TWO DAWA LEADERS SAY DEBAATHIFICATION WILL BE HARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001463

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: TWO DAWA LEADERS SAY DEBAATHIFICATION WILL BE HARD
SELL

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

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Small Signs of Political Reconciliation
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1. (C) In separate conversations with PolCouns April 28 and
29, Dawa leaders and Council of Representatives (CoR) members
Ali al-Adeeb and Haider al-Abadi mentioned small signs of
Shi'a and Sunni politicians working together but indicated
that deBaathification reform would be hard to achieve in the
next two months. Al-Adeeb recounted his experience at a
reconciliation conference he had attended the previous week
in Beirut that included Salafis and Baathists. While he said
that CoR member Abdulnasir al-Jinabi (National Dialogue
Council) tried to torpedo the dialogue by insisting on
dissolving the CoR and negating the consitition, he
characterized several of the Sunnis in attendance, including
Baathist Khalid al-Mai'ene and Association for Muslim
Scholars member Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi, as "moderate."
Al-Adeeb acknowledged that some of the requests of these
moderate Sunnis could be countenanced, including a quick
release of innocent detainees and, at some point, a pardon
for lesser criminals or oppositionists. Al-Abadi offered his
opinion that friction at the CoR between lawmakers of
different sects had declined, partly through working together
on projects like selecting the IHEC commissioners and partly
because Sunnis were now seeing al-Qaeda as the greatest
threat. "The Sunnis, and especially the IIP, are looking for
allies; we are ready," al-Abadi said.

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deBaathification Reform a Hard Sell
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2. (C) On deBaathification, however, al-Abadi argued that no
one in the Shi'a coalition was ready champion the reform
process because the Shi'a street perceived it as a process
that would reward Baathists. PolCouns argued that if Shi'a
coalition leaders themselves believed that reform was
justified, they should correct misperceptions on the Shi'a
street. She stressed how vital it was that Iraqi politicians
show the Iraqi people that they were making progress on
important national priorities. Both al-Adeeb and al-Abadi
stressed that Baathists were one important source of violence
in Iraq, noting that Shi'a would have a hard time supporting
a law that might allow some Baathists to return to work or
receive pensions when other (or perhaps even the same)
Baathists were engineering car bombs that caused large Shi'a
casualties.

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Other Issues: Provincial Powers, Kirkuk, etc.
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3. (C) Al-Abadi expressed optimism that the CoR would pass
the hydrocarbons law and the provincial powers law before it
went on summer recess. The government was now considering
the provincial powers law, he said, and was expected to
provide extensive comments to the CoR. For its part, the
Shi'a coalition, according to al-Abadi, had reassessed its
position and would seek a law that was the least
decentralized as possible given constitutional constraints.
He suggested that SCIRI was seeking to take electoral
provisions out of the provincial powers law (thus requiring a
separate elections law) in order to delay elections. Turning
to Kirkuk, al-Abadi said he did not think it could or should
be solved in 2007. The Shi'a, he said, "did not want to
facilitate Kurdish goals in Kirkuk or to be an obstacle." He
opined that U.N. involvement would be a good idea, noting
that the TAL, to which Article 140 refers, mentions this
possibility. Al-Adeeb expressed concern that the Baghdad
Security Plan was focusing on Shi'a neighborhoods, suggesting
that biased intelligence from the INIS might be to blame.
CROCKER