Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ATHENS2078
2007-10-19 09:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

WHO DOES EVANGELOS VENIZELOS THINK HE IS?

Tags:  PREL PGOV OVIP GR 
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DE RUEHTH #2078/01 2920920
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190920Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0543
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002078 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP GR
SUBJECT: WHO DOES EVANGELOS VENIZELOS THINK HE IS?

Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville. Reason: 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002078

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP GR
SUBJECT: WHO DOES EVANGELOS VENIZELOS THINK HE IS?

Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville. Reason: 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Vigorous campaigning is underway across
Greece as candidates for the leadership of opposition
socialist PASOK try to rally support. The real battle is
between incumbent George Papandreou and main challenger
Evangelis Venizelos (the third candidate, Skandalides, is
assumed to have no chance). Papandreou continues to hold a
steady lead in the polls, but much will depend on how many
friends and supporters participate in the November 11
election. Many PASOKies are deeply dissatisfied with
Papandreou's leadership, but are unclear what Venizelos
actually stands for. On key foreign policy issues, our past
conversations with Venizelos show he is primarily concerned
about Greek-Turkish relations and Turkey's EU prospects. On
Macedonia, his private support for a compromise some months
ago may be changing as the leadership campaign heats up.
Venizelos's overall reputation as a sharp, witty, bullying
critic may also be working against him and for Papandreou --
whose gentle, egalitarian demeanor is precisely the opposite.
END SUMMARY.

VENIZELOS'S PUGNACIOUS REPUTATION


2. (C) Born in 1957, even Venizelos's name is subject to
debate. It is rumored that his original family name was
Tombuzoglou, and that he changed it to elicit associations
with noted Greek statesman Eleftherios Venizelos. Venizelos
himself denies it, and neither he nor his detractors have put
forward documentary evidence either way. Early on, he
displayed the characteristics that define his reputation
today: he is ambitious, pugnacious, caustic, proud.
Venizelos became a professor of constitutional law at
Thessaloniki University, a position he still holds. He was
elected to parliament in 1993, and has held cabinet posts at
the ministries of Culture, Justice, and Press. Although he
began his career as a staunch defender of Andreas Papandreou,
he later sided with the "modernist" wing emerging under
future PM and PASOK leader Kostas Simitis. But when Simitis
himself left office, Venizelos -- despite his ambitions --

was bypassed and George Papandreou tapped as PASOK leader.


3. (C) Venizelos is a clever and compelling speaker who
does not suffer fools gladly. His face wears a natural
frown, and he effectively wields a high-faluting vocabulary
to illustrate his dissatisfaction. He has used his internet
blog to take potshots at George (as well as the New Democracy
government) for the past year. It was therefore no surprise
when, immediately after PASOK's loss in the September 16
general elections, Venizelos immediately tried to oust
Papandreou from the leadership. What some PASOKies have
termed an "attempted coup" did not succeed, and Venizelos has
run steadily behind George in the intervening weeks.

WE KNOW HIS REPUTATION -- BUT WHAT'S HE FOR?


4. (C) Some PASOKies complain that it is hard to know
Venizelos's "vision" for Greece; he's better at criticizing
than creating. For example, on recognition of private
educational institutions (an issue which roiled Greek
politics for months),Venizelos told us he was "open-minded."
However, he drew a distinction between private non-profit
and for-profit universities: the latter, he said, could not
be trusted.


5. (C) Venizelos has little practical foreign policy
experience. On Greece-Turkey relations, he has cultivated
the public impression that he leans toward the "hawks."
Nevertheless, as Minister of Culture, he initialed the
Greek-Turkish protocol on reforming history school books to
reduce mutual hostility in their curricula. He has told us
privately that he sees Greece's relationship with Turkey as
its major foreign policy challenge (though it is unclear to
what degree he supports improving Greek-Turkish relations).
He suggested that, as it becomes clear that Turkey does not
have real EU prospects, Greece will need to craft an approach
based on bilateral engagement, development of Sarkozy's
Mediterranean Union, and dealing with the "parked" Cyprus
problem. This, he added, will be politically costly for
Greece, which has so far relied on EU leverage to achieve its
objectives. Without the EU carrot, Greece will have to give
as well as get -- a major paradigm shift. It is telling,
however, that while raising the issue with us, he left us
with little concrete impression of what exact policy he would
recommend.


6. (C) On the Cyprus issue, Venizelos was an early
proponent of the Annan Plan, a rare instance of agreement
with Papandreou. But Venizelos is also capable of changing
course. In April 2004, Venizelos openly criticized Cypriot
President Papadopoulos in a major newspaper column. But in
May 2007, Venizelos traveled to Cyprus, met with

ATHENS 00002078 002 OF 002


Papadopoulos, and told reporters that PASOK and he were
"never on a collision course with the President of the
Cypriot Republic."


7. (C) On Macedonia, Venizelos, as a northerner, is
publicly presumed to be hard-line. Nevertheless, he told us
privately a few months ago that he was attracted to the
Nimetz concept of a "Grand Bargain," in which -- in return
for a commitment to work for Skopje's benefit -- Macedonia
compromises on the name. Venizelos argued that Greece could
not be "passive;" all it needed was "one complicated name"
for Skopje's entry into European institutions "and we should
be prepared to pay something to Skopje to get it." But now,
several months later, Venizelos's views are less clear, at
least in public. On October 6, Venizelos charged the
government with "complete blankness" on how to handle the
dispute. At the same time, he offered no proposals for
change.

COMMENT


8. (C) In meetings with the Embassy and ConGen
Thessaloniki, Venizelos strikes us as erudite, knowledgeable,
witty, a bit obnoxious and, while not anti-American, not a
great admirer of the U.S. He speaks excellent English, and
is versatile and articulate. He is also cagey. In the
leadership debate, PASOKies have so far focused on
personalities, not policies. Venizelos's sharp elbows may be
handy in a general election, but party stalwarts fear that,
if Venizelos became party leader, they'd be nudged to the
sidelines. That's working in Papandreou's favor.
COUNTRYMAN