Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ATHENS2089
2007-10-22 15:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREECE/MACEDONIA: MANAGING A NATO INVITATION

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO GR MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6082
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #2089/01 2951513
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221513Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0555
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1093
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0260
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 002089 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO GR MK
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA: MANAGING A NATO INVITATION

REF: A. ATHENS 2029


B. USNATO 537

Classified By: Charge Tom Countryman for 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 002089

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO GR MK
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA: MANAGING A NATO INVITATION

REF: A. ATHENS 2029


B. USNATO 537

Classified By: Charge Tom Countryman for 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Before April, 2008, NATO will take decisions on
enlargement; Macedonia's candidacy is complicated by its
long-standing difference with Greece over Macedonia's name.
We see no possibility of arriving at an agreed, final
resolution of the name issue between the two parties prior to
the April 2008 NATO Summit. As things currently stand, we
assess that Greece will block a NATO invitation for
Macedonia, even if it has fulfilled all MAP criteria and is
ready to accept NATO membership as "FYROM."


2. (C) With no prospect of Nimetz reaching any compromise on
The Name before April, this cable lays out Embassy Athens
thoughts on how to manage this issue in a way that
facilitates Macedonia,s NATO entry should it meet Alliance
criteria. Key will be an outcome that allows political
leaders from both Athens and Skopje to claim success. We
propose development of a package of understandings between
Athens and Skopje with the following elements:

-- a joint statement by Macedonia and Greece that restates
key provisions of Interim Agreement -- with particular
emphasis on provisions confirming the common existing
frontier, renouncing any Macedonian claims to territory not
within existing borders, and renouncing any Macedonian role
in the internal affairs of other states intended to protect
the status and rights of any persons in other states who are
not Macedonian citizens.

-- A commitment by Macedonia not to seek to change its
"FYROM" name in international organizations without Greek
concurrence, or, alternatively, a commitment by the remaining
25 NATO states that they will not support a change in the
name at NATO (or other IOs) absent a settlement on the issue;
and

-- Establishment of a bilateral process of confidence
building.

An additional potential element could be an explicit
understanding that, after the invitation, Greece will
postpone parliamentary ratification of Macedonia,s full NATO

membership until a bilateral solution to the name issue is
reached.


3. (C) Development of such a package goes beyond UN
negotiator Nimetz's mandate and would likely require strong,
coordinated efforts by the US and key European partners; we
suggest consideration of adding this issue to the Contact
Group's admittedly full agenda. Furthermore, the United
States may need to be prepared to make some bilateral
assurances of its own. Absent such steps, however, we see
little possibility of anything other than a train wreck over
Macedonia's NATO aspirations.


4. (C) Constructing a package that brings Macedonia into
NATO, but which does not cause either government to fall will
be extraordinarily difficult. We must be conscious in
advance that it could require not only the two parties, but
the US and other NATO members as well, to accept less than
ideal compromises to established principles. At a time of
potential Kosovo-related instability, we believe the
importance to regional stability requires us to consider such
trade-offs. End Summary

--------------
Assumptions
--------------


5. (C)
-- A. There will be no Greece-Macedonia agreement on a
permanent name under the process led by UN Personal
Representative Nimetz prior to the NATO Summit.

Embassy Athens and Skopje consultations show no point of
intersection between Greece and Macedonia's respective
red-lines. As visiting EUR DAS Rosemary DiCarlo recently
heard from President Crvenkovski and PM Gruevski, the
Macedonians are not prepared to consider any change to
@ name ("The Republic of Macedonia")
no matter how slight. o
the M on the second elementlements
to arrive at a mutually-disliked-but-acceptable package.


8. (C) To reach a bilateral agreement on the two elements
above, the two parties will also need to address explicitly
whether it would lead only to an invitation to Bucharest, or
will also include a Greek commitment to seek early
parliamentary ratification of Macedonia,s full membership.
PM Karamanlis will NOT submit any package for ratification if
it would cause the fall of his government. As we understand
it, the result (of invitation without ratification) would be
that Macedonia would have most of the benefits of NATO
membership, but not all (it would still lack full voting
rights and full Article V protection). Macedonia and current
NATO members will need to face the question of whether a
half-loaf strategy would serve our regional interests better
than no invitation at all. We fully understand the
institutional undesirability of importing this stalemated
issue into NATO. But we may reach a situation in which
Macedonia,s nearly full membership is sufficient for the
day, while preserving the future possibility that a different
government in Skopje may be able to compromise on the name
issue, or a stronger government in Athens would be able to
force through ratification.

--------------
Process-Related Issues
--------------


9. (C) If we choose to manage this issue through
construction of a package of understandings as outlined
above, there are a number of process-related issues that must
be thought through:

-- Who Does This: Most of what has been laid out goes beyond
the scope of UN Envoy Nimetz. Although he could be a good
candidate to pull such a package together, it is not
inherently part of his responsibilities. We will need to
grapple with the question of who would lead efforts to put
such a package of understandings together and engage the
parties. The manner in which such a package is presented to
the parties and is subsequently negotiated will play a key,
if not determining, role in the ultimate success of obtaining
such a package. Both sides look to the US as the key player,
and US leadership would be key in getting such a process
started. We believe it unlikely that US representatives would
be successful in the absence of other NATO states, including
those EU members which Greece counts upon for support of its
positions. We suggest Washington consider consultations
within the Contact Group (or a smaller sub-set of the Contact
Group) to gauge interest in/reaction to such an approach. It
is also possible that there is a role for the NATO Secretary
General to play.

-- The Greek "Strategy:" The Greek "strategy" to date has
been to ask the United States to "fix" the problem by putting
pressure on Macedonia to accept a change in its
Constitutional name. While we have pushed back, telling the
Greeks that they need a strategy and not just an approach, we
may need to accept the fact that the Greeks are incapable of
more on this issue. The Greeks are also not limiting
themselves pressing the US; they are also reaching out to

ATHENS 00002089 002 OF 004


constitutional name to differentiate it from Greek Macedonia.
Those red lines will not shift between now and April.

-- B. Macedonia will be ready for NATO membership/fulfill
MAP criteria.

Although the US has not made its judgment on Macedonia's
readiness to join NATO, we understand that some Allies are
concerned about numerous, substantial areas for further
reform (ref B). However, given Macedonia's commitment to
NATO to fulfill all required reforms prior to the April
summit, for purposes of this message, we proceed on the
assumption that Macedonia will meet the criteria, and that
the only obstacle to Macedonian NATO membership is Greek
opposition to its name.

-- C. Greece will not join consensus on a NATO invitation to
Macedonia, even if it applies for membership as "FYROM."

Although under the terms of the 1995 Interim Agreement,
Greece has an obligation to do so, it is our assessment that
the Greeks are no longer ready to comply with this
obligation. We have pushed back hard, arguing that a veto
would be a direct violation of the IA. Our position is
legally correct, bt we have no expectation that this will
sway Greek behavior or thinking. The Greeks continue to
signal their resolve to block Macedonia's entry into NATO
absent satisfaction on the name, irrespective of what the
Interim Agreement says.

--------------
Package of Understandings
--------------


6. (C) On several occasions, we have encouraged GOG
officials to utilize the procedures outlined in the Interim
Agreement to begin a process of dialogue with the GOM.
However, Athens has made no move to begin that dialogue,
arguing that such a dialogue can only begin once Skopje has
acknowledged that the purpose of such a dialogue is to arrive
at a new name for itself. As a result, we believe the USG
must take an initiative to work with partners to manage this
issue. We (and concerned NATO partners) should seek to
initiate a mediated ) or guided ) bilateral dialogue which
would negotiate a set of understandings between Greece and
Macedonia that would convince Greece to allow an invitation
to join NATO to go forward. Ideally, it would also lay the
basis for future resolution of the name issue. Essential
elements to any such package of understandings are:

-- 1) A joint statement by Macedonia and Greece that restates
key provisions of Interim Agreement. This could allow the
Greeks to point domestically to significant commitments by
the Macedonians, while allowing the Macedonians to note --
domestically -- that they have made no new commitments. The
joint statement would have particular emphasis on provisions
confirming the inviolability of the common existing frontier,
renouncing any Macedonian claims to territory not within
existing borders, and renouncing any Macedonian role in the
internal affairs of other states intended to protect the
status and rights of any persons in other states who are not
Macedonian citizens.

-- 2) A side agreement between Greece and Macedonia that any
NATO invitation to Macedonia would not be followed by an
attempt to change Macedonia's name in international
organizations without Greek concurrence.

Among PM Karamanlis, greatest concerns is the potential for
Macedonia to seek to obtain UN General Assembly recognition
of Macedonia's constitutional name. He is apparently
convinced that, if this were to occur after Greece failed to
use effectively the leverage provided by Macedonia,s NATO
accession, it would be the end of his government and his
political future. This is not an idle concern; seeking UNGA
approval for its constitutional name seems to be part of the
GOM,s long-term strategy, given the fact that 117 nations
have now recognized the constitutional name.
Such a side agreement could be limited to the UN General
Assembly, or it could also cover other UN bodies, NATO, the
OSCE, the EU, etc. The parties would also need to consider
whether such an agreement would be between the two sides or
whether they would seek guarantors/witnesses, to include the
US and/or all NATO members.

Alternatively, the other 25 NATO states could commit
themselves to a statement that they would not support any
effort to change the "FYROM" name at NATO (alternatively also
at other IOs, including the UN),absent a final solution on
the name or Greek concurrence for the name to be changed.
Obtaining such a commitment could be problematic, given

ATHENS 00002089 003 OF 004


Turkey's insistence that all NATO documents carry a footnote
on Turkey's recognition of Macedonia's constitutional name.
However, if such a statement were achieved, it would be seen
as quite powerful in Athens and could very well obviate the
need for other elements in this proposed package.

-- 3) Establishment of a bilateral process of confidence
building.

There is misinformation and mistrust on both sides, and a
number of the specific complaints by each side could be
addressed through greater government-to-government
interaction at various levels. A bilateral process of
confidence building could include:
-- a bilateral working group to address educational and
cultural issues;
-- bilateral mechanisms with third party mediators -- such as
the OSCE or International Crisis Group -- to address specific
complaints; and/or
-- A commitment from NATO or OSCE officials to host a regular
process of dialogue at the political and/or expert levels to
address areas of dispute.


7. `s would be a package, al elements
to arrive at a mutually-disliked-but-acceptable package.


8. (C) To reach a bilateral agreement on the two elements
above, the two parties will also need to address explicitly
whether it would lead only to an invitation to Bucharest, or
will also include a Greek commitment to seek early
parliamentary ratification of Macedonia,s full membership.
PM Karamanlis will NOT submit any package for ratification if
it would cause the fall of his government. As we understand
it, the result (of invitation without ratification) would be
that Macedonia would have most of the benefits of NATO
membership, but not all (it would still lack full voting
rights and full Article V protection). Macedonia and current
NATO members will need to face the question of whether a
half-loaf strategy would serve our regional interests better
than no invitation at all. We fully understand the
institutional undesirability of importing this stalemated
issue into NATO. But we may reach a situation in which
Macedonia,s nearly full membership is sufficient for the
day, while preserving the future possibility that a different
government in Skopje may be able to compromise on the name
issue, or a stronger government in Athens would be able to
force through ratification.

--------------
Process-Related Issues
--------------


9. (C) If we choose to manage this issue through
construction of a package of understandings as outlined
above, there are a number of process-related issues that must
be thought through:

-- Who Does This: Most of what has been laid out goes beyond
the scope of UN Envoy Nimetz. Although he could be a good
candidate to pull such a package together, it is not
inherently part of his responsibilities. We will need to
grapple with the question of who would lead efforts to put
such a package of understandings together and engage the
parties. The manner in which such a package is presented to
the parties and is subsequently negotiated will play a key,
if not determining, role in the ultimate success of obtaining
such a package. Both sides look to the US as the key player,
and US leadership would be key in getting such a process
started. We believe it unlikely that US representatives would
be successful in the absence of other NATO states, including
those EU members which Greece counts upon for support of its
positions. We suggest Washington consider consultations
within the Contact Group (or a smaller sub-set of the Contact
Group) to gauge interest in/reaction to such an approach. It
is also possible that there is a role for the NATO Secretary
General to play.

-- The Greek "Strategy:" The Greek "strategy" to date has
been to ask the United States to "fix" the problem by putting
pressure on Macedonia to accept a change in its
Constitutional name. While we have pushed back, telling the
Greeks that they need a strategy and not just an approach, we
may need to accept the fact that the Greeks are incapable of
more on this issue. The Greeks are also not limiting
themselves pressing the US; they are also reaching out to

ATHENS 00002089 004 OF 004


Paris, London, and other key capitals. Both Athens and
Skopje have shown a readiness to play NATO partners off
against each other. We believe this further argues for us to
engage with Contact Group partners to determine whether/how
we want to work together to manage Greek behavior in lead-in
to NATO decisions on enlargement.

-- Any Bilateral Assurances?: The Greeks have occasionally
asserted that this issue is a US and not/not a Greek problem,
given that the US brokered the Interim Agreement but later
emboldened Macedonia by recognizing its constitutional name.
We have emphatically rejected this assertion. However,
should a process begin to construct understandings between
Greece and Macedonia, we cold be asked by either of the
parties to make additional bilateral commitments to them to
strengthen any package of understandings. For examle, the
Greeks may want a US commitment not to support any effort to
change Macedonia's ame in international organizations absent
Grek concurrence, even if Greece has obtained a sid
agreement with Macedonia on this issue. We ake no
recommendations on this point, but suggest that should we
pursue a policy of working with partners to construct a
package of understandings, we will need to be prepared to
receive and respond to such requests from either side.
COUNTRYMAN