Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ATHENS1891
2007-09-19 16:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREECE-MACEDONIA: FM BAKOYIANNIS MEETINGS IN NEW

Tags:  PREL PGOV GR MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHTH #1891/01 2621608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191608Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0291
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1080
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0240
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001891 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK
SUBJECT: GREECE-MACEDONIA: FM BAKOYIANNIS MEETINGS IN NEW
YORK

Classified By: Charge Tom Countryman. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001891

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK
SUBJECT: GREECE-MACEDONIA: FM BAKOYIANNIS MEETINGS IN NEW
YORK

Classified By: Charge Tom Countryman. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: In their September 19 meeting,
Charge and MFA SYG Agathocles focused on the Macedonia name
issue. Charge noted that, when it came to Macedonia, FM
Bakoyiannis would need to demonstrate that the GOG had a
strategy to achieve progress (rather than simply ask for help
from us). Agathocles took the point, but emphasized that
Macedonia was the number one issue for the GOG.
Unfortunately, the GOM was not ready to negotiate on the name
issue. Charge pressed Agathocles: had the GOG tried to
engage at a high political level on the issues of concern, as
outlined in the Interim Accord? Agathocles argued that the
GOG had tried at a "lower level" and were prepared to do so
at a higher level. He agreed with Charge that the new
Government should not postpone resolution of the issue,
despite the difficulty in selling a solution to the Greek
public and parliament. COMMENT: Agathocles got our point.
He knows we are looking for both commitment and a strategy
from the GOG. But whether FM Bakoyiannis will bring both to
her New York meetings with U.S. policymakers is not clear.
It may well be that a meeting next week with U/S Burns,
followed by a later meeting with the Secretary, would be a
productive way to prompt some creative strategizing in the
FM's cabinet. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Agathocles told Charge that FM Bakoyiannis wanted
to meet with the Secretary, despite the fact that her visit
to the UNGA September 23-25 had been curtailed (due to
procedural issues related to the post-election government's
formation). If, as it now appeared, that would not be
possible for them to meet, FM Bakoyiannis was prepared to
return to the U.S. at the beginning of October in order to
meet with the Secretary in New York or Washington.
Bakoyiannis is also seeking a meeting with U/S Burns on Sept.
24 or 25.


3. (C) Charge noted that, should a meeting be possible, the
Secretary would view Greek issues as part of the overall U.S.

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policy agenda. FM Bakoyiannis would naturally want to update

the Secretary on GOG actions related to those global
priorities. For example, it would be useful for Bakoyiannis
to convey the new government's determination to continue
cooperation with the U.S. on equipment and training for Iraqi
forces. She might also outline possible further Greek
contributions for Alliance efforts in Afghanistan, and
indicate where the new government stood regarding the
deployment of an ESDP mission to Kosovo. We would also
welcome an assessment of whether, following elections in both
Turkey and Greece, these two governments might begin to make
progress on resolving Aegean issues. Finally, Charge noted
that we had discussed with MFA officials the possibility of
an EU border monitoring mission in Lebanon. While these
issues might not be at the top of FM Bakoyiannis's list -- a
spot undoubtedly occupied by Macedonia -- they were
important for the U.S.


4. (C) Agathocles noted that Bakoyiannis was already
thinking about how to make progress with the GOT on Aegean
issues; she planned to meet FM Babacan soon. Kosovo was
harder. But Agathocles emphasized that, for Greece, the
number one issue was Macedonia. If Greece allowed Macedonia
to enter NATO without resolving the name issue, the issue
would be a constant source of annoyance for the U.S and the
Alliance. Unfortunately, the GOM was not willing to sit and
negotiate -- to find a name that both sides could accept (and
not a "dual name" solution). Even then, the GOG would have
"huge problems" selling such a solution to its public and
parliament.


5. (C) Charge pressed Agathocles: was the GOG willing to
sit and talk with representatives of the GOM without first
demanding that they accept a predetermined outcome? Had the
GOG conveyed, at the Ministerial or at a lower level, their
concerns regarding textbooks, the airport name, etc. as
called for in the 1995 Interim Accord? Agathocles argued
that they GOG had made these points at "other levels," and
was prepared to suggest talks at a higher level. What was
unacceptable, for the GOG, was Skopje's strategy of trying to
trade agreement to stop building statues, re-naming cities,
etc. for Greek agreement to keep the name Macedonia. There
was no guarantee that, once in NATO and the EU, Macedonia
would not simply resume these pactices. Skopje, he argued,
had "locked" their position since the U.S. recognized its
constitutional name.


6. (C) Charge said the U.S. perception is that Athens, not
Skopje, has been the party resisting high-level dialogue. He
pointed out that it would be helpful if FM Bakoyiannis could
confirm, to the Secretary, that Greece was engaging, at a

political/ministerial level, in discussions with Skopje.
Without such discussions, an attempt by Greece to walk away
from the Interim Accord -- without using its problem-solving
mechanisms -- would be even more heavily criticized within
the Alliance. If FM Bakoyiannis wanted the U.S. to engage,
she needed to demonstrate that the GOG had a roadmap to
unfreeze the deadlock and create the conditions for UN
mediator Nimetz to succeed. Both the Secretary and
Undersecretary would expect the FM not just to describe
Greece's constraints, but to give a vision of a way ahead.


7. (C) Agathocles argued that, in any case, Macedonia was
not ready to enter NATO; it did not meet the criteria. A
veto was not the GOG's first choice; he hoped they were not
forced to use it. The GOG needed to protect its national
interests, but it would try not to reach that point. Charge
responded that neither we, nor other Allies, had made a
decision on Macedonia's readiness; in previous enlargements
of both NATO and the EU, political factors had also been a
consideration. It was clearly in the new Greek government's
interest to resolve this issue early in its tenure, and not
push it off. Agathocles agreed, predicting early elections
in either 2009 or 2010.


8. (C) Charge reminded Agathocles that, with a Kosovo Final
Status decision ahead, there were good arguments for having
Macedonia and Albania in NATO to increase regional stability.
Agathocles suggested that made resolution of the name issue
all the more important for the GOM.

COUNTRYMAN