Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1308
2007-04-16 16:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT ACTION PLAN

Tags:  ETRD EINV KBCT IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #1308/01 1061645
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 161645Z APR 07 ZDK DE RUEHCB 7386 1071057
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0751
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001308 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: ETRD EINV KBCT IZ
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT ACTION PLAN

REF: A. STATE 42386

B. 2006 BAGHDAD 4690

C. 2006 BAGHDAD 4067

D. 2006 BAGHDAD 3797

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001308

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: ETRD EINV KBCT IZ
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT ACTION PLAN

REF: A. STATE 42386

B. 2006 BAGHDAD 4690

C. 2006 BAGHDAD 4067

D. 2006 BAGHDAD 3797

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: As requested in ref A, post has outlined an
aggressive action plan with mission-wide support and input
from State, Commerce and Treasury. Given the high-level
attention of events in Iraq, GOI officials will expect
important issues to involve pressure from all levels of the
USG. Increased pressure on the GOI may lead to Iraqi
politicians making public statements in support of the Arab
League Boycott. We understand Washington's request for an
aggressive action plan on this important policy issue. One
major positive development is that the Ministry of Health is
making concrete steps towards reform of its procurement
agency, a source of many of the ALB complaints. We look
forward to responses to the suggested plan from the April 19
Deputies meeting. End summary.

-------------- -
Effective GOI Engagement Requires VIP Pressure
-------------- -


2. (C) As detailed in ref B, Embassy Baghdad has repeatedly
raised concerns about the Arab League Boycott (ALB) at all
levels of the government. Our engagement is constrained,
however, by the lack of attention from high-level USG
officials during visits to Iraq. Iraqi officials understand
Washington's focus on events in the country, and expect that
important issues will be raised by visiting Assistant
Secretaries, Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and

SIPDIS
cabinet-level officials. Given the importance of engagement
on ALB as described in ref A, such visitors may want to focus
more on ALB during their visits in-country. We would
appreciate Washington support in briefing principals on ALB
engagement prior to their visits to Iraq.

--------------
Chief Enforcer of ALB No Longer in Power:
Progress at the Ministry of Health
--------------


3. (S/NF) Certain working-level engagement with specific
enforcers of the ALB, such as the Ministry of Health, has
been very difficult in the context of the Iraqi security
situation. As the head of a Sadrist Ministry, the Minister
of Health (MoH) was often constrained in his cooperation with

USG officials ) although recent detentions of MoH officials
have enabled engagement with more moderate elements. The
Ministry itself has been shelled in the past few months by,
one assumes, Sunni insurgents, and the building is off-limits
to visits from embassy personnel. The Health Attache has had
specific death threats levied against her, and requires extra
protection even within the International Zone. In one
instance, Econoff held a constructive discussion about ending
ALB enforcement with the Director General (DG) of Kimadia,
the procurement arm for the Ministry of Health; the DG was
removed from office by the Minister of Health the following
day (ref C).


4. (S/NF) As illustrated by the Department of Commerce's
list of ALB complaints, the Ministry of Health's procurement
arm is responsible for many instances of the boycott
language. Since the February arrest of the Deputy Minster of
Technical Affairs, mission engagement with the MoH has
greatly improved. Kimadia is understood to be a problem at
the MoH, and a USG-funded National Capacity Development
project is being developed to reform it. In the meantime,
the Prime Minister has signed an agreement to allow the US to
act as a contracting agent for Kimadia using the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) mechanism. Should this agreement be
finalized, Kimadia will have no ability to require ALB
language in its contracts, eliminating a major source of ALB
complaints in Iraq.

-------------- --------------
Increased Pressure May Lead to Increased Enforcement
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Iraqi politics encompasses a wide spectrum of
opinions and perspectives. Statements said during private
discussion can differ in both tone and meaning from those
made in public. Econoffs noted that the televised discussion
during the Council of Representatives (CoR) plenary debate on
the Investment Law included several strong proposals to
include ALB language in the law itself, yet low-profile
engagement with key members of the CoR Economic committee and
party leaders resulted in no such language in the final law
(ref D). An aggressive action plan may lead to a public
discussion of the issue that results in more, not less, ALB
enforcement. We should be aware of the possibility of this
outcome when devising the ALB action plan. Furthermore, the
next few months will be critical to the CoR review of the
hydrocarbon laws, and popular perception of trade pressure
from the U.S. may affect our ability to effectively argue
other policy priorities. Ongoing discussions with Gulf
Countries about Iraqi debt relief, including the
International Compact with Iraq launch on May 3 may also be
affected by the timing of this plan. Fair trade practices
remain a core U.S. policy priority, and Iraq's steps towards
accession to the WTO indicate that the leadership understands
the need for open trade.

--------------
ALB GOI Action Plan
--------------


6. (C) Embassy representatives from State, Treasury, and
Commerce have developed the following action plan from April
15 - June 30 2007:

April 15 - June 30 * Ongoing engagement with GOI
working-level officials, including staff from the Deputy
Prime Minister for Economic Affairs' Office, Ministry of
Industry and Minerals, Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of
Health (where possible).

April 22 * Embassy provides talking points to
all of the current IRMO Senior Consultants to deliver to a
consistent and aggressive message about the negative impacts
of ALB enforcement. We will ask Senior Consultants to report
ALB enforcement in procurement and contracting within their
assigned ministries.

April 15 - June 30 * High-level engagement by visiting
Assistant Secretaries, Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries
and Secretaries, particularly from the Departments of
Commerce, Treasury and State.

May 1 - May 15 * Urge Foreign Minister Zebari at the
Ambassadorial level to disband the ALB office at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and end Iraqi participation in ALB
meetings.

May 10 - May 20 * Enlistment of support of Deputy
Prime Minister for Economic Affairs to resolve existing
complaints of ALB enforcement, using the list of complaints
compiled by the Department of Commerce.

June 1 * GOI finalizes use of FMS to
contract for Kimadia procurement, eliminating a major source
of ALB complaints.

April 15 - June 30 * Encouragement by FCS for US
companies to immediately report any attempts at ALB
enforcement to the Dept of Commerce. Commerce is requested
to inform the Embassy of new complaints at the earliest
possible time.


7. (U) Post looks forward to review and comment of this
action plan.
CROCKER