Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASTANA125
2007-01-16 11:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: NEW CABINET TO MAINTAIN POLICY COURSE

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8618
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0125/01 0161152
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161152Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8179
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2097
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0413
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2169
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1668
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ASTANA 000125 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NEW CABINET TO MAINTAIN POLICY COURSE

REF: A. ASTANA 87


B. ASTANA 96

C. ASTANA 48

Classified By: CDA Kevin Milas, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ASTANA 000125

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NEW CABINET TO MAINTAIN POLICY COURSE

REF: A. ASTANA 87


B. ASTANA 96

C. ASTANA 48

Classified By: CDA Kevin Milas, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: President Nazarbayev's early January cabinet
reshuffle will not have a major impact on Kazakhstani
government policy, but may offer insight into the struggle
for influence between power groups and would-be successors.
New Prime Minister Karim Masimov is expected to maintain the
economic policy course that President Nazarbayev has long
charted, focusing on economic diversification and
competitiveness. Familiar figures named to other key
positions, including Marat Tazhin as the new Foreign Minister
and Daniyal Akhmetov as Kazakhstan's first civilian defense
minister, are also expected to continue Kazakhstan's
multi-vector foreign policy and defense reform efforts. The
government shake-up is more significant for the insight it
provides into competition between elite power groups based on
Nazarbayev sons-in-law Timur Kulibayev and Rakhat Aliyev, and
metals magnate Aleksandr Mashkevich. With his allies
installed as Prime Minister, Minister of Energy and Mineral
Resources, and at KazMunaiGaz, Kulibayev appears to be the
clear winner of the reshuffle. End summary.

--------------
What Has Changed
--------------


2. (C) As reported in Refs A and B, President Nazarbayev
appointed Karim Masimov as Prime Minister on January 10 and
named his new cabinet on January 11. Twelve ministers
retained their positions, including Bakhtykozha Izmukhambetov
in the key post of Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources.
Nazarbayev made seven new cabinet appointments:

-- Marat Tazhin, most recently secretary of the Security
Council, was named Foreign Minister, replacing Kasymzhomart
Tokayev. On January 11 Nazarbayev introduced Tazhin to
Foreign Ministry staff as his "main advisor on international
issues" who would continue Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign
policy. Known as a master of Kazakhstan's political system,
Tazhin has until now held posts out of the public eye,
including a brief stint as chairman of the Committee for

National Security (KNB),where current Deputy Foreign
Minister Rakhat Aliyev was his very troublesome deputy, and a
long tenure as Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration
(2002-2006). Tazhin, a fluent English speaker, has never
held a diplomatic post. Tazhin's protege Nurlan Yermekbayev,
head of the Foreign Policy Center of the Presidential
Administration, was named Deputy Foreign Minister. There has
been no announcement of whom Yermekbayev is to replace,
although it is rumored that Deputy Foreign Minister Aliyev
may depart.

-- Aslan Musin was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, while
retaining the position of Minister of Economy and Budget
Planning that he has held since last October. Musin, who
served as Akim of both the Aktobe and Atyrau oblasts,
possesses extensive regional economic experience that is
expected to complement Masimov's expertise in finance. In
his January 11 speech to Parliament, Nazarbayev challenged
the cabinet to increase budget planning efficiency and to
create a new system of center-regional budget relations --
areas in which Musin may be able to make a significant
contribution. Some post contacts maintain that Musin, whose
limited experience in Astana makes him a somewhat surprising
choice for the Deputy Prime Minister position, was chosen in
order to maintain balance among the three main Kazakh clans
("zhuz") at the top level of government. (Note: Musin is an
influential representative of the "Younger" clan, dominant in
western Kazakhstan, as is Tazhin. Nazarbayev and Tokayev are
both from the "Elder" clan, from southeastern Kazakhstan.
Mazhilis speaker Mukhamedzhanov represents the "Middle" clan,
from the northeastern part of the country. As an ethnic
Uighur, Prime Minister Masimov is outside the clan system.
End note.) Other observers point to Musin's reported ties to
Rakhat Aliyev and Dariga Nazarbayeva and see him as a
counterweight to Masimov, known to be close to Timur
Kulibayev.

-- Daniyal Akhmetov, the former Prime Minister, was appointed

ASTANA 00000125 002 OF 005


as Kazakhstan's first civilian Defense Minister. In
announcing the appointment, Nazarbayev said that his decision
conformed to the international practice of having civilians
handle policy and management. The former Defense Minister,
Mukhtar Altynbayev, remains the senior uniformed member of
the Armed Services while becoming First Deputy Defense
Minister -- an appointment that many observers do not expect
to last given the almost inevitable tension between the men
and the fact that Altynbayev is nearing retirement age. The
press has suggested that Akhmetov, who has never been
involved in any public corruption scandals, may undertake an
anti-corruption crusade within the military. Before serving
as Prime Minister from 2003-2007, Akhmetov served as Akim of
the Pavlodar (1993-1997 and 2001-2003) and North Kazakhstan
(1997-1999) oblasts, as well as Deputy Prime Minister
(1999-2000). He was the highest-ranking representative of
the "Middle" clan in the previous government, and is closely
linked to metals magnate Aleksandr Mashkevich. Post sees the
appointment of a civilian as Defense Minister as an important
milestone in Kazakhstan's defense reform efforts.

-- Galym Orazbakov replaces Vladimir Shkolnik as Minister of
Industry and Trade. Orazbakov, only 42 years old, previously
served as Deputy Minister of Economy and Trade (2001-2002)
and of Industry and Trade (2002-2003),where he was head of
Kazakhstan's WTO negotiation team. Since 2003, he has worked
as President of the private "Kazakhstan Engineering" firm.
Orazbakov, a member of the "Elder" clan, is believed to be
related to Abykayev. It is not yet known whether Orazbakov
will retain Deputy Minister Zhanar Aitzhanova, the lead
negotiator on WTO accession. (Shkolnik, a longtime
Nazarbayev confidante, was appointed a deputy head of the
Presidential Administration on January 12; his portfolio has
not been announced.)

-- Zhanseit Tuymebayev, formerly ambassador to Russia,
replaces Berganym Aitimova as Minister of Education and
Science. Tuymebayev is a career diplomat, who served as
Chief of Presidential Protocol prior to his February 2006
appointment to Moscow. A PhD in philology, Tuymebayev has
conducted extensive research on the Kazakh language. Media
analysts have suggested that Aitimova may have lost her job
due to her failure to effectively fight corruption in the
universities. Given the lack of significant criticism of
Aitimova, it is more likely that Nazarbayev simply needed to
free up a ministerial post for Tuymebayev in order to send
former Senate speaker Nurtay Abykayev to Russia.

-- Viktor Khrapunov replaces Shalbay Kulmakhanov as Minister
of Emergency Situations. Khrapunov, a member of the "Middle"
clan, previously served as Akim of the East Kazakhstan Oblast
(2004-2007),Akim of Almaty City (1997-2004),and Minister of
Energy and Coal (1995-1997). Nazarbayev's decision to
"demote" Khrapunov from Almaty to East Kazakhstan in 2004 was
widely seen as a sign that Khrapunov had not yet mastered the
political game; he came in for particular criticism for crude
violations during the 2004 parliamentary elections. Given
that the Ministry of Emergency Situations is seen as a
political backwater, Khrapunov's latest appointment is likely
a sign that his performance has not improved. Many observers
are puzzled as to how Khrapunov, who is known to be quite
corrupt (industry sources tell post that as akim he directly
solicited a bribe from a distributor in Ust-Kamenogorsk),has
managed to stay in government. His wife's reported close
friendship with Dariga Nazarbayeva may be one explanation.

-- Yerbol Orynbayev was named Chief of the Prime Minister's
chancery, the only non-ministerial cabinet position.
Orynbayev replaces Altay Tleuberdin in the relatively
low-profile job. Orynbayev, born in 1971 in Shymkent and
thus a representative of the "Elder" clan, holds a law degree
from Moscow State University (1993) and a Master's in
international development from Duke (2002). He previously
served as Deputy Minister of Economy and Budget Planning
(2002-2003),chairman of the board of directors of the Center
of Marketing and Analytical Studies (2003-2004),and in
positions of increasing responsibility in the Presidential
Administration, most recently as Deputy Head with
responsibility for economic policy (2006-2007). Orynbayev
worked closely with Masimov on the international board of
advisors for the Almaty Financial Center and on the
government working group on administrative reform, and is
thus expected to focus on economic and administrative reform

ASTANA 00000125 003 OF 005


issues.


3. (C) In perhaps the most surprising move, Nazarbayev
appointed former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kasymzhomart
Tokayev to replace Nurtay Abykayev as Speaker of the Senate.
(Under the Constitution, Nazarbayev can appoint up to seven
senators. The Speaker is first in line of presidential
succession.) Some media analysts have claimed that Tokayev
is an ally of Rakhat Aliyev and thus intended as a
counterweight to the Masimov-Kulibayev camp. Given the
obvious tensions between Tokayev and Aliyev during their
coexistence at the MFA, however, that theory holds no water.
Tokayev is known as a smart, honest, and relatively
politically unambitious figure whom Nazarbayev can therefore
trust to be a heartbeat away from the presidency. Abykayev's
transfer to Moscow is widely seen as punishment for his
failure to prevent his staffer Yerzhan Utembayev from
ordering the February 2006 murder of opposition leader
Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly and bringing international criticism on
the Kazakhstani government.


4. (C) Confusion and controversy surrounded Nazarbayev's
appointment of Berik Imashev, formerly the deputy head of the
Presidential Administration for legal affairs, to replace
Tazhin as chairman of the Security Council. On January 11, a
decree was posted on the Presidential Administration website
naming current Ambassador to the U.S. Kanat Saudabayev to
that position, and numerous news outlets reported the story
as fact. On January 12, with no explanation, the original
decree was replaced with one naming Imashev to the post.
Imashev, 46, holds a law degree from Moscow State University
(1982). He worked his way up through the procuracy and later
the Financial Police before working in the private sector
during the mid-1990s. Imashev served as deputy secretary of
the Security Council (2003-2005) before moving to his most
recent job at the Presidential Administration. Imashev is a
stern individual whose department is thought to have drafted
much of the legislation considered damaging to human rights
in the past two years. His daughter Aida (born 1984) is
married to Rakhat Aliyev and Dariga Nazarbayev's son Nuraly
(born 1985),making Imashev the grandfather of President
Nazarbayev's great-grandson Alan (born 2005).

--------------
What Has Not Changed
--------------


5. (U) Twelve ministers retained their positions:
Bakhtykozha Izmukhambetov, Energy and Mineral Resources;
Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov, Internal Affairs; Yermukhamet
Yertysbayev, Culture and Information; Natalya Korzhova,
Finance; Zagipa Baliyeva, Justice; Anatoliy Dernovoy, Health;
Akhmetzhan Yesimov, Agriculture; Gulzhana Karagusova, Labor
and Social Protection; Serik Akhmetov, Transportation and
Communications; Nurlan Iskakov, Environment and Natural
Resources; Temirkhan Dosmukhanbetov, Tourism and Sports; and
Musin at Economy and Budget Planning.


6. (U) There were no changes at the top of the key agencies
and committees. Head of the Presidential Administration
Adylbek Dzhaksybekov, KNB Chairman Amangeldy Shabdarbayev,
Financial Police head Sarybay Kalmurzayev, Chairman of the
Financial Supervision Agency Arman Dunayev, and Civil Service
Agency head Zautbek Turisbekov all retained their positions.
Procurator General Rashid Tusupbekov and Supreme Court Chief
Justice Kairat Mamy are appointed by Parliament and thus were
not affected by the cabinet reshuffle.

--------------
What It Means for Policy
--------------


7. (C) In Kazakhstan, the Prime Minister is primarily
responsible for coordinating economic policy. On paper, all
ministers report to him. In reality, however, ministers
dealing with foreign policy and security issues work directly
with the Presidential Administration. Even in the economic
realm the Prime Minister, because he is appointed by the
president and has no electoral legitimacy of his own, has no
authority to chart his own policy course. Masimov, an ethnic
Uighur, underscored his loyalty to Nazarbayev and his
policies during the January 10 joint session of parliament
when he placed his hand over his heart and stated "You showed

ASTANA 00000125 004 OF 005


great trust in me when you named me your aide. I want to say
that I was, am, and will remain your loyal assistant." In a
conversation with Pol-Econ Chief, True Ak Zhol co-chairman
Tulegen Zhukeyev, himself a former chairman of the Security
Council, described the gesture with disgust as that of a
"slave," something that "a Kazakh would never do."


8. (SBU) Masimov's authority will thus be limited to the
economic realm, within the policy limits set by Nazarbayev
and the Presidential Administration. Although Masimov is
well known to post as a liberal, reform-oriented individual
with a positive attitude toward the West, it is not realistic
to expect his influence to extend to the political realm or
questions of democratic reform. Other cabinet-level changes
are not likely to have either a positive or negative impact
on the reform process, as it is being orchestrated by the
Presidential Administration (Ref C). Likewise, most
observers do not expect significant changes in the country's
economic policy as a result of the switch, as Nazarbayev's
decision to replace former Prime Minister Akhmetov is seen as
a routine change after 3.5 years rather than a condemnation
of his performance. During the January 11 parliamentary
session, Nazarbayev set out a familiar list of priorities for
the new government, including pursuing Kazakhstan's objective
to be among the 50 most competitive countries in the world,
the need to improve state planning and development programs,
support for regional development based on "centers of
economic growth," economic diversification, affordable
housing, fair rules for land sales, creation of a pilot
program of civic-oriented entrepreneurial corporations,
increased efficacy in budget planning, improving education
and health care, strengthening the pension system, and job
creation.

--------------
What It Means for Politics
--------------


9. (C) The cabinet changes have touched off a great deal of
debate about the battle for succession. While Nazarbayev's
decision to appoint Karim Masimov as Prime Minister is a
clear vote of confidence in his political and managerial
skills, it does not necessarily augur a bright political
future for Masimov beyond his current posting. It is highly
unlikely that anyone other than an ethnic Kazakh could be
chosen as Nazarbayev's successor. (There has already been
criticism in the parliament of the fact that Masimov does not
speak fluent Kazakh.) Masimov's appointment thus says more
about the ascendant position of his main backer, first
son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, than it does about his own
prospects. Kulibayev himself controls the giant Samruk
holding company -- which includes KazMunaiGaz -- and his
allies now hold the key revenue-controlling positions of
Prime Minister and Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources.


10. (C) Kulibayev's primary rival, Dariga Nazarbayeva's
husband Rakhat Aliyev, appears to have come out on the losing
end of the reshuffle. While he has some allies in key
positions, namely Deputy Prime Minister Musin and Security
Council chairman Imashev, he has also seen rivals such as
Tazhin and Tokayev retain positions of great influence.
Aliyev, who has been First Deputy Foreign Minister since
2005, is rumored to be on his way back to "honorable exile"
in Vienna where Nazarbayev sent him in 2002 following
accusations that Aliyev was plotting to seize power. Some
believe he is being punished for mismanaging Kazakhstan's bid
to chair the OSCE; others see the changes as delayed
retribution for his rumored involvement in the Sarsenbaiuly
murder.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) Comment: Kazakhstani politics are particularly
opaque due to the closed nature of the clan system, the tight
family relationships among the elite, and the shortage of
political analysts and investigative journalists with any
first-hand knowledge of events. The maneuverings that are
visible to outsiders are merely the surface ripples of an
enormous struggle that takes place far beyond the public eye.
Nevertheless, a few things are clear: the Kazakhstani elite
are beginning to maneuver into position to succeed

ASTANA 00000125 005 OF 005


Nazarbayev, and -- for now -- the Kulibayev camp appears to
be playing the game most successfully.
MILAS