SLA-UNITY'S SHARIF HARIR SPEAKS ON SIRTE AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000875

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PREL KPKO SU ER
SUBJECT: SLA-UNITY'S SHARIF HARIR SPEAKS ON SIRTE AND THE
FUTURE


Classified By: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a November 9 meeting with Poloff, Sudan
Liberation Army-Unity (SLA)Unity) Head for Negotiations
Sharif Harir expressed his commitment to engaging in peace
negotiations for Darfur and critiqued the process leading up
to the Sirte talks. Harir said internal problems within
SLA-Unity had been caused by a lack of understanding by
certain members, especially Abdallah Yehia, of their roles
and responsibilities. He highlighted the need for SLA-Unity
political leaders to meet in Darfur with the party's
supporters to resolve differences. Harir offered his
assessment of various rebel leaders, commenting that some who
had attended Sirte had little support on the ground. He
asked that the international community support SLA-Unity's
efforts to stay united and encourage the Darfur groups to
create lasting, and meaningful, alliances between themselves.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Harir expressed frustration at the process leading up
to the Sirte meetings (which he did not attend, stating that
the UN/AU's system for issuing invitations, the multiple
meetings and the selection of Libya as the venue all
contributed to greater division between the different rebel
groups. Harir stated that by recognizing any Darfurian "who
speaks a little English and has a Thuraya satellite phone,"
the UN/AU had encouraged some groups to split into multiple
factions in order to improve their chances of "getting a Land
Cruiser and a bigger piece of the cake." The selection of
Libya, and the Libyans subsequent maneuverings to buy off
Darfur leaders such as Abdallah Yehia, also negatively
impacted the process. He added that Qaddafi's opening
comments, i.e. that the Darfurians were "fighting over a
camel", were unhelpful and underlined why Libya was the wrong
venue for talks.


3. (C) Harir acknowledged internal problems within SLA-Unity
and asked for international community support of the group's
efforts to resolve its differences. (NOTE: Harir did not ask
for resources or financial support, but rather recognition of
the need for SLA-Unity to work through its internal problems
and the time ad political space to do so. End Note.) He
ascribed the internal discord to Abdallah Yehia's failure to
understand clearly his role as the leader of SLA-Unity, and
to Yehia's behavior in the months leading up to the Sirte
talks. Harir stated that Yehia's long stay in Libya, and his
agreements with the Libyans before Sirte, did not have the
full support of the SLA-Unity commanders and troops. He also
claimed the Libyans had prevented his travel to Darfur prior
to the Sirte meetings in order to forestall such
consultations with the SLA-Unity commanders. According to
Harir, the Chadians had delayed, and then refused him transit
permission to travel to Darfur. In explanation, the Chadians
alluded to meetings with Libyan officials and told him the
issue "was complicated." Harir said the SLA-Unity commanders
are insisting again that Harir return to the field and have
refused to let Yehia depart Darfur until these issues are
resolved. (Note: Harir departed Eritrea on November 10 and
traveled via Egypt to Darfur. End Note.)


4. (C) Once in Darfur Harir planned to: work toward
resolution of SLA-Unity's internal issues, strengthen the
SLA-Unity's political program and build stronger alliances
with other Darfurian groups. He said that building
allegiances with the Arab groups was particularly critical at
this time, in order to help disarm the janjaweed militias.
Harir expressed his commitment to peace in Darfur and told
Poloff he would participate in UN/AU negotiations, even in
Libya, once SLA-Unity resolves its differences. Harir
suggested Chad might provide a better venue than Libya for
continuing talks, because of its proximity to Darfur. He
also mentioned Eritrea as a venue option. Although the
logistics would be more difficult, in his view the Eritreans
would be more supportive of the UN/AU process than Libya.
South Africa was another viable venue for negotiations; Egypt
was not.


5. (C) Harir refuted claims that the SLA-Unity has agreed to
negotiate with SLA-Khamees Abdallah, the SLA/G-19 and others

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as a block. Commenting that SLA-Unity remains the largest
and strongest force in Darfur, he added that SLA-Khamees
Abdallah also commands a strong force. Harir noted that
Khamees' history as Abdulwahid's deputy, the support and
respect he receives from his fellow Masalit tribesman, and
his skill as a politician make him an important player in
bringing peace to Darfur. As for other Darfurian figures,
Harir said that Adam Bakhit now has little to no actual
support or assets on the ground in Darfur, aside from a
couple of Land Cruisers and a Thuraya phone courtesy of
high-ranking relatives in the Chadian army. With regards to
Abdulwahid, he noted that Furs are also represented in other
rebel groups. He said that the general assumption that all
Furs support Abdulwahid was mistaken. Dismissing many of
those who participated in Sirte as bit players with little
support on the ground, Harir concluded, "you can't stop the
war by inking a paper with those in Sirte, because they don't
control the armies."


6. (C) Comment: Clearly pro-Eritrean, Harir denies
allegations that he is "in the pocket of the Eritreans,"
although he freely states this belief that they are the "most
strategic thinkers in the region." Notwithstanding the
gossipy tone of Harir's observations about other Darfurians,
particularly those he discounts, Harir himself has proven to
be a reliable source of information in Asmara on the shifting
alliances within the SLM/SLA groupings and appears sincere in
his intention to continue engaging with the UN/AU process,
despite his expressed reservations. End Comment.
MCINTYRE