Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1392
2007-04-23 13:55:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

STAFF SHARE VIEWS ON IRAQI PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND

Tags:  PGOV PINR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3715
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1392/01 1131355
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 231355Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0878
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001392 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO INR/B

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: STAFF SHARE VIEWS ON IRAQI PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND
TRAVEL PLANS, LEADERSHIP STYLE

REF: BAGHDAD 1293

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist per 1.4 (b)
and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001392

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO INR/B

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: STAFF SHARE VIEWS ON IRAQI PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND
TRAVEL PLANS, LEADERSHIP STYLE

REF: BAGHDAD 1293

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist per 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (S) Summary: In a meeting on April 11, members of
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's staff told PolOffs
that Talabani's health continues to improve, but his
staff continues to try to limit his activities,
including his desire to travel. His staff shared
Talabani's techniques for fostering cooperation
among the Presidency Council, as well as for
creating an inclusive, intersectarian office. They
hinted that Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih is
being groomed for possible PUK succession and
clarified some economic issues reported in septel.
End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Talabani's Health Improving, Planning Trips to Asia, Mayo
Clinic
-------------- --------------


2. (S) Talabani's staff told PolOffs that Talabani's
overall health continues to improve. The staff recounted
that recently prior to a lunch Talabani hosted for the
Ambassador on April 11, he spent 15 minutes arranging the
place settings and food on the table, a habit that his
staff later said stemmed from his days cooking for his
Peshmerga. This prompted DPM Saleh to announce to the
Ambassador and guests at the lunch that Talabani was
"officially back to his old self." His staff, however,
told us that they continue to try to manage the daily
pressures placed on him by limiting his schedule as much as
possible. They admit that they did not inform the
President that the Ambassador had wanted to present his
credentials the day before they were actually presented.
They also are working to turn off some of his future
aspirations, including a trip to East Asian countries
tentatively planned for May that would include China, South
Korea, and Japan before going to the US for medical
treatment. They believe the multiple stops in Asia would
be too fatiguing and are hoping to limit it to just one
stop before arriving at the Mayo Clinic for a month or so
of treatment. One staffer appreciated Poloffs' suggestion
that they request U.S. assistance for this trip, but
replied that he thought it was being taken care of (Note:

in a subsequent conversation, another staffer told Poloff
that the Asia trip had been postponed until July or August
and Talabani would now travel to the UK to give a speech at
Cambridge University before going on to the U.S.).

-------------- --------------
The PUK and Talabani's leadership Style
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Staff told Poloffs that the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) is a reflection of Talabani's personality;
likewise, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is a
reflection of Barzani's - each has very different
management styles. As an example of Talabani's style, one
staff member recalled an impasse in 2003 when the Sunni and
Shia politicians refused to talk to each other. He said
Talabani instructed his staff to call 20 people from each
side (Sunni and Shia) to attend a lunch at his house. They
were instructed to say that due to security concerns, they
could not discuss who was invited. When the guests
arrived, they were ushered into separate rooms until all
were present. Talabani personally invited each of them
into the room for lunch because he knew they would not
refuse the President.


4. (C) Acording to one staffer, Talabani used similar
tactics with the current Vice Presidents; he looked for
opportunities to bring them together. He would often play
them against each other, i.e. "I'm leaving the country and
I'm delegating Vice President Hashimi to act on my behalf.
So, Adil, if you need something, please talk with Tariq,"
and vice versa. Through these confidence-building
measures, Talabani's staff believes he was able to foster a
natural collegiality among the two. Now, the VPs and
President often eat and meet together without the need for
Talabani to act as the catalyst.


5. (C) The staffer drew on Talabani's selection of Barham
Salih and Kosrat Rasul as deputy Secretaries General of the
PUK to illustrate that Talabani is grooming Salih as his
successor. (Note: In the past, Talabani's staff has
confided that Rasul's medical problems could prevent him
from being the face of the PUK.) Salih was a student, or

BAGHDAD 00001392 002 OF 002


protege, of Talabani's, and exhibits the same engaging
personality, boundless energy, and ability to bring people
together, according to the staffer. He joked about Salih's
inability to sit still in meetings, often using his PDA and
cell phones, or walking in and out of meetings while in
progress. The staffer commented that Qubad, Talabani's
son, was Barham's protege and also embodies a similar
leadership and personality style.

-------------- ---
The President's Staff: Inclusive but Not Perfect
-------------- ---


6. (C) According to the staffer, Talabani is inclusive - he
employs Sunni, Shia, Yezedi, Turkoman, and Kurdish staff in
the President's office on down to the cooks in his kitchen.
Even the Kurds are from different areas. His method of
hiring personnel was to go to party leaders and tell them
that he wanted a Sunni on his staff -- and they selected
this person for him. This led to better cooperation as the
person was chosen by the party to represent them on
Talabani's staff, and not vice versa. The staffer wondered
why others, such as Maliki, had not used this model. He
said that Maliki's immediate staff is especially sectarian
and mentioned that Maliki had appointed 85 new Directors
General and 650 military personnel working in some sort of
capacity for the PM that were all Shia. He said that
Maliki had begun his term in office in a more non-sectarian
way, but was starting to approach the style of the Jafari
government in its sectarian and isolationist leanings.


7. (S) Talabani frequently gets angry with his chief of
staff, Kamran Karadaghi, because he works slowly and
methodically, and tries to control things. The staff also
gets annoyed with Karadaghi because he tries to do
everything in a legal, proper manner. The way Iraq
operates, this often takes longer and is less effective,
Talabani's staffers claimed, hence the President's nickname
for his chief of staff: "Handbrake."


8. (S) Another staff member noted that Talabani's friend
and advisor Fakri Karim was enraged that he did not receive
a blue badge because he considers himself first among
Talabani's advisors. It is a status issue for him as the
rest of the immediate staff has blue. The staff did not
seem to think highly of Karim and noted that Karim is often
not in country, as he spends much of his time in Syria.


9. (S) Comment: While the staff members painted a rosy
picture of the collegiality of the President's staff,
closer examination of his immediate staff exposes fissures.
Although they show a good public face, privately, each
voices frustrations about the others. At the same time,
when it comes to Talabani's welfare they are in complete
agreement. His staff takes turns taking the blame for
things they know will upset the president so that no one
gets fired. End Comment.
CROCKER