Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD147
2007-01-15 08:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CODEL BAYH/CLINTON/MCHUGH MEETS WITH IRAQI LEADERS

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7969
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0147/01 0150823
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150823Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9082
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000147 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL BAYH/CLINTON/MCHUGH MEETS WITH IRAQI LEADERS

Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000147

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL BAYH/CLINTON/MCHUGH MEETS WITH IRAQI LEADERS

Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On January 13, 2007 Senator Bayh (D-IN),
Senator Clinton (D-NY) and Representative McHugh (R-NY 23)
met with the Iraqi government leadership over lunch, and then
held separate meetings with Prime Minister Al-Maliki and Vice
President Abdul Mehdi. Many of the CODEL's questions focused
on the new Baghdad security plan, with Iraqi leaders
emphasizing that this time Iraqi forces will be in the lead.
CODEL members voiced support for Iraq but pointedly added
that the GOI needs to demonstrate results soon. End Summary.

--------------
Lunch with Iraqi Leaders
--------------


2. (C) CODEL Bayh attended a lunch meeting with Council of
Representatives (CoR) Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, National
Security Advisor (NSA) Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Deputy Prime
Minister Barham Salih, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshyar
Zebari, and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Rafi
al-Asawi. Speaker Mashhadani told Codel Bayh the GOI was
focused on restoring the strength of the state, bringing its
citizens into the political process, and moving forward with
national reconciliation. He characterized the American
presence as vital to both Iraqi security and politics but
said solutions should come from the Iraqis, with support and
assistance from the Coalition. Mashhadani said that with
Iraqis vice Americans in the lead, the GOI can show the Iraqi
people that they are capable of rebuilding the Iraqi state
and that the Coalition presence is friendly and beneficial.
Mashhadani said he considered the CoR as representing all
components of Iraqi society and the only institution capable
of making decisions without pressure from outside parties
such as the Coalition.


3. (C) NSA Rubaie asked Codel Bayh for patience, saying that
2003 represented a paradigm shift for Iraq and the change
would take a long time to settle in the region. He described
the new Baghdad Security Plan as completely and radically
different because the Iraqis were in the lead, and Coalition
forces were playing supporting roles in logistics,
intelligence, and airpower. He emphasized that every patrol
would contain Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and Coalition forces

to ensure the forces would act in a nonsectarian manner. In
response to a question from Senator Clinton, he said the
biggest challenge to success was getting the political
parties to speak in one voice.

--------------
Meeting with PM Maliki
--------------


4. (C) Noting the media assembled to cover the CODEL visit,
Prime Minister Al-Maliki noted that expanded media was one
accomplishment of the Iraqi and U.S. The PM called Iraq "the
best democratic system in the region." He noted that
bloodshed was being perpetrated by those who fear democracy,
and it is important to also remember what has been
accomplished in Iraq.


5. (C) Senator Clinton said the U.S. shares the PM's sense of
accomplishment and is aware of how much Iraqis have suffered
and how much courage they have shown. She congratulated the
PM on the steps he had taken to improve Iraqis' lives. The
Senator said she was encouraged to see the PM had developed a
plan to end violence and asked the PM to explain how it would
move forward.

-------------- ---
PM on Security Plan: We Want This Responsibility
-------------- ---


6. (C) The PM called the plan a "continuation of our security
plans in the past." He said the plan had already begun and
was attacking areas where militias are. In addition to that,
what distinguishes this plan is Iraqi command and leadership,
which had not been true in previous efforts. Coalition
Forces (CF) are in a support role, he added, "but we will
take responsibility, do the work and take the casualties. We
want this responsibility." The PM said some terrorist and
militia leaders had already been detained.


7. (C) The PM also highlighted that he had ordered no
political interference with military commanders, that all
lawbreakers will be dealt with equally regardless of sect,
and that there will be no sanctuaries for lawbreakers
anywhere in Baghdad. The PM also highlighted the political,
economic, services and media committees he had set up to
support the plan. Finally, he noted that the plan is an
opportunity to build and train Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),

BAGHDAD 00000147 002 OF 003


which would eventually allow U.S. troops to retire to bases
and withdraw from Iraq.

-------------- -
CODEL: The Necessity of Demonstrable Progress
-------------- -


8. (C) Senator Clinton replied that, for U.S. support to
continue, U.S. leaders would have be able to demonstrate
progress along the lines the PM described. Congress wants
the plan to succeed. The Senator called the PM's January 6
speech "helpful" in explaining the plan's goals.


9. (C) Senator Bayh told the PM that the U.S. public hopes
for the plan's success and that it would allow a reduction of
the U.S. presence in Iraq. However, Senator Bayh noted, U.S.
leaders need to assure the U.S. public that the GOI is
serious about progress and would see things through. Bayh
asked the PM about his plans and timetables for legislation
in hydrocarbons, de-Ba'athification and constitutional review.


10. (C) On hydrocarbons, the PM said there is only "one small
disagreement" that he expected resolved within days. The GOI
would urge the Council of Representatives to act on
hydrocarbons, de-Ba'athification and constitutional review.
He noted that in a January 6 speech he had opened the door to
the return to the army of former officers who had served
under Saddam but did not have "blood on their hands," which
would help reconciliation.

--------------
PM Iraqi Security Capabilities
--------------


11. (C) Representative McHugh asked whether the PM shared the
objective of Iraq taking over security for 17 of Iraq's 18
governorates by November. The PM said the GOI would be
prepared to do this before November. Mentioning U.S.
casualties, the PM said he wants to reduce them and ease the
political pressure on U.S. leaders. In return, Iraq is
asking for authority over security matters and light to
medium weapons for the ISF, so that U.S. soldiers can "get
off our streets and go home." He predicted that the GOI
would be able to build up the ISF sufficiently in three to
six months to constitute a viable alternative to U.S. forces.


12. (C) Senator Bayh asked whether the PM thought a U.S.
troop "surge" is a mistake. No, the PM replied, this will be
temporary and accompanied by a surge of Iraqi troops from all
over the country. The bulk of the effort will be on Iraqi
shoulders; the best support the U.S. could give would be air
support. The surge, he said, would actually be the first
step toward reducing the U.S. troop presence.

--------------
Iraq's Neighbors
--------------


13. (C) Senator Clinton asked the PM's views on Iraq's
neighboring countries. The PM said that one reason for
Iraq's tensions with its neighbors is U.S. tensions with
them. In addition, neighbors are interfering with Iraq; they
"fear Iraqi democracy."


14. (C) Senator Clinton inquired whether U.S. engagement with
Iran and Syria would be helpful to the PM's plan. The PM
replied "for sure," with the caveat that "but this will not
end problems between us and other countries." It would be
helpful for Iraq for the U.S. to solve its problems with
Iraq's neighbors. The most important thing is for Iraq to be
able to make independent political decisions. Iraq should be
a buffer between Iran and the Arab world, not tilted toward
either, which would be bad for the region.

--------------
Meeting with VP Abdul Mehdi
--------------


15. (C) Later that same afternoon, the Ambassador and CODEL
Bayh (without Senator Clinton) met with Vice President Abdul
Mehdi. Senator Bayh confirmed that "we want to stand with
you" but that there was a sense of urgency. "What is a
reasonable expectation for a time line showing when things
can be done," asked the Senator. Vice President Mehdi opined
that "we still think we can succeed," because (1) the Iraqi
people are still with us, (2) we have the support of the
U.S., and (3) we have a national unity government. He then
enumerated the successes to date: a successful transition
from dictatorship to democracy, elections, constitutional
referendum, and a high rate of participation. Senator Bayh
acknowledged that the Iraqi rate of participation in the 2005

BAGHDAD 00000147 003 OF 003


elections was much higher than in the typical U.S. election.


16. (C) Vice President Mehdi felt that political progress
would be made for two reasons: the execution of Saddam
Hussein, which closed a chapter in history and dispelled
Ba'athist illusions of return, and the new Baghad Security
Plan. As examples of impending progress, he noted that the
constitutional reform committee should be completed in six
months, and that a draft investment law was almost finished.
He added that with Saddam's execution, de-Ba'athification was
now a closed issue.


17. (C) Senator Bayh said that "time has not been our
friend," and that "the American people hope you will act
urgently, in your own best interests." Vice President Mehdi
acknowledged the importance of national reconciliation by
stating that "when we share power, we tell the Shia that
although we are the majority, we still have to respect the
rights of others and share the country." With respect to
regional affairs, Mehdi observed that many border issues are
left over from Saddam's era, and cannot solve themselves in
only four years.


18. (C) The CODEL did not clear this cable.
KHALILZAD