MACEDONIA'S PATH TO NATO: GREECE AND THE NAME ISSUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001131

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: GR MARR NATO PREL
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA'S PATH TO NATO: GREECE AND THE NAME ISSUE

REF: SKOPJE 416

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1.(C) SUMMARY: In managing U.S. interests in Greece's long
dispute with Macedonia over the latter's name, Embassy
Athens' primary goal is to prevent Greece from interposing
obstacles to Macedonia's NATO membership at the point that an
invitation is otherwise timely. We can succeed in doing that
by:

-- Active lobbying in this election year to keep GoG
officials from boxing themselves into a position of blocking
Macedonia's membership invitation, should it be merited on
the substance;

-- Privately assuring the Greeks that the U.S. will NOT press
for Macedonia to be admitted to NATO under the name "Republic
of Macedonia";

-- A careful choice of words in U.S. public statements,
particularly during the President's June 10 visit to Tirana.


2. (C) The secondary goal is less urgent, but more ambitious:
to use the window between Greek elections this fall and the
Bucharest NATO Summit to promote progress, or even
completion, of a permanent resolution of the name. The Greek
prescription for accomplishing this -- "more U.S. pressure on
Skopje" -- is wrongheaded. But the Greek analysis -- that
those few months present a unique opportunity to settle this
vexing issue -- is on the mark. A subsequent cable will
contain recommendations on the role the U.S. can play to push
the two parties toward such an outcome. END SUMMARY.

GREEK POLITICAL DYNAMICS
--------------


3. (C) The Greek foreign policy esablishment, including FM
Bakoyannis, former F Molyviatis, and PM Karamanlis' staff,
have recently begun to focus on upcoming decisions about NATO
membership for Macedonia, from the uniquely Greek perspective
of the name under which the invitation will be issued.
Unfortunately, the Greek press also has been unhelpfully
speculating on the issue, muddying the issues and raising
political temperatures. The public debate holds the risk
that the Greek Government will -- wittingly or not -- paint
itself into a corner on the issue, complicating the NATO
process and posing an unnecessary risk to an otherwise
pro-American Greek Government facing competitive national
elections this fall.


4. (C) Our assessment is that FM Bakoyannis has offensive and
defensive interests on the name issue as the NATO decisions
approach. Offensively, she would like to use the pressure of
the NATO accession process -- and the hint of a Greek veto --
to reach an overall, new, and lasting accommodation with
Skopje on the name. Greek industry already has major
investments in Macedonia and there is a natural economic
symbiosis between the two countries, which are astride the
main north-south transportation corridor for the new Balkans.
Apart from the fundamental dispute on the name, Greece and
Macedonia have been (by Balkan standards) pretty good
neighbors.


5. (C) Defensively, FM Bakoyannis and the PM at all costs
want to prevent any new purported Greek "defeat" on the name
issue, since it would be exploited in the national elections
by the right-wing "LAOS" party, based in the Greek province
of Macedonia. Along with a host of neo-racist and anti-U.S.
positions, a hard line on the name is LAOS' signature issue.
If "LAOS" can figure a way to ride the name issue over the
three-percent Parliamentary threshold, it could gravely
complicate New Democracy's electoral arithmetic and could
even allow PASOK to sneak back into government.

MOLYVIATIS: STICK WITH INTERIM AGREEMENT
--------------


6. (C) When he was Foreign Minister (2004-06),Petros
Molyviatis held to the firm and explicit policy that Greece
would abide by the 1995 Interim Agreement (IA). In the IA,
the Greek Government committed not to object to Macedonia's
membership in Euro-Atlantic structures under the name of
FYROM, unless another name was mutually agreed by the two
parties. Like other Greek leaders over the years, Molyviatis
was firm against any "dual-name" approach (which would have
one name for bilateral use by Greece and another, the
constitutional name, for everyone and everything else).
Greek concern is over the irredentism and purported
non-respect of the Macedonians for Greek equities inherent in
the concept of "Macedonia" in general and competition for the
symbol of Alexander the Great in particular. In pursuance of
his strategy, Molyviatis supported Matthew Nimetz' March 2005
proposal of "Republika Macedonija-Skopje" as a single name
and was greatly disappointed when Nimetz came out with a dual
name as a second 2005 proposal.

BAKOYANNIS: USE NATO ACCESSION TO SOLVE ISSUE
--------------


7. (C) FM Bakoyannis, during her March visit to Washington,
signaled (but did not explicitly state) a departure from
Greece's long commitment to the Interim Agreement by
indicating that Greece could not ratify NATO membership if
the name issue were still unresolved. More recently, public
statements by Bakoyannis and PM Karamanlis have been along
the same line. The GoG now argues that by failing to address
the name issue, and by taking provocative actions such as
renaming the Skopje airport after Alexander the Great,
Macedonia is failing to meet its NATO MAP obligations to
maintain good neighborly relations and is violating certain
sections of the Interim Agreement. Beyond the public
statements, Greek reasoning seems to be that NATO membership
is one of the few levers Athens has left to get Skopje to
compromise (the even stronger lever -- EU membership for
Macedonia -- is years away from being an actual issue). With
the perception that international opinion is moving in
Macedonia's favor -- with more than 90 countries recognizing
it by its constitutional name -- the GoG seems embarked on a
high-risk strategy to force a compromise by Skopje. An
essential part of their thinking is that only the U.S. has
the capability to force Macedonia to compromise.


8. (C) This strategy is risky for the GoG in two ways.
First, it creates a risk that the Greek public will perceive
Macedonia's accession EVEN -- repeat EVEN -- under the name
"FYROM" (which most NATO members, including the U.S., would
see as the least contentious solution) to be an embarrassing
climb-down by the government. Second, it sets the U.S. up as
the fall-guy for the embarrassment, which the GoG may be
counting on as a reason for Washington to intervene with
Skopje. If so, of course, they will be disappointed; the
U.S. is far better placed to withstand Greek public criticism
than the GoG is.


9. (C) Our assessment remains that, in the end, the GoG is
unlikely to veto Macedonian accession under the "FYROM" name.
If Greek elections are held in October (as most expect),the
GoG may keep up the tough rhetoric only until Election Day
and then gradually back away from it. Even if the drumbeat
continues after October, the Greek PM would have to think
long and hard before taking a decision that would annoy (if
not infuriate) all of Greece's Allies. However, we cannot be
100-percent confident of a "no objection" from Greece. The
risk is that today's rhetoric will box in the GoG, and that
-- even after the fall elections -- a veto of accession
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-- the GoG should not respond to every perceived provocation
from Skopje;
-- the GoG should recognize that the U.S. is neither
obligated nor capable to force Skopje into a compromise that
Athens finds acceptable;
-- the GoG reaffirm its Interim Agreement commitment to
agree to accession as "FYROM".

FEAR OF A TIRANA SURPRISE
--------------


11. (C) We have heard from both Bakoyannis and one of the
PM's closest aides that the government is acutely anxious
that in Tirana June 10 the President will state his
"decision" that NATO invitations should be extended to
Macedonia, as well as Croatia. A "Tirana surprise" would be
a big blow to Karamanlis, already reeling from a pension fund
scandal. The FM understands that we have not yet completed
our evaluation of the candidacies, and that our public
statements will offer strong encouragement to the candidacies
of Skopje and Tirana. Still, if the President were to state
a position that is characterized here as early endorsement of
an invitation to Macedonia, it would undercut the GoG's
timetable for managing the name/accession decision next year.
As the FM put it, the Macedonians should not feel that they
have "U.S. support in their pocket." In this regard, Embassy
Athens believes that the points contained in reftel are just
right for public and private use by the President.

U.S. PREFERENCE FOR THE ACCESSION NAME
--------------


12. (C) The GoG feels compelled to respond to the themes in
the Greek media, despite the latter's penchant for fact-free
reporting. Inexplicably, most papers in Athens (and many GoG
officials) are convinced that the USG will insist that NATO
approve accession for the "Republic of Macedonia" rather than
"FYROM". We are not aware of any statement by any U.S.
official or Allied official suggesting that NATO accession
must take place as "ROM" or ruling out "FYROM." It would be
tremendously helpful in controlling the rumor mills (and the
worst instincts of Greek politicians) if the Department
authorized us to tell the GoG privately (and -- ideally --
publicly) the following:
"The U.S. does not insist -- and will not insist -- that the
Republic of Macedonia's eventual accession to NATO occur
under the name "Republic of Macedonia." As in all previous
decisions regarding the country, the U.S. is prepared to join
the NATO consensus for either "Republic of Macedonia" or
"FYROM."
RIES