Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1417
2007-04-26 07:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

REMOVING IRAQ'S YELLOW CAKE

Tags:  KNNP MOPS PARM PGOV PINS PTER TRGY IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7621
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1417/01 1160744
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 260744Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0911
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001417 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR SECRETARY RICE AND SECRETARY GATES FROM AMBASSADOR
CROCKER AND GENERAL PETRAEUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: KNNP MOPS PARM PGOV PINS PTER TRGY IZ
SUBJECT: REMOVING IRAQ'S YELLOW CAKE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1252

B. STATE 38641

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001417

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR SECRETARY RICE AND SECRETARY GATES FROM AMBASSADOR
CROCKER AND GENERAL PETRAEUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: KNNP MOPS PARM PGOV PINS PTER TRGY IZ
SUBJECT: REMOVING IRAQ'S YELLOW CAKE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1252

B. STATE 38641

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request (see paragraph 7).


2. (S) SUMMARY: We believe that it is time for the US to
remove the 550 tons of yellowcake uranium stored at the
Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. We do not believe that the
Iraqi government will be able to sell it to an appropriate
buyer in the near future and further delay poses a growing
risk of theft or misuse of the yellowcake and attendant
negative repercussions for our efforts here. With U.S.
combat troop presence approaching its peak, the next few
months offer our best opportunity to safely remove the
material. Costs incurred in the yellowcake's removal can be
recovered upon completion of its sale. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
PROPER DISPOSITION IS BEYOND GOI'S CURRENT CAPACITY
-------------- --------------


3. (S) Iraq has failed to find an appropriate buyer for the
yellow cake -- currently valued at 100 million dollars -- and
is unlikely to do so in the future despite our assistance.
In fact, Minister of Science and Technology Ra'id Jahid has
disclosed that Iraq has made no attempt to find a buyer and
has not yet begun the required legal and administrative
procedures necessary to complete a sale (ref a). Senior
Iraqi officials on several occasions have reiterated
willingness to work closely with us to remove the yellowcake
immediately and accept reimbursement, less expenses, after
the sale (ref a). This appears to be our best solution to
the problem. It seems clear that if we do not remove it, the
yellowcake will remain in an increasingly vulnerable
warehouse at progressively greater risk to loss, misuse, or a
sale against our interests to a buyer like Iran.

--------------
REMOVAL TOO COMPLEX FOR IRAQ
--------------


4. (S) Finding a buyer for the yellowcake, agreeing to terms,
executing a sale and receiving payment are tasks that have
proven beyond the capacity of the Iraqi government to
execute. It is also highly unlikely that the Government of
Iraq could satisfactorily comply with the numerous
international shipping and safeguarding regulations on its
own. As these complexities illustrate, we cannot depend on
Iraq to dispose of the yellowcake and should take measures to
remove it ourselves.


5. (S) The physical removal of the yellowcake and its
shipment out of Iraq, while logistically onerous, is
feasible. Logistical and security contracting firms
currently operating in Iraq, stand well equipped to carry out
this effort. Costs incurred in the removal can be reimbursed
to the US from the proceeds generated by the yellowcake's
sale.

--------------
SECURITY AT TUWAITHA AT ITS PEAK
--------------


6. (S) The present coalition security infrastructure and
operations, including the establishment of a Combat Outpost
within the Tuwaitha complex's outer perimeter are sufficient
to allow the safe removal of the yellowcake. Security at
Tuwaitha is unlikely to get better than it is now.
Tuwaitha's security level could begin to decrease, at least
marginally, once the Combat Outpost is withdrawn, which could
take place as early as August, after our troop surge passes
its peak.

--------------
REQUEST DECISION TO REMOVE YELLOWCAKE
--------------


7. (S) Removing the yellowcake will be complex but this is
the right time to execute the mission. Indefinitely delaying
the removal of over 550 tons of yellowcake uranium from a

BAGHDAD 00001417 002 OF 002


vulnerable warehouse storage facility is clearly not in our
national interest. We urge adoption of a plan immediately to
remove the yellowcake and provide for its long-term
disposition, with the goal of complete removal within six
months.
CROCKER