FM BAKOYANNIS FOCUSED ON KOSOVO, MACEDONIA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 002305

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK
SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS FOCUSED ON KOSOVO, MACEDONIA IN
RUN-UP TO NATO, EU MINISTERIALS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DANIEL SPECKHARD.
REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D),


1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite visits this week by Egyptian
President Mubarak, Turkish FM Babacan, and UN mediator
Nimetz, FM Bakoyannis focused on two main issues in her
December 3 introductory meeting with Ambassador Speckhard:
Kosovo and Macedonia. On Kosovo, she "unofficially" urged
delaying a status decision until March, to give Tadic greater
traction in the Serbian elections. She had also pressed EU
colleagues to give a concrete message to the Western Balkans
regarding their EU future. Ambassador Speckhard pointed out
that, in our view, further delay would have a detrimental
effect on regional stability; EU unity would be essential in
the weeks ahead. Bakoyannis assured the Ambassador that --
provided the EU found a legal basis -- Greece would keep its
personnel in Kosovo and support technical assistance
programs. On Greece's bilateral dispute with Macedonia over
the name, Bakoyannis was firm: Greece would veto Macedonia's
NATO entry absent agreement on a mutully acceptable name.
Ambassador Speckhrd urged Bakoyannis to stick to the Interim
Areement, which was designed to keep this issue rom
impeding Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic course. Bakoyannis (who
discussed the issue last week with U/S Burns) maintained that
no Greek government could move any further than Karamanlis
already had; it was politically impossible. Bakoyannis was
optimistic, however, about the upcoming visit by Turkish FM
Babacan, saying that she looked for "momentum" in the run-up
to PM Karamanlis's January visit to Ankara. Finally, she
pushed for Greek admission to the Visa Waiver Program,
terming it the most important step the U.S. could take to
improve the bilateral relationship. END SUMMARY.

STRONG U.S.-GREECE TIES A FOUNDATION FOR COOPERATION . . .


2. (C) Ambassador Speckhard noted that shared interests
between Greece and the U.S. were the foundation of our
cooperative bilateral relationship. First, we share an
interest in Balkan stability, which is thinly rooted and
needs maturation. That means resolving the issues of Kosovo
and Macedonia's NATO entry. Second, we share an interest in
combating transnational threats. Greece, with its key
strategic location, can contribute both bilaterally and
through the EU, including in the areas of counter-terrorism,
trafficking and non-proliferation. Third, we share an
interest in regional stability, lowering Aegean tensions and
fiding a resolution of the Cyprus problem. Finaly, our
countries share an interest in expandig our economic
cooperation. These shared interests were one reason we
welcomed FM Bakoyannis's participation in the recent Anapolis
conference on the Middle East.

. . . IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . .


3. (C) Bakoyannis agreed that U.S.-Greece ties were strong.
She appreciated the invitation to Anapolis, as Greece was at
the crossroads between the Middle East and Europe. Moreover,
the presence of the Greek Patriarchate in Jerusalem meant
that it also had an interest in a final settlement.
Bakoyannis emphasized that the EU needed to support U.S.
efforts in the Middle East -- only the U.S. could put
sufficient pressure on the parties to bring a resolution.
The EU focus should be on the Palestinians, not just through
the Paris donor's conference, but also through infrastructure
projects that made a visible difference to everyday life.
Greece was prepared to support these EU initiatives.


4. (C) Bakoyannis added that Greece also sought to help
U.S. peace efforts bilaterally; for that reason, it sponsored
periodic Track II discussions in Athens. In addition,
Bakoyannis offered to host a follow-up meeting of women
political and business leaders in Athens on May 28 (a subject
she has discussed with Secretary Rice). As part of the "Next
Generation Activity" she had raised in Anapolis, she also
planned a ship-board program for Israeli and Palestinian
youth (ages 12-20) that would build contacts and
understanding while cruising the Greek islands.

. . . IN THE BALKANS, ESPECIALLY KOSOVO . . .


5. (C) Bakoyannis also agreed that there was a veneer of
stability in the Balkans -- but it was thin. That was why
Greece had pushed its EU partners for a credible, concrete
message to the Western Balkans about its EU future. For many
in the Balkans, the EU was important not because it offered a
common "roof" for different nationalities, but because it
offered economic development and prosperity. But that would
take time; these countries needed assurance that there was
light at the end of the tunnel.



6. (C) Focusing on Kosovo, Bakoyannis suggested that the EU
do as much as possible to prepare for "the next day,"
including laying the groundwork for its relationship to
Serbia. Bakoyannis -- speaking "unofficially" -- argued that
Kosovars should wait until March before taking any steps on
independence (she believed Thaci was prepared to do so at the
request of the U.S.). Waiting until March would get past
Serbia's elections, giving Tadic the only electoral chance he
had. Otherwise, the international community would face
another nationalist government, and have no moderate
interlocutor. Another reason that a status decision should
be postponed until spring: Pristina could face a winter
electricity cutoff by Serbia, which supplied 26% of its
electricity needs. That could prompt reprisals by Kosovar
Albanians against the Serbian minority.


7. (C) Ambassador Speckhard underscored our assessment that
Kosovo status could not wait another six months for
resolution without threatening the stability now in place.
EU unity on this point would be particularly important.
Bakoyannis agreed that EU unity was crucial, but maintained
that the Kosovar government could handle a 4 month wait. She
noted that the Romanian and Bulgarian FMs would visit Athens
on December 22, as a coordinated response by countries in the
region would be important in the EU context. Greece would
try to be "as constructive as possible," and -- provided the
EU found a legal basis -- would keep its military forces and
experts on the ground (and even send more).

. . . EVEN WHEN WE DISAGREE (MACEDONIA)


8. (C) Bakoyannis noted she had reviewed the Macedonia name
issue with U/S Burns in Madrid. The Karamanlis government
had take a bold policy decision to support a compound name
that included the word "Macedonia" -- and gained parliament's
agreement. But this was as far as any Greek government could
go. Bakoyannis admitted that it was "incredible" that, with
all the other issues in the region, it was Macedonia that
brought the Greek public to "explosion." If there was no
agreement on the name issue, Greece would not let Macedonia
join NATO.


9. (C) Ambassador Speckhard emphasized that the Interim
Agreement was designed to prevent exactly that, and the
United States expected the parties to abide by its
principles. Bakoyannis argued that U.S. recognition of
Macedonia had changed the situation. The government in
Skopje simply did not feel any pressure to do what the
Interim Agreement called for: negotiate on a mutually
acceptable name. Bakoyannis added that Skopje was now
considering changing their automobile license plates; did
they really think that would go over well when cars were
driven to Thessaloniki? Greece had agreed to support a
Macedonian as president of the UNGA, only to hear him call
his country "Macedonia" not "FYROM" according to UN rules.
Greeks were "not fools" any longer.


10. (C) Ambassador Speckhard urged FM Bakoyannis to look at
the issue more broadly. NATO expansion was another step
of European security -hplishments of both NAT` several
years. Thaal that the issue berl Bucharest summit.
Bakoy such stability must be ring on the U.S., as itQior to
its NATO entry, Romania had been pressed to sign a difficult
agreement with Ukraine -- and it did. Good neighborly
relations were essential for entry into the Alliance. The
Karamanlis government was making an intense effort, and so
was UN mediator Nimetz. But Greece needed a solution it
could live with. Bakoyannis admitted, however, that she was
not optimistic.

KEEPING UP MOMENTUM WITH TURKEY


11. (C) With FM Babacan due i Athens December 4,
Bakoyannis told the Ambasador she hoped for "momentum" with
Turkey. Te two governments were both recently elected, an
Greece openly supported Turkey's EU course. She noted that
Karamanlis's visit to Ankar (scheduled for January 28,
though not yet oficially announced) was the first by a Greek
PM in 48 years. She hoped that, during the visit, there
could be a clear declaration that there was no causus belli
between the two. It would take some negotiation, but a
statement indicating that two allies do not threaten each
other with war would be a positive step. It would help
propel Greek public opinion, and make it possible for
cooperation between parliamentarians. Bakoyannis also
planned to raise with Babacan the influx of illegal
immigrants coming from the Turkish coast; Greece would ask
Turkey to honor the existing bilateral agreement that
required them to take back migrants detained by Greek
authorities. Most of these were Kurds and Iraqis who had
made their way through Turkey to Greek shores. Ambassador
Speckhard told Bakoyannis he would discuss with Ambassador
Wilson in Ankara to see how the U.S. might be helpful in
supporting this historic opportunity for advancing the
relationship between Greece and Turkey.

WORKING TOGETHER ON ALLIANCE PRIORITIES


12. (C) Ambassador Speckhard expressed appreciation for
Greek contributions to Alliance efforts, which he urged be as
robust as possible. Bakoyannis suggested that it would be
useful for Defense Minister Meimarakis to visit the U.S., in
part to build knowledge of Greece's efforts. The Ambassador
questioned whether Greece could contribute additional
resources for Afghanistan, both personnel and equipment
(particularly helicopters). Bakoyannis responded that
helicopters were difficult due to shortages, but Greece had
offered forces for Kabul airport. And EU CFSP Rep Solana had
just called her to request a Greek plane for operations in
Chad.

A GREEK PRIORITY: VWP


13. (C) Bakoyannis added a bilateral priority to the
U.S.-Greece agenda: Greek participation in the Visa Waiver
Program. Both the MFA and the Embassy had made an immense
effort to persuade U.S. authorities that Greece was a
credible candidate. Greece was the only Schengen country not
part of VWP. It already met most criteria, and now had
state-of-the-art passports. She had discussed this with
President Bush as well as the Secretary who (she believed)
had committed to including Greece; there was no better step
to build the bilateral relationship than to extend VWP to
Greece. Ambassador Speckhard noted that a DHS evaluation
team was currently in Greece, and pledged to work with
officials in Washington on the issue.
SPECKHARD