Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ATHENS1316
2007-06-27 15:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

U/S BURNS' JUNE 11 MEETING WITH PM KARAMANLIS:

Tags:  GR OVIP PGOV PREL 
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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #1316/01 1781528
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271528Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9567
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001316 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: GR OVIP PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' JUNE 11 MEETING WITH PM KARAMANLIS:
KARAMANLIS FEELING THE HEAT OVER MACEDONIA'S NATO ENTRY

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOMAS COUNTRYMAN. REASON 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001316

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: GR OVIP PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' JUNE 11 MEETING WITH PM KARAMANLIS:
KARAMANLIS FEELING THE HEAT OVER MACEDONIA'S NATO ENTRY

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOMAS COUNTRYMAN. REASON 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In his June 11 meeting with U/S Burns, PM
Karamanlis was calm about the latest state-of-play on Kosovo
final status. However, the normally relaxed Karamanlis was
clearly feeling the domestic political heat over Macedonia's
NATO entry. Burns promised that the USG would work with the
GOM and GOG to lower the temperature, but also urged the GOG
to work directly with Skopje and UN mediator Nimitz. Burns
also counseled patience on the issue of Macedonia's NATO
membership, which would not be discussed within the Alliance
until the end of the year. Burns briefed Karamanlis on
efforts to counter Iranian proliferation, pressed for
additional Greek contributions to Alliance efforts in
Afghanistan, and urged Karamanlis to continue efforts to
ensure diversity in energy suppliers. On Cyprus, Karamanlis
suggested little progress was possible until after elections
in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. END SUMMARY.

KOSOVO FINAL STATUS POST-G8


2. (C) U/S Burns updated Karamanlis on G8 discussion of
Kosovo final status. Although Russia was no longer a
contributor in Kosovo, it was still seeking to block a UNSCR.
The French proposal for an additional 6-month negotiating
period differed only in length from the U.S. proposal of 120
days. In addition, the U.S. had agreed to specific requests
to address Russian concerns: reference to the dissolution of
Yugoslavia, protection of ethnic Serb rights, and a UN envoy
for Serbian issues. Burns said Russia could not be allowed
to stop the Process, especially given that it had not
contributed to Kosovo stabilization for eight years. At the
end of the day, the United States and Europe needed to agree
to a process which led to Kosovo's independence. That could
include an alternative UNSCR to facilitate the EU civilian
mission.


3. (C) Karamanlis agreed that the international community
could not reverse the reality on the ground. The key was how
-- whether through additional time or symbolic measures -- to

make it "sellable" to the Serbs. Karamanlis believed the
Serbs understood this. While even an additional six months
would not allow the GOS to agree, under certain
circumstances, its reaction might be muted. In addition,
Karamanlis suggested, the EU needed to make some overtures to
Serbia so that the Kosovo decision could be seen in the
context of the region's Euro-Atlantic integration. Burns
agreed that Greece could play a positive role. The GOS had
taken positive steps recently, including on war criminals,
and the EU was slated to re-start SAA negotiations this week.


MACEDONIA AND NATO MEMBERSHIP


4. (C) Karamanlis said he had told the Macedonian President
and PM last year that he was committed to resolving the name
issue, but the GOM leaders said they preferred to wait until
elections -- which had brought to power a more nationalist,
irredentist government. Normally relaxed, Karamanlis
questioned heatedly wether he could get any decsion o
acedoia'sNATO membership through the Greek parliament --
despite the fact that his government wanted to see Macedonia
enter Euro-Atlantic institutions to assure regional
tability. Burns asured Karamanlis that the US understood
the ensitivity, but urged the GG to find a way to wrk
directly with Skopj. We aso ookedfor rsults from UN
mediator Nimitz. The USG would urge the GOM not to take
provocative actions or provoke crises -- but that was no
substitute for direct contact between the two parties. Burns
also counseled patience on Macedonia's NATO membership, which
would not be discussed within the Alliance until the end of
the year.

IRAN . . .


6. (C) Burns told Karamanlis that he foresaw a third
Chapter 7 UNSC resolution on Iran, but EU countries and other
states may need to consider bilateral sanctions in order to
bring Iran to the negotiating table. Karamanlis responded,
that while Greece favored a negotiated solution, it was clear
that all options would need to be considered if there was no
progress. The international community could not give Iran
the impression that it could "get away with it." They needed
an incentive to talk seriously, which they were not doing
now. Burns agreed that diplomacy was the preferred solution,
but the USG had not excluded the military option. Iran was
also starting to push back in Iraq, providing explosive
devices to insurgents. The UK had also intercepted two
shipments from Iran to Afghanistan in direct contravention of
UNSCR 1747. The U.S. and EU must remain united on this issue
as well.

ATHENS 00001316 002 OF 002



. . . IRAQ . . .


7. (C) Regretting Ambassador Ries' imminent departure for
Iraq, Karamanlis told Burns that the worst-case scenario
would be a speedy U.S. withdrawal. That would open a
Pandora's box, not only in Iraq but throughout the region.
Burns said that, as a result of the current surge in U.S.
manpower, local leaders in Anbar province were turning
against Al Qaeda.

. . . CYPRUS . . .


8. (C) Karamanlis told Burns that he did not foresee much
opportunity for progress on a Cyprus solution in the near
future, due to upcoming elections in Turkey, Greece and
Cyprus. He suggested the U.S. find a way to reestablish
communication with Papadopoulos, who was certain to be
re-elected and was "more realistic than he looks."
Karamanlis said he did not understand Turkish-Cypriot
reluctance to move forward with last July's UN-brokered
agreement on working groups and technical committees.
Nevertheless, the international community should be prepared
for a more serious effort toward reaching a settlement
post-elections.

. . . AFGHANISTAN . . .


9. (c) Burns pressed Karamanlis to contribute additional
assets to NATO's mission in Afghanistan. ISAF forces were
doing well against the Taliban in fixed engagements, but ISAF
needed additional helicopters, transport, firepower and
troops on the ground. Burns pointed out that Greece's
contribution need not be immediate; NATO was looking ahead to
its 2007/8/9 rotations. Karamanlis admitted that this was
not an easy issue. While he would discuss it further with
ministers, he did not foresee a serious change in Greece's
participation. Burns noted the long-term implications for
NATO, both in its first-ever ground combat mission and for
the Bucharest NATO Summit next year.

AND ENERGY SECURITY


8. (C) Burns urged Karamanlis to ensure diversity of energy
resources and routes. Karamanlis agreed; the GOG was
pursuing both Azeri and (possibly) Kazakh options. The
reality was that, at this point, Greece was dependent on
Russia for 80 percent of its liquefied natural gas (LNG).
While they were trying to find other sources (and pushing
renewable resources),it would not happen overnight.
COUNTRYMAN