GREECE/MACEDONIA: MFA FINDS NIMETZ PROPOSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 002199

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA: MFA FINDS NIMETZ PROPOSAL
UNACCEPTABLE (BUT ISN'T SAYING SO NOW)


Classified By: CHARGE TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a November 9 meeting with MFA Secretary
General Agathocles, Charge summarized Ambassador Nuland's
message to the GOM: time was short if it planned to meet
NATO standards. Nuland had also urged the GOM to participate
fully in the Nimetz negotiations (and stop negotiating via
public statements). Charge emphasized the importance, as the
Nimetz process moved forward, of restraint by both sides,
recommitment to the Interim Agreement, and direct bilateral
dialogue on issues affecting the two countries. He also
noted that, should either side walk away from the Interim
Agreement, the basis of U.S. policy since 1995, we would need
to consider how to adjust our policy. Agathocles resented
the "threat," and argued that any bilateral dialogue with the
GOM would have to wait until after the name issue was
resolved. The name was the "spearhead" of Macedonia's
policy; once that was neutralized, the two countries could
move to CBMs. Agathocles, normally low-key, firmly rejected
any suggestion for bilateral discussions other than the
Nimetz negotiation. Speaking "personally" however, he termed
Nimetz's opening paper unacceptable; Greece saw it as an
opening gambit and had not rejected it at this stage. END
SUMMARY.

NOT REJECTING NIMETZ PAPER -- BUT NOT ACCEPTING IT EITHER


2. (C) Agathocles noted FM Bakoyiannis's visit to London
this week, terming her consultations on the Macedonia name
issue "positive" while admitting that he did not have a
precise readout of the discussion. Reacting to the Nimetz
proposal of November 1, Agathocles said that the GOG could
not accept it -- but realized that Nimetz was using it to
start discuss( it was important that me that would be used
ons and multilateral fr; it now accepted that could be used
in that na@ject the Nimetz paper, ascuttle the discussions
had resisted any public statements. Agathocles
appreciated Ambassador Nuland's visit to Skopje on November
8, and her influence on PM Gruevski's statements. The GOM
needed to realize that the GOG meant business.


3. (C) Agathocles suggested that the GOM was actually going
against the wishes of much of its public. Perhaps a slight
majority agreed with Gruevski that the name issue was of key
importance. The rest were more concerned with NATO entry and
economic development. Governments needed to lead; the GOG
had taken a constructive position despite the fact that 81%
of its public opposed a name that included the word Macedonia.


4. (C) Speaking personally, Agathocles stressed that any
proposed name must be used both in bilateral relations with
all countries as well as in multilateral fora. There would
need to be practical measures to guarantee this. Any attempt
by the GOM to reverse the agreement should carry consequences
in the EU and NATO. Charge pressed: did Agathocles mean to
say that, for the issue to be resolved satisfactorily, the
GOM would have to change its constitution? Yes, Agathocles
responded -- just to "add some words."

KEEPING PUBLIC STATEMENTS NEUTRAL


5. (C) Charge noted that Ambassador Nuland had focused on
NATO standards: the GOM was not making the progress needed
and time was short. Internal reform and ethnic
reconciliation were critical. On the name issue, she told FM
Gruevski firmly that his public statements were unhelpful and
worked against resolution of the issue. She pressed the GOM
to make clear it would continue negotiations through the
Nimetz process. Negotiating in public was
counter-productive.


6. (C) In our view, Charge said, both governments neededto
avoid public statements (we were pleased the GOG had avoided
press comments on the Nimetz paper). It was also our
expectation -- as it had been for 12 years -- that both sides
would recommit themselves to their obligations under the
Interim Agreement. Both sides needed to understand that U.S.
policy was based on the principle that the provisional name
"FYROM" would be used in international organizations until
such time as a solution to the name issue was agreed by both
parties. Agathocles countered that the GOG was not prepared
to let Macedonia enter NATO as FYROM ("that's out
completely.")

WHILE ENHANCING BILATERAL DIALOGUE


7. (C) Charge added that we also encouraged both sides to
establish direct bilateral channels to discuss all issues of
mutual concern. There was no substitute for direct dialogue.
It would be helpful if the GOG would formulate, in a concise
way, the specific examples of Macedonian irredentism or
misuse of Greek cultural heritage. That would make it
possible for specific issues to be addressed and resolved.
Agathocles noted that any list would also need to include
efforts -- government or otherwise -- to exploit the issue of
individuals claiming "Macedonian" origin in Greece. Such
efforts were orchestrated, though it was tough to prove GOM
complicity.


8. (C) When it came to direct dialogue, however,
Agathocles argued that all bilateral issues could be
discussed -- once the name issue was resolved. At that time
the GOG was prepared to offer the GOM a "substantial"
package. Charge disagreed; dialogue was essential to
confidence building on both sides. Agathocles stuck to his
guns, however, arguing that the name issue was the
"spearhead" for policy. The GOM's policy was a change of
borders, and that must be removed. Later, bilateral
commissions could work on CBMs.

IF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT FAILS, WHAT NEXT?


9. (C) Finally, Charge noted that it was unclear to us what
steps would need to be taken should one party or the other
withdraw from the Interim Agreement. The U.S. had helped to
broker the Agreement, and it was the basis of our policy. We
would need to think about what action to take in the UNSC or
UNGA, in order to handle contingencies in its absence.
Agathocles immediately termed this "a threat," adding that it
would simply encourage Skopje not to negotiate. Charge
rejoined that it was not a threat, but a fact: the collapse
of the Interim Agreement would require not only Athens and
Skopje, but also Washington and Brussels, to re-think
long-standing policy. Agathocles argued that the Interim
Agreement was negotiated in order to prompt a resolution of
the name issue. For 12 years, no progress had been made --
and Greece had turned a blind eye. It was the GOM that had
avoided finding a solution, seeking to impose its preferred
solution via bilateral recognition.

COMMENT


10. (C) The most positive thing about the Greek position as
we heard it today is that it's not their final, official
position. The second most positive thing is that they are
serious enough about the Nimetz process to have avoided
discussing its details publicly. Nothing else about this
conversation was positive. Agathocles is one of the more
mild-manered Greek diplomats, but we could see his blood
pressure go up as we urged him to make a good, concise
argument regarding specific GOM actions they find
objectionable. Perhaps most disappointing is that he showed
no appreciation for the potential value of bilateral contacts
in any format other than the Nimetz negotiations.


COUNTRYMAN