Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASTANA1302
2007-05-15 11:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER

Tags:  ENRG EPET KZ RS TX 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5566
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #1302/01 1351104
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151104Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9444
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0163
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001302 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO SMANN); EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA)
DEPT PLEASE PASS USTDA (DSTEIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ RS TX
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER
DOWNPLAY ANNOUNCED GAS PIPELINE DEALS

REF: ASHGABAT 489

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001302

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO SMANN); EB/ESC; SCA/CEN (O'MARA)
DEPT PLEASE PASS USTDA (DSTEIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: ENRG EPET KZ RS TX
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER
DOWNPLAY ANNOUNCED GAS PIPELINE DEALS

REF: ASHGABAT 489

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Both Prime Minister Masimov and Foreign
Minister Tazhin downplayed the significance of the gas
pipeline deals announced during the May 12 tripartite summit
in Turkmenistan (Ref A) in separate May 15 conversations with
Ambassador Ordway. Masimov told the Ambassador that "all we
agreed to was a feasibility study" for a new gas pipeline,
and that "only because it was so very important to Putin."
Tazhin, in turn, described the deal as a "Russian deal for
Turkmen gas," and assured the Ambassador that "we are not
cutting off any options" for gas transportation. Masimov
also told the Ambassador that the summit had not led to any
progress on the issue of Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
expansion, and voiced skepticism that the Government of
Russia would ever agree to expansion terms. Masimov
acknowledged that the government was preparing itself for a
heated battle with Kashagan partners once project delays and
cost overruns were formally announced later this summer; in
addition to financial compensation, he said, the government
might seek a change of operator. End summary.

Downplaying the Gas Pipeline Drama
--------------


2. (C) On May 15, Prime Minister Masimov downplayed the gas
pipeline deals announced during the May 12 tripartite summit
in Turkmenistan, telling Ambassador Ordway that "all we
agreed to was a feasibility study" for a new gas pipeline,
and that Nazarbayev had gone that far "only because it was so
very important to Putin." The presidents, he said, had
ordered their governments to draw up an agreement for
signature by September 1. Masimov portrayed the deal as
driven by the Russians and Turkmen, with Kazakhstan involved
merely by virtue of geography.


3. (C) What Kazakhstan was really after in Turkmenistan was a
gas concession, Masimov explained, in order to secure gas
supplies for Kazakhstan's gas-deficit Southern population

centers. Beyond that, he said, the Government of Kazakhstan
(GOK) had pursued railroad and road projects linking the
Caspian port of Aktau with Turkmenistan.


4. (C) Foreign Minister Tazhin requested the May 15 meeting
with Ambassador Ordway, telling the latter that he was
fulfilling a commitment he had made to Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary Mann to inform the USG about the
discussions in Ashgabat. Like Masimov, Tazhin downplayed the
significance of the announced agreements. What had
transpired, he said, was a "Turkmen-Russian deal for Turkmen
gas." Kazakhstan, he noted, was only a transit country. The
deal did not involve Kazakhstani gas, nor any project on the
Kazakhstani shelf. Therefore, he concluded, there was
nothing which Kazakhstan had been in a position to say "no"
to. Tazhin shared an additional detail of the gas pipeline
project with the Ambassador, noting each of the three
countries would pay for the construction of that part of the
pipeline which passed through its territory, with Kazakhstan
recouping its investment by means of transit fees.


5. (C) Tazhin also qualified Nazarbayev's May 10 remark
(following a meeting with Putin) to the effect that
Kazakhstan was committed to shipping most, if not all, of its
oil through Russian territory. Tazhin agreed that, even if
CPC expansion was factored in, there was "no way" that
Kazakhstan could export all its oil through Russia.


No Progress on CPC Expansion
--------------


6. (C) Masimov told the Ambassador that, notwithstanding
Nazarbayev's media quotes implying that optimism on CPC
expansion was justified, no progress had been made on the
issue. "The Russians are not going to agree on CPC
expansion," Masimov said flatly. Masimov noted that he would
be traveling to Moscow on June 1, where a host of energy
issues, including CPC expansion, possible expansion of the
Atyrau-Samara pipeline, and the Orenburg gas-processing plant
joint venture would be at the top of his agenda. (Tazhin
told the Ambassador that the Orenburg negotiations were "very
difficult" as well. The Russians were striking a hard
bargain, he said, knowing that the cost to the Kazakhstanis

ASTANA 00001302 002 OF 002


of constructing their own, alternative gas processing plant
were nearly prohibitive.)

Tough Times Ahead for Kashagan Partners
--------------


7. (C) Masimov informed the Ambassador that the GOK had hired
outside, U.S. consultants -- including Cambridge Energy
Research Associates' Daniel Yergin -- in preparation for the
formal announcement, later this summer, of Kashagan delays
and cost overruns. (Note: The Kashagan partners will present
the project's "Final Project Schedule," as well as cost
estimates for full field development, to the GOK either in
late June or July. End note.) The report, Masimov
predicted, would unleash a "storm," as the GOK intended to
seek economic compensation for the delays and cost overruns.
The GOK might go further, he said, and seek a change of
operator. While the GOK was considering a series of options,
Masimov concluded, it had no interest in either slowing down
overall Kashagan development or forcing any existing partner
to sell its stake in the consortium.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) While we are encouraged by Masimov's interpretation of
what was -- and what wasn't -- agreed to in Turkmenistan, it
is clear that our window of opportunity for proving the
advantages, both economic and geopolitical, of a
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline is closing. In order to counter
the momentum squarely now on the side of the Russians, we
need to move ahead with our own Trans-Caspian pipeline
feasibility study as soon as possible. We may need to
rewrite the Terms of Reference in order to obtain at least
preliminary results by September 1, in order to give
ourselves the evidence and arguments to state our best case.
ORDWAY