wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy  Privacy
IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
07ATHENS1619 2007-08-10 14:46:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

FURTHER GREEK VIEWS ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS

Tags:   PREL PGOV GR KV SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7302
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #1619 2221446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101446Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WSHDC PRIORITY 9919
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITCAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
					C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001619 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR KV SR
SUBJECT: FURTHER GREEK VIEWS ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS

REF: A) ATHENS 1609 B) STATE 109526

Classified By: CDA TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: In an August 10 introductory
call on new MFA Secretary General Agathocles, Charge reviewed
ref B points on Kosovo next steps. Agathocles reiterated the
long-standing Greek concern regarding the legal basis for any
future status decision. He also shared two ideas (which he
characterized as rumors): a "Montenegro" option along the
lines crafted by EU Foreign Policy rep Solana several years
ago, and a confederal formula. Charge underscored that the
U.S. would agree to any solution agreed to by the parties.
However, in our view, supervised independence as envisaged by
Ahtisaari remained the best proposal; it was essential for
the international community to be prepared to act should
there be no progress by December. Comment: Agathocles's
"rumors" likely represent Greek wishful thinking. At the
same time, Agathocles clearly implied that the "Montenegro
option" had received some official consideration -- though
whether by selected Serbian officials or EU authorities was
unclear. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) Charge reviewed ref B points on Kosovo next steps
(which he had already discussed August 9 in a meeting with PM
Karmanlis's diplomatic advisor, ref A). Charge underscored
that the U.S. looked forward to progress in the additional
period of intensified discussions available to the parties.
At the same time, we and our allies must be prepared for the
possibility that, in December, we are faced with the status
quo. In our view, we would need to find another way to move
to supervised independence as envisaged in the Ahtisaari
plan. At the same time, we wanted to assure our allies that
the United States remained fully committed to KFOR; we looked
to other substantial contributors, such as Greece, for a
similar commitment.



3. (C) Agathocles believed the primary obstacle, for the
EU, was the lack of a legal basis for supervised independence
should negotiations between the parties fail. Without a
legal basis, it would be difficult for Greece (and others) to
recognize a unilateral declaration of independence.



4. (C) Agathocles told Charge he had heard two "rumors"
recently. The first (which he suggested came from
"semi-official" sources) was that Western nations might be
prepared to accept a "Montenegro" solution for Kosovo. While
this had been relayed in a hush-hush manner, Agathocles noted
wryly that, two days later, Kostunica had publicly rejected
such a strategy. The second (un-sourced) rumor was that
"someone" had explored with various Kosovar factions the
possibility of accepting a form of confederation with the
Serbs. While some Kosovar politicians had reportedly
rejected this out of hand, others had been prepared to
consider it provided a date for referendum was set and the
ultimate right to independence provided for. Agathocles
suggested that, in his view, these two ideas might offer a
productive way out of the current dilemma. But making
independence a precondition for the current negotiations gave
the participants very little maneuverability.



5. (C) Charge responded that, in principle, the U.S. would
support whatever solution the two parties agreed to. But all
of us needed to consider the question of what course we would
take in December in order to preserve stability in Kosovo and
the region. The U.S. was not seeking to dictate the process;
we were working closely with the Contact Group. Agathocles
argued that Serbia needed to find a solution that would allow
them to postpone a final decision on the Kosovo issue for
several years. A solution along the lines of that crafted by
EU Foreign Policy rep Solana for Montenegro would allow
Serbia time to deepen its relationship with the EU and
improve its economy. That would, in his view, ultimately
make Kosovo less problematic to solve.
COUNTRYMAN