador the draft
law would be finalized "today" and the agreed draft law would
be presented to the Council of Ministers January 18. This
would send a strong positive message to Iraqis and to the
world. Saleh said it would be important to brief the plan to
donor country ambassadors and to the EU.

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The Importance of One Voice and No Public Splits
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9. (C) Al-Dabbagh also asked to be briefed on the plan in
order to be able to put together a media plan; he called for
there to be a single GOI source authorized to make public
statements. VP Mehdi stressed that the GOI must not split
publicly about the security plan, even if internal
differences arose.


10. (C) The Ambassador told the group that, as in the
security sphere, the USG would follow the GOI's lead on the
plan's service and economic aspects. He also suggested that
VP Mehdi's political committee help push key legislation
through the Council of Representatives (CoR).

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PM Previews Security Measures
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11. (C) The PM said the group would meet again before the
plan was officially launched. Security is the basis for
political progress, the PM said, and President Bush seemed to
be thinking in the same way. The PM stressed that there
would be no political interference in the plan's military
operations and no sanctuary for terrorists. He said he had
contemplated starting operations January 15 but more
preparation is needed. He noted that some trenches have been
dug around Baghdad, there have already been some detentions,
and force deployments have begun. The PM told the group
there would be 28 fortified checkpoints around Baghdad with
over 30 people manning each, including Coalition Forces (CF).


12. (C) DPM Zawbai pointed out that, in the past, official
Iraqi government vehicles had violated curfews and this had
caused problems. The PM replied that official vehicles would
not be allowed to depart government offices after working
hours. The Ambassador urged the PM to also think about
routing of cars and parking restrictions that should be
enforced.
KHALILZAD