Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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07ATHENS1522 | 2007-07-30 08:51:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Athens |
VZCZCXRO5554 OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHTH #1522/01 2110851 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 300851Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9814 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4837 RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 2869 RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001522 |
1. (C) SUMMARY: Following the re-election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Sunday's elections, the mainstream Greek political elite breathed a sigh of relief. PM Erdogan's first term was a period of Greek-Turkish stability, offering Greeks a more secure vision of their bilateral relations. While problems still exist -- notably the division of Cyprus and Turkey's treatment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Halki seminary -- most contacts expressed optimism at the continuity a second AKP term would bring. Conversely, there was widespread distancing from the Republican People's Party (CHP) opposition and its leadership, who are seen as losing credibility with Turkish voters. The inclusion in the Parliament of the nationalist National Movement Party (MHP) alsoproved worrying but most Greek observers weretaking a wait-and-see attitude. END SUMMARY. -------------------------- View from the Top -------------------------- 2. (U) The Turkish elections were closely watched in Greece. Following the announcement of AKP's victory, Athens, like most European capitals, was quick to offer congratulations. PM Kostas Karamanlis telephoned Turkish PM Erdogan from Sarajevo to offer congratulations. According to press reports, Karamanlis invited Erdogan to continue working together to increase and improve cooperation between their two countries. In public statements, Karamanlis stressed that he hoped the AK re-election would contribute to an increased pace of reform efforts. He stressed that Greece continued to support Turkey on its path to EU accession. Opposition PASOK leader George Papandreou sent a similar message in a letter to Erdogan, saying he would support Erdogan in fulfilling Turkey's obligations to resolve the Cyprus problem and respect the rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as Turkey proceeds in its EU accession process. FM Bakoyannis expressed satisfaction at the smooth, democratic process in Turkey, noting that AK offered the Turkish people a stable, democratic, European-oriented government. In a statement to the press following her June 25 meeting with the visiting Cypriot FM, Bakoyannis stated that Greece fully expected the re-elected AKP to take tangible actions on the Cyprus issue. -------------------------- View from the MFA -------------------------- 3. (C) In a meeting with visiting Greece Desk officer on June 26, Stavros Venizelos (Internal Turkish Politics) and Ioannis Ghikas (Bilateral Political-Military Affairs) in the A-4 Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs echoed Bakoyannis, comments but were less optimistic on the Cyprus problem or Aegean tensions. However, they agreed the AK victory was good for the bilateral relationship, continuing the stability of the last few years. The &stars8 of AK (Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, and Ali Babacan) represented the modern face of Turkey and the electorate seemed to be behind them. Venizelos surmised that the June 6 shake-up in the AKP,s list of candidates served a two-fold purpose: to reassure Turks that an AK victory would not usher in an Islamic state, and to entrench AK as THE party with a firmly modern outlook, capable of leading Turkey towards the European Union. Ghikas emphasized that the GOG has never believed that a re-elected AKP would lead Turkey towards an Islamic revolution ala Iran. AK voters supported the party not only because AK had ushered in a period of stability and growth in the Turkish economy, but also as a protest vote against the military's actions following the nomination of Gul for the presidency. 4. (C) Venizelos and Ghikas believed CHP is moving against the current of mainstream Turkey. They attributed this to the heavy-handed approach of Deniz Baykal and the CHP party leadership, which allied itself with the military. Venizelos also speculated Kemalism as an ideology was becoming outdated, more suitable to Turkey in the 1920,s than to the modernizing path most Turks now see their country heading down. Perhaps the Turkish electorate was not ready for AKP to decide on the President this time around, Ghikas mused, but four years from now, if AK continued on the same path, it would be a different story. ATHENS 00001522 002 OF 002 5. (C) Nonetheless, both Venizelos and Ghikas noted that there were still significant irritants in the bilateral relationship, which would be difficult to overcome, even by a more secure Erdogan/AKP led government. Ghikas pointed to the hardening of Turkish positions in Aegean affairs over the last year, including: disputes over fishing and research vessels, an increase in Turkish overflight "violations," and at NATO (implicitly referencing the Agios Efstratios incident in February). He noted Turkey still maintained three casus belli: over oil exploration of the continental shelf, territorial waters and territorial airspace. He admitted the Greek press was often an obstacle to progress as the GOG is always portrayed as having made concessions to Turkey. The government was working to shift the media's mindset away from a zero-sum game, but that was an uphill battle. He also blamed the Turkish media and Turkish military for spurring on the Greek media in a negative fashion. As an example, he noted a posting on the Turkish General Staff's website last spring listing instances of Greek "harassment" of Turkish planes. He noted that in addition to the false nature of these claims, posting them on a public website did nothing to lower tensions in the region. -------------------------- Cyprus, Aegean Still Issues -------------------------- 5. (C) Ghikas and Venizelos were equally pessimistic about a possible solution to the Cyprus problem. They noted the on-going dispute between Turkey and Cyprus was threatening Turkey's EU accession. Both dismissed Turkish accession to the EU as long as there was a dispute with Cyprus and casus belli against Greece. DeskOff agreed that Turkey still needed to undertake reforms before becoming a full member, but that it was important to keep Turkey on the EU path. DeskOff continued that eleven years ago, following the Imia/Kardak crisis, it would have been unthinkable for Greece to be a firm supporter of Turkish accession, but much has changed since then. The important thing was not to close the door on Turkey. Ghikas and Venizelos agreed, but argued Turkey needed to do something significant, not to convince just Greece, but all of Europe -- and soon. Europe would be looking for serious moves on Article 301, the Kurds and/or Halki and the Ecumenical Patriarchate following the elections. DeskOff reiterated these were impor -------------------------- A View from PASOK -------------------------- 6. (C) A well-connected PASOK-affiliated university Professor took much the same view of the elections as the MFA officials. Erdogan's victory was good because it meant continuity and the continued stabilization of relations between Greece and Turkey. While most Greeks did not trust Erdogan because they viewed him as an Islamist, she noted they appreciated the sense of security his re-election brought. Of course there was concern about the nationalists entering Parliament, but people were waiting to see how they behaved. As for the CHP, despite being the party which represented the same leftist ideological roots as PASOK, PASOK was becoming more and more uncomfortable with the relationship. This was largely due to Baykal and the current CHP leadership, though other CHP members, especially Kemal Dervish, could prove to be the future of CHP, reintegrating the party into mainstream Turkish politics and the European left. Ultimately, the re-election of Erdogan was viewed as being helpful as the PASOK elite made its case for supporting Turkey's accession to the EU to the Greek public. Even within PASOK's membership it was a tough sell: a recent internal party poll showed 75 percent of members responding negatively to Turkey's possible EU membership. COUNTRYMAN |