MACEDONIA NAME DISPUTE AND NATO ACCESSION: GREEK

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 002288

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (GARBLED TEXT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK NATO
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA NAME DISPUTE AND NATO ACCESSION: GREEK
RESPONSE

REF: A. STATE 160890


B. ATHENS 2199

Classified By: Charge Tom Countryman. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: On November 29, Charge
delivered ref A points to MFA SecGen Agathocles.
Agathocles's response was frank: in his view, the U.S.
failed to appreciate Greece's concerns. The GOG was not
bluffing; the name issue must be resolved before the 2008
Bucharest Summit, or there would be no NATO entry for Skopje.
Agathocles rejected the idea of direct talks with Skopje on
cultural heritage and other issues prior to resolution of the
name issue via the Nimetz process. COMMENT: We had already
previewed these points with Agathocles; his reaction today
was equally firm though more controlled. Ambassador will
raise the issue in his introductory call with FM Bakoyannis
on December 3; we expect the FM will take an equally firm
line. Agathocles had few specifics to offer on the Nimetz
visit next week, a sign that the GOG is in listening mode --
with no new message to offer. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On November 29, Charge delivered ref A points to MFA
Secretary General Agathocles (FM Bakoyannis was in Madrid).
Charge noted that we had already previewed many of these
points informally (ref B). Now, with UN mediator Nimetz's
visit to the region scheduled for December 3 - 5, we had been
instructed to raise the issue officially in Athens and Skopje
to restate the USG position. Charge emphasized that the U.S.
had made no decision on Macedonia's candidacy yet. Our
decision would be based on Macedonia's fulfillment of NATO
requirements, including its progress on key reform issues.
It is our expectation that the 1995 Interim Agreement will
continue to be respected, and that Macedonia's candidacy will
be judged solely on its merits. The United States was not
seeking an invitation using Macedonia's constitutional name,
a point we are making with other NATO allies. Charge
underscored that dialogue was essential -- both within the
Nimetz process and in parallel. For that reason, we urged
both sides to open channels of bilateral dialogue on cultural
and other issues.


3. (C) Agathocles was concerned: was this a dialogue of
the deaf? The U.S. failed to appreciate Greece's concerns
about regional stability. Unless the name issue was resolved
before Bucharest, stability in the region could deteriorate.
The name was not a joke; Skopje was using it to plan,
long-term, for a revision of borders at Greece's expense.
Greece was not bluffing; there would be no NATO entry for
Skopje unless the name issue was resolved. Frankly, because
NATO is a military alliance, the question of Macedonia's
membership was even more serious than it was for the EU.
Agathocles argued that, unless the Nimetz process brought
results before Bucharest, Greek-Macedonian relations would
start to resemble Greek-Turkish relations "in the old days."


4. (C) Agathocles also questioned the utility of direct
talks; there was an international process under Nimetz. That
was the only vehicle for progress, and we should not give
Skopje the impression that they did not have to cooperate.
Charge countered that our message to Skopje was also to take
the Nimetz process seriously. But we sincerely believed that
Nimetz had a better chance of ultimate success if the two
sides were expanding their dialogue on all issues. Agathocles
stated that the GOM was using the name issue to build its
popularity -- as well as harboring irredentist ambitions
against Greece. Charge pointed out that this was the reason
why direct dialogue between the two governments on the issues
behind the name dispute -- cultural patrimony and education
-- was essential.


5. (C) Agathocles was blunt: the GOG did not trust Skopje.
Greece's good intentions were clear, and the proof lay in 12
years of economic investment by Greek firms there. Greece
would not open a bilateral discussion until and unless the
name issue -- the spearhead of the relationship -- was
resolved within the Nimetz framework. Agathocles admitted he
did not know what to expect from Nimetz's upcoming visit; the
GOG was prepared to listen. Above all, it wanted to clear up
the name issue, leaving no grey areas behind.
COUNTRYMAN