UNAMI BROACHES POSSIBLE ROLE IN THE KIRKUK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001432

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2017
TAGS: PREL UN IZ
SUBJECT: UNAMI BROACHES POSSIBLE ROLE IN THE KIRKUK
REFERENDUM

Classified By: Classified by Deputy Political Counselor Robert Gilchris
t for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The United Nations Assistance Mission for
Iraq (UNAMI) has suggested that it may be able to play a
constructive role in resolving the final status of Kirkuk and
other disputed territories as outlined in Article 140 in two
"informal" documents given to poloffs by UNAMI Deputy Special
Representative to the Secretary General (D/SRSG) Michael
Schulenburg. The analysis states that based on the December
2005 election results may be possible to draw a first
indicative regional border line along the entire stretch of
contested territories based on district level local
majorities for or against the Kurdish alliance. End Summary.

--------------
KIRKUK ISSUE NOT RIPE FOR A REFERENDUM?
--------------


2. (C) D/SRSG Schulenburg in several recent conversations
with the Embassy discussed possibilities for a greater UN
role in a resolution of Kirkuk and other disputed
territories. He opined that a referendum (which under the
Iraqi constitution must be held on Kirkuk by year's end)
should only be the final affirmation of a successful
political process. Schulenburg presented post with a
document that he called an "informal and uncleared" analysis
of Kirkuk. In the analysis, UNAMI has posited that a
referendum on Kirkuk could only be successful if political
decisions are made first on four critical questions: (1) what
is the definition of "Kirkuk" - i.e. which historical borders
will be used; (2) what is the definition of "disputed"
territory - i.e. what dispute threshold must be met to
qualify; (3) what is the definition of disputed "territory" -
i.e. governorates, districts, or sub-districts; and (4) what
is the precise wording of the ballot question.


3. (C) UNAMI's informal analysis points out that any
political process which successfully answers these four
questions -- to the degree that it achieves a consensus among
the various sectarian and ethnic groups concerned -- will
also solve the Kirkuk crisis. "I do not think they will
resolve these issues by November, and to vote on a referendum
prior to completing the political process will only make
matters worse," D/SRSG Schulenburg asserted to post, a
statement which has been echoed by SRSG Qazi.


4. (C) Although acknowledging that the Kurds have sought to
move ahead with a referendum, in Schulenburg's view the Kurds
"have the most to lose if they proceed precipitously" as they
would antagonize the Turks as well as other Iraqis who have
legitimate ties to Kirkuk. He believes they should suspend
the referendum timing and engage in a process of negotiation.
Obtaining a result acceptable to Turkey, Iran, and Iraqi
Arabs would be critical to the long-term viability of the
Kurdistan region.

-------------- --
A DIVIDING LINE: DECEMBER 2005 ELECTION RETURNS
-------------- --


5. (C) UNAMI's analysis states that based on the December
2005 election results it may be possible to draw a first
indicative regional border line along the entire stretch of
contested territories based on local majorities for or
against the Kurdish alliance. The December 2005 elections
provide some guidance on what a solution might look like. In
these elections about 90% of all voters voted along sectarian
and ethnic lines. In addition, the high turnout out of 76%
made those results fairly representative. These elections
produced surprisingly clear majorities at the district level
- in most cases as much as two thirds majorities. Along the
contested stretch of border, only three districts had no
clear majorities, and even those may be clearer cut at the
sub-district level.


6. (C) UNAMI interlocutors have suggested the UN mediation
contribute to this process, although they have not specified
what this mediation may look like. Their analysis asserts
that four pre-conditions should be in place to ensure the
most effective UNAMI involvement: (1) UNAMI's role as an
international mediator must be clearly defined; (2) the UNAMI
must have international support to mediate an internal Iraqi
regional border conflict, preferably through a new Security
Council Resolution; (3) UNAMI must have the concurrence of
Iraq's central and regional governments; and (4) UNAMI must
be given the necessary financial, operational and logistical
support to fulfill its tasks as mediator.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------

BAGHDAD 00001432 002 OF 002




7. (C) With little visible progress by Iraqis in recent
months toward reaching decisions on Kirkuk, an enhanced role
for the UN may be an option for spurring more dialogue. UNAMI
has pledged to provide post with further suggestions in
coming weeks.
CROCKER