MY WAY: GREECE AND NATO TRANSFORMATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000685

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS: NATO MARR MOPS PREL PGOV GR
SUBJECT: MY WAY: GREECE AND NATO TRANSFORMATION

REF: A. ATHENS 216

B. ATHENS 550

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Greece's fulfillment of its commitment to the
NATO Alliance in terms of defense transformation has been, at
best, mixed. Greece has taken some steps to reform its
military doctrine and strategic and tactical thinking. It
also has introduced some new institutions and procured new
systems. But, overall, Greece's focus remains on traditional
regional threats and, hence, traditional strategy and
tactics. A number of factors account for Greece's
transformation tardiness: budget constraints, the Greek
public's reflexive anti-Americanism -- and by extension,
anti-NATO feeling -- and the traditional obsession with the
Turkish "threat." Our challenge remains getting the Greeks
to look beyond their immediate neighborhood and to recognize
their own interests in NATO's broader strategic agenda. END
SUMMARY.

WHAT GREECE HAS DONE ...
--------------


2. (C) NATO has identified transformation of forces,
capabilities, and doctrine as critical for the Alliance in
the 21st Century. According to the Riga Summit Declaration
of November 29, 2006, defense transformation "is essential to
ensure that the Alliance remains able to perform its full
range of missions." The Greek foreign policy establishment
and military officially support transformation -- though it
is usually referred to in Greece as "evolution," emphasizing
a more gradual and somewhat less comprehensive concept of the
adaptation of forces. Greek military planning and strategy
documents emphasize the fundamentally new character of
warfare in the 21st Century, the significance of new
"asymmetrical threats," and the importance of adapting forces
and strategy to meet these new challenges. Hellenic General
Staff Defense Policy Director Brigadier General Aleksandros
Tsigaras told us the Greek military supports transformation

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and insisted that it was doing all it could, given Greece's
unique defense requirements and political and budgetary
capacities.


3. (C) Tsigaras pointed to a number of specific examples
where Greece was making contributions to NATO transformation.
One was the new deployable headquarters for a NATO division
or corps that Greece had set up and positioned in
Thessaloniki, to which many other allies had contributed.
Another was the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations
Training Center (NMIOTC) Greece had established at Souda Bay
on Crete to train NATO personnel for exercises such as
Operation Active Endeavor. Greece had donated patrol boats
to Georgia to help that country meet its Intensified Dialogue
goals of border security. At home, the Hellenic General
Staff had established an "Evolution Center" to plan and
oversee the Greek military's increased interoperability and
NATO transformation.


4. (C) In addition to the contributions Tsigaras noted,
Greece has consolidated its rapid reaction forces under its
2nd corps in Veria in northern Greece, established a
broadband communications satellite link with cartographic
work stations to permit mapping of remote locations, and
acquired a well-drilling and reverse-osmosis water
purification system for use in distant locations without
regular water supplies. Greece has also made modest
contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan (ref a) and
the Balkans.

...AND HASN'T DONE
--------------


5. (C) These efforts notwithstanding, Greece remains far from
achieving the transformational goals outlined by NATO. Its
military doctrine -- a new version of which was recently
announced -- continues to emphasize conventional warfare and
deterrence of the Turkish "threat." Greece's military
procurement system remains focused, at best, on traditional
weapons systems, such as F-16 fighters and heavy armor. At
worst, it focuses on buying incompatible and/or un-needed
weapons systems to score political points with European
governments. And while Greece has made modest contributions
to NATO's new missions -- the most critical being Afghanistan
-- its forces are hamstrung by caveats.

BUDGET WOES
--------------


6. (C) There are a number of reasons why Greece has trouble
with transformation. One is budget constraints. Greece
traditionally has maintained relatively high levels of
defense spending, higher as a proportion of GDP than the EU
or NATO averages. But more recently such outlays have become
unsustainable, and the New Democracy government has made
reductions a priority, with spending as a percentage of GDP
going from about 4.4 in 2005 to 3.5 in 2006 and targeted to
be under three percent in 2007. In such a fiscal
environment, the GoG has had to focus not on procurement of
new, more modern -- and potentially transformational --
systems but on meeting obligations for systems incurred in
the past. As editor of the defense monthly "Amyntika
Themata" Spyros Papageorgacopoulos told us, "despite all the
talk about procuring new systems, they are now only paying
their bills."

ANTI-AMERICAN DIALECTICS
--------------


7. (C) Another reason Greece drags its transformational feet
is the sometimes vague, sometimes pointed anti-Americanism --
and by extension, anti-NATO feeling -- that permeates much of
the Greek polity. A lengthy and lively discussion with
several defense analysts revealed various facets of this
phenomenon. Zacharias Michas, chief editor of "Geostrategy,"
said much of the Greek public has a knee-jerk reaction
against NATO expressed in slogans such as "NATO has never
helped Greece," "NATO is not good for peace," and "NATO can
hurt stability in the region." (NOTE: Cancellation of NATO's
participation in the February 27 military exercise at Agios
Efstratios following Turkish assertions of the island's
"de-militarized" status (ref b) was taken by many Greeks as
confirmation of their preconceptions about the Alliance. END
NOTE.) At the same time, Michas noted, Greeks got very upset
when Bulgaria and Romania entered the Alliance because that
ended the Greek monopoly on Balkan NATO membership. Pericles
Zorzovilis, correspondent for "Defense News," agreed on the
contradictory views many Greeks have about the Alliance.
While many disliked NATO's policies, they recognized its
value for meeting the pressing military needs of the country.
Maintaining a standing army of 140,000, Zorzovilis argued,
imposed an enormous financial cost, which the Greek budget
could not sustain without outside help.


8. (C) In such a paradoxical environment, the GoG has found
it difficult to commit itself fully to NATO. Greek
governments, Michas argued, had developed a defensive tactic
vis-a-vis evolving NATO initiatives that he described as
"katenatsio," an Italian term for a tight zone defense in
soccer. Defense analyst Konstantinos Grivas said Greek
governments always "play against the clock," trying to
postpone major decisions on Alliance matters or on assuming
greater responsibilities within the context of collective
action. It was this reluctance to get involved, the analysts
agreed, that kept Greece from deploying more troops to
Afghanistan or allowing the Greek troops already there to
leave their protected bases. As for transformation, Greece
embraced the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the concept of
reorganizing rapid deployment forces to add greater
flexibility to existing mission profiles. But beyond these
concepts, Zorzovilis noted, Greek politicians just could not
bring themselves to commit. Ever fearful of the impact of
new initiatives, Michas argued, Greek politicians worried
that transformation would spell changes that would hurt Greek
interests and negatively influence hard-fought domestic
political and military balances.

THE OBSESSION WITH TURKEY
--------------


9. (C) The third and perhaps most important factor shaping
Greek policy on NATO transformation is the 900-pound gorilla
of Greek politics -- the obsession with Turkey. It permeates
practically all aspects of Greek politics and, especially,
military policy. Former DefMin Spilios Spiliotopoulos, whose
views undoubtedly reflect the attitude of much of the Greek
military, said that at the heart of the current problems with
Turkey was Ankara's consistent refusal to act according to
the letter and spirit of international law and treaties. For
Spiliotopoulos, the Turks were constantly pushing the
envelope in the region. They "see talks of any kind as
opportunities to push new demands on the table so they can
demand more in the future and force a compromise on something
that was not identified as an issue in the first place."


10. (C) Such animosity had a direct impact on NATO policy.
NATO obligations notwithstanding, Greece's "primary need," in
Spiliotopoulos' view, was for troops ready to face "a
tactical army like the Turk." With 1,400 men serving abroad
in various missions, Greece had reached the "absolute limit"
of what it was able to do without risking its own defense.
NATO transformation, he said, was an important goal, but it
could only be pursued within the context of Greece's
overarching defensive policy against Turkey. Deputy director
of the MFA D2 Directorate for NATO Theodoros Daskarolis
succinctly summed up this position. "If you could guarantee
us protection against the Turks," Daskarolis said, "we could
do a lot more in Afghanistan and on NATO transformation."


COMMENT
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11. (C) When it comes to cooperation in the Aegean and
eastern Mediterranean, Greece has been forthcoming, meeting
specific requests for military assistance. Examples include
Greek support for the USN facility at Souda Bay and Greece's
generous offer on CFE entitlement transfers. Our challenge,
however, remains getting the Greeks to look beyond their
immediate neighborhood and to recognize their own interests
in NATO's broader strategic agenda. Our goal is to get
Greece to embrace genuine Alliance internationalism that sees
issues such as NATO transformation not as burdens imposed
from without but as self-generated imperatives.
RIES