Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ATHENS716
2007-04-11 07:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR PDAS VOLKER'S VISIT TO GREECE

Tags:  PREL PGOV OVIP GR 
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DE RUEHTH #0716/01 1010747
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110747Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8708
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000716 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP GR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PDAS VOLKER'S VISIT TO GREECE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000716

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP GR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PDAS VOLKER'S VISIT TO GREECE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Kurt: Welcome to Athens! Your expertise
on NATO/EU issues will send an important message to GOG
officials: that we see Greece as a productive partner on
such key issues as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Balkans development,
and a stable Middle East. Greece's reflexive
anti-Americanism makes it NATO-skeptic, and public wariness
can have political impact (as the recent dust-up over NATO
exercises in the Aegean showed). While we have worked well
with the center-right New Democracy government since it took
office in 2004, elections are due by March 2008 (and
generally expected earlier). Pre-election campaigning is
increasing, making it harder for the GOG to tackle the tough
stuff: lifting Afghanistan troop caveats, showing
flexibility on Kosovo, and sticking to its 1995 agreement
regarding Macedonia's entry into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Unlike some other EU countries, Greek focus on the
environment is minimal, and viewed largely in terms of its
potential contribution to alternative energy production. For
both the GOG and the public, the key bilateral issue is
Greece's participation in the Visa Waiver Program. In your
meetings, you can expect GOG officials to make their best
case; you can help by clarifying the bureaucratic obstacles
involved.

END SUMMARY.

STRENGTHENING NATO COOPERATION . . .


2. (C) There is no NATO ally whose public is as wary of
NATO as here in Greece. The recent incident involving a
cancelled exercise over the Aegean island of Agios Efstratios
was interpreted here as an example of NATO neutrality tilting
in Turkey's direction. Greek policymakers stated flatly that
the public needed, "for once," to get NATO support on record.
Greek NATO-skepticism impacts heavily on what the GOG is
willing to contribute to Alliance initiatives. In
Afghanistan, Greece has ponied up an engineering and a
medical unit -- but with caveats on the ability of these
troops to operate outside of Kabul. At the NATO Council in
late January, Greece pledged an additional 500,000 Euros to
assist the Hungarian-led PRT, but expects to offer only a

couple of civilian personnel (if that).


3. (C) Greece's commitment to NATO transformation goals is
hampered by its overwhelming focus on the perceived
territorial threat from Turkey. That threat remains the
guiding principle for Greek arms procurements, troop levels,
and commitments to international peacekeeping efforts. The
GOG has already indicated that it has about reached its
contribution limit. And Greek wariness of fellow ally Turkey
surfaced again during our negotiations over the transfer of
unused CFE entitlements, though the result was ultimately
positive.

WHILE ADVANCING PROGRESS ON REGIONAL ISSUES: KOSOVO . . .


4. (C) Greece is a major investor in the Balkans, and
stability there is a key concern. On Kosovo, they are
anxious about an early status settlement, they say before a
Serbian government is formally in place, but we suspect the
MFA seeks delay for its own sake. Greeks also talk in favor
of further changes to the Ahtisaari plan protect the Kosovar
Serbian population and its cultural heritage -- which they
say they hope would make the settlement more acceptable to
the GOS. We expect they are making these points firmly in EU
consultations. However, they have told us they will align
themselves with eventual EU consensus. We have underscored
that stability in Kosovo and the region is more threatened by
the absence of a settlement than it is by Ahtisaari's
proposals. And some businessmen seem to have grasped the
opportunity; we understand that the MFA soon may sponsor a
visit to Pristina by potential Greek investors.

. . . MACEDONIA . . .


5. (C) Such investment has made Greece the biggest foreign
investor in neighboring Macedonia, despite their bilateral
dispute over the country's name. GOG officials have recently
begun to qualify their stated adherence to the 1995 Interim
Agreement allowing Macedonia to join NATO/EU as FYROM; they
now emphasize possible objections from the Greek Parliament
to ratification for Macedonia's membership under the name of
FYROM. Some GOG officials, including PM advisor Bitsios and
Deputy FM Valinakis, have suggested postponing Macedonia's
NATO entry until the name issue is resolved. The atmosphere
has not been helped by provocative moves by the Macedonians,
such as re-naming Skopje Airport as "Alexander the Great."
All in all, progress on the name issue will be next to
impossible in this Greek election year, and if the election
takes place in October, it would leave little time for
resolution before NATO's Summit in April 2008. We have

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pointed out that for us Macedonia's membership depends on its
ability to meet NATO criteria -- and not on its bilateral
agenda with Greece. At the same time, we support resolution
of this issue via the existing UN mediation process.

. . . TURKEY


6. (C) The Karamanlis government has steadfastly supported
Turkey's EU candidacy. That policy, at least, has bipartisan
support from PASOK, which originated it. December's GAC
barely kept Turkey's candidacy on track despite the failure
of the Finns to find a compromise on the trade issue. With
pre-election posturing rising in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus,
the Turks are suddenly walking away from the UN's "July 8"
Cyprus process and the Greeks expect more trouble in the
Aegean. The GOG will be under the usual pressure to support
Cyprus, particularly over oil drilling leases. Cyprus is a
"third rail" which has burned many a politician here, and
with New Democracy down in the polls, Karamanlis will be
loathe to risk electrocution.

ENVIRONMENT/ENERGY


7. (C) Greek "green awareness" is relatively low. It
surfaces periodically, as during recent debate over the lack
of landfill for local garbage or opposition to GMO's in the
countryside. However, many see the potential for this
country to develop "clean energy" alternatives, such as solar
and wind power. This is a natural area for development,
particularly for energy-starved islands and agricultural
areas. U.S. investors are interested in getting involved,
provided there is a decent regulatory environment and they
get a fair shake from an otherwise oligopolistic business
structure. Emphasizing the U.S. record on clean air and the
environment can help counter the erroneous belief that U.S.
abstention from Kyoto means the U.S. is pro-pollution.


8. (C) We continue to stress the importance of energy
diversity with the GOG. During his recent visit, DAS Bryza
focused on GOG concerns as to whether Azerbaijan is fully
committed -- and able -- to supply the natural gas
interconnector currently under construction with Turkey and
slated to run through Greece to Italy (TGI). GOG nervousness
is understandable; it relies on Russia for its own
(admittedly now small) natural gas needs in the short-medium
term. Russia is also their partner (with Bulgaria) in the
Burgas-Alexandropouli pipeline venture. The GOG will look
for reassurance that we appreciate their commitment to energy
diversification, as well as a commitment from us to press the
Azeris to come through.

GEORGIA


9. (C) The small Greek minority in Georgia means the
situation there receives more attention by the GOG than it
otherwise would. Recently, however, Greece blocked agreement
in the PSC to expand the EU Special Representative's mandate
as well as other initiatives. They also opposed the Special
Representative's recent recommendations. Some of this may be
directly attributed to domestic politics (balancing, in
advance of a Putin visit, a perceived pro-U.S. stance on
missile defense). However, the GOG is also likely concerned
about setting precedents that could be applied on Cyprus. In
your discussions with MFA officials, it would be useful to
stress the importance of keeping the international community
united, particularly given the GOG interest in stability
there.

FOR GREEKS, THE ISSUE IS VWP


8. (C) For Greece, their major bilateral objective is
securing participation in the Visa Waiver Program. Greece is
the only one of the original EU 15 not participating in VWP.
The Attorney General approved Greece for inclusion in May
1999, subject to Greece's completing reforms of its passport
security and accountability procedures. However, Greece
failed to meet the passport deadline and no new countries
have been admitted since 9/11. In December and January,
State and DHS took the first steps to evaluate Greece's
candidacy, but DHS has since pulled back. Greece fully meets
the "economic/immigration" criteria, with low visa refusal
and overstay rates. During her recent visit to Washington,
FM Bakoyannis placed this at the top of her "to do" list. We
are quietly trying to temper their expectations, particularly
on timing, but if we were able to move on VWP, it would help
a lot in moving Greece on our own agenda items.


9. (C) The January 12 RPG attack on the Embassy
demonstrated that Greece still has to work -- hard -- on
countering domestic terrorism. While the GOG's immediate
response was immediate and cooperation has been excellent,
there is no arrest (or prosecution) in sight. We continue to
reiterate the importance of demonstrable progress to all GOG

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officials, and hope you will do the same.
RIES