Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASTANA2223
2007-08-14 13:03:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER: KAZAKHSTAN ELECTION PREVIEW

Tags:  PGOV OSCE KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9844
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2223/01 2261303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141303Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0384
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1808
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0237
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002223 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV OSCE KZ

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: KAZAKHSTAN ELECTION PREVIEW

REF: A. Astana 2069 B. Astana 1906

ASTANA 00002223 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002223

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV OSCE KZ

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: KAZAKHSTAN ELECTION PREVIEW

REF: A. Astana 2069 B. Astana 1906

ASTANA 00002223 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary: With Kazakhstan's parliamentary elections headed
into the final few days of campaigning, it is clear that the
pre-election period has been substantially freer and fairer than in
any prior election. As one pundit put it, the political field is
now much more level, although there are still some big bumps, as Nur
Otan maintains significant institutional advantages. The two
principal opposition parties have had an opportunity to wage a
vigorous campaign, with few obstacles to meeting voters and placing
advertising on television and radio, and in the print media.
Television, while neither unbiased nor equal in its reporting,
nonetheless has for the first time provided substantial coverage of
the opposition's campaign efforts and broadcast two debates. Despite
the improvements, however, the splintered opposition's failure to
deliver a focused message, the popularity of President Nazarbayev,
and voter apathy may yet result in a massive Nur Otan victory, an
unappealing result for the GOK. End Summary.

Pre-election Campaigning: So Far, So Good
--------------


2. (SBU) Presidential Administration Chief Adilbek Dzhaksybekov
spoke to the Ambassador at length on August 14 about the
authorities' efforts to provide an opportunity for the opposition to
make its case to the electorate, and a definitive decision by
President Nazarbayev to accept the results of the election.
Interestingly, he noted that there had been "discussions" within the
Administration about other approaches, but he said that he has never
considered any other option realistic for Kazakhstan at this point
in its history. He said that such a positive and constructive
approach is important for Kazakhstan's development and for
Nazarbayev's legacy of creating a democratic society. He added that
new election day procedures for counting ballots and distributing
precinct-level protocols make it "impossible" for any widespread
cheating to occur.


3. (SBU) The Ambassador met with National Social Democratic Party
(NSDP) leaders Bulat Abilov and Oraz Zhandosov on August 10. While
they offered a number of examples of impediments to their campaign
and "bad faith" by the government and Nur Otan, they appeared to be

primarily focused on running their campaign and getting their
message out. They, too, said that newspapers were completely free
to cover the campaign as they wished, and that there had been little
or no interference with their campaign rallies, distribution of
literature, or meetings with voters. They did complain, however,
about biased television coverage and a lack of access to commercial
billboards. (Reftel A)

Election Day: The Main Test
--------------


4. (SBU) New electoral and counting procedures, if implemented as
designed, may yet reduce the opportunities to distort the vote count
and aggregation. New requirements include displaying each ballot to
all commission members and observers before counting it, providing
all interested parties with copies of the protocol of results, and
allowing each party competing in the election the right to have a
"consultative" member (without vote) at each level of the election
commissions (Reftel B). (Note: NSDP plans to have such
representatives on higher-level commissions, but only observers at
the precinct level. End Note.) In addition, the Central Election
Committee (CEC) has promised to post precinct-by-precinct results on
the Internet, allowing observers to compare the protocols they
received with the ones used to calculate the final results.
(Comment: The sooner the CEC does this the better, although there
appears to be some debate within the Commission about whether to put
the protocols on the Internet as they are received, or only after
all the results are tabulated and announced. End Comment.)


5. (SBU) Historically, efforts by local and regional authorities to
ensure that they produce better-than-average results for the
president and his party have been a major source of election fraud
in Kazakhstan. The Ambassador has heard from Dzhakysebekov and his
deputy Maulen Ashimbayev, as well as from Nur Otan campaign chairman
Kairat Kelimbetov, that they have explicitly told local authorities
not to interfere with the ballot counting process. Nonetheless, the
chances of at least isolated attempts of malfeasance by local
authorities are high - and it is certainly possible that they could
be widespread enough to discredit the entire process. We are fairly
confident, however, that the OSCE election observation mission will
be in a position to detect and report on any significant level of
such abuse.

The Outcome
--------------

ASTANA 00002223 002.2 OF 002




6. (SBU) We can predict with a high degree of confidence that Nur
Otan will win a majority, perhaps even a large majority, of the
votes cast. We also expect that voter turnout will be relatively
low. Beyond that, crystal balls are in substantial disagreement,
and published polls are all over the map and in our view totally
unreliable. In the last election, USAID financed both pre-election
and exit polls using reliable independent contractors and
methodologies. Unfortunately, there was neither time nor the budget
to arrange for such polling for these elections.


7. (SBU) The Presidential Administration tells us that their
internal polls suggest low votes for the two principal opposition
parties, Ak Zhol and NSDP. In an August 9 meeting with the
Ambassador, Presidential Administration Deputy Chief Ashimbayev said
that their information suggested that NSDP would not pass the 7
percent threshold. NSDP Abilov and Zhandosov, however, claimed that
their polling suggested the party was getting 20 percent or more
among "likely voters," and was leading in Almaty and two or three
other regions.


8. (SBU) The outcome will largely depend on turnout, and Nur Otan is
likely to have a significant advantage in getting its supporters to
the polls. It is much easier to mobilize voters in rural areas,
where the opposition has significantly less support. Urban voters
seem largely unexcited by the campaign. Abilov and Zhandosov said
that they were anticipating a 20-30 percent turnout in Almaty, and
that even strong supporters were telling them they saw no reason to
vote this time.


9. (SBU) Comment: We think there is a reasonable chance that both
NSDP and Ak Zhol will get more than 7 percent of the vote and get
representation in Parliament - although it is also conceivable that
both could fall short and the new Parliament will be completely in
the hands of one party - an outcome our contacts in the Presidential
Administration tell us would be undesirable and embarrassing. Our
reaction to the election process, and the standard to which we
should hold the GOK, especially in view of its candidacy for the
OSCE chairmanship in 2009, should not focus on the results. Rather,
it should be focused on the process and take as its factual basis
the OSCE election observation effort. So far, the OSCE's criticism
has focused primarily on two legislative provisions that the
observation mission believes are inconsistent with the Copenhagen
commitments. These are both important issues, and could very well
be on our post-election agenda with the GOK as we determine how to
proceed to evaluate Kazakhstan's candidacy for the chairmanship, but
in our view are separate issues from the conduct of the elections
themselves. End Comment.