PFDJ CHIEF VIEWS ON SUDAN, THE BORDER AND SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000874

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: PREL KPKO PTER SO SU ER
SUBJECT: PFDJ CHIEF VIEWS ON SUDAN, THE BORDER AND SOMALIA

Classified By: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On November 8, CDA met at her request with
Yemane Ghebreab, Head of the Office of Political Affairs for
Eritrea's sole political party, the People's Front for
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). Discussion topics included the
recent UN/AU Darfur meetings in Libya, the Eritrean-Ethiopian
border situation, Somalia and the presence of Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys in Eritrea. While the conversation yielded
little new in terms of GSE policy positions, Ghebreab's
expression of interest in continuing discussions on a range
of U.S.-Eritrean bilateral matters marked a departure from
last spring, when he expressly stipulated PFDJ-Embassy
dialogue would be limited to issues concerning the Darfur
peace process. End Summary.

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GSE'S PERSPECTIVE ON DARFUR NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SPLM
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2. (C) Ghebreab offered positive feedback on the recent
Darfur talks in Sirte, commenting that attendance had been
good and coordination between the regional actors and the
UN/AU team was improving. Although encouraged by the initial
accomplishments of these talks, Ghebreab expressed concern
that divisions within Sudan's Government of National Unity
(GNU) and the instability and disorganization within the
Darfur rebel groupings could lead to failure in future phases
of the negotiations. In addition, the Libyan's and
international community's focus on absent Darfur leaders
Khalil Ibraham of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and
Abdulwahid Nur of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) sent
the wrong message to those Darfurians who had attended.
Ghebreab opined that as long as the other Darfur leaders were
present and engaged, a viable Darfur political process could
proceed without either Abdulwahid or Khalil.


3. (C) Ghebreab noted that the regional partners, including
Egypt, and the UN/AU planned to meet in Asmara the week of
November 13. He hoped the discussions would result in a plan
for next steps in the negotiation process, including a plan
of action in the event the current initiative falls apart.
Ghebreab emphasized the importance of continued U.S.-Eritrean
coordination on issues of Darfur as well as the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA). He expressed particular interest in
meeting with Special Envoy Natsios on Sudan issues.


4. (C) As in past meetings, Ghebreab underscored the GSE's
belief in the critical importance of maintaining the CPA as
the key to peace throughout Sudan. He noted that the recent
crisis within the GNU had resulted in the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) recognizing, for the first time,
the extent of their internal problems. SPLM leaders serving
in the GNU found their only fallback to be a weak and
politically divided organization. Ghebreab said the SPLM is
realizing that to be an effective part of, and counterbalance
in, the GNU, the organization has to be unified and
strengthened. Without a strong SPLM, the CPA will not be
successful, he concluded.

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BORDER STALEMATE: MORE DIPLOMACY NOT AN OPTION
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5. (C) CDA expressed concern over the military build-up and
tensions at the border and firmly refuted claims published in
the GSE-run media that the U.S. would support or condone any
action by either Ethiopia or Eritrea that could provoke
conflict. She added that our Embassy in Addis Ababa has
delivered the same message to PM Meles. Ghebreab responded
that U.S. backing "does not have to be direct support; there
are other ways the U.S. can encourage Ethiopia." (Note:
Ghebreab's comment echoes an observation from a recent
International Crisis Group report on the border stalemate.
End note.) Ghebreab assured CDA that the GSE has no plans or
interest in going to war, adding the caveat that Ethiopia
would instigate any conflict. The positions of the Eritrean
Defense Forces (EDF) were defensive only, in order to protect
against an Ethiopian invasion. CDA noted that Eritrea could

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significantly reduce tensions by moving troops out of the
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ),which would also remove this
charge of GSE violations of the Algiers Agreement. Ghebreab
responded predictably by noting the TSZ represents one
quarter of Eritrean territory, and the most fertile. He
attested to the need for the EDF to continue its economic
activities in the TSZ. (Note: Post believes Ghebreab was
referring to farming and other agricultural projects run by
the EDF. End note.)


6. (C) CDA asked Ghebreab what diplomatic options the GSE
might consider to resolve the border impasse and achieve
normalization of relations with Ethiopia. Ghebreab said the
GSE had been talking with UN Under Secretary Pascoe, but felt
the UN has presented no viable new ideas. Ethiopia was the
intractable party and in violation of international law, he
added. For Eritrea, resolution of the border simply came
down to implementing a legal decision. Ghebreab stated the
GSE had tried to resolve border disagreements through
diplomatic efforts before the 1998 war. Now, the GSE was
"100 percent sure that diplomacy will not lead to the
demarcation of the border." Ghebreab reiterated the GSE
position that after the border is demarcated, Eritrea would
welcome normalized relations with Ethiopia.

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ERITREA DOES NOT SUPPORT TERRORISTS; WHAT ABOUT AWEYS?
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7. (C) CDA expressed concern about the presence of Sheikh
Aweys in Asmara, noting that providing support to this
individual violated UN Resolution 1267. Without addressing
Aweys specifically, Ghebreab averred that the GSE has been
one of the staunchest country supporters in global efforts to
fight terrorism. The U.S. could not accuse Eritrea of
supporting terrorism. He further stated that he had formerly
chaired Eritrea's counterterrorism committee and the GSE
"would willingly cooperate in the counterterrorism effort."
CDA commented that she had seen no evidence of GSE
counterterrorism cooperation during her tenure in Eritrea.
Ghebreab offered to brief CDA on GSE counterterrorism efforts
dating from 2001 in a future discussion.


8. (C) CDA inquired also about the GSE's support to the Tamil
Tigers, in light of the allegations that appeared in the U.S.
Senate hearing report in late summer 2007. With an enigmatic
smile, Ghebreab refuted that the GSE has any direct links,
opining that the Tamil Tigers have referred to the Eritrean
struggle in their literature as a model in the Tamil Tigers'
own fight for independence.

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GSE SUPPORTS SOMALIS RIGHT TO RESIST ETHIOPIAN OCCUPATION
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9. (C) Ghebreab asserted that the GSE has evidence showing
that the U.S. fully supported the Ethiopian invasion of
Somalia. Reminding CDA of the long-standing ties between
Somalia and the GSE leadership, he noted that Eritrea
supports the Somali people in their fight against foreign
occupiers. African troops will not end the violence in
Mogadishu, he added, because they will not be allowed to
intervene in disputes. While in the short term, the GSE
benefited from the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia,
in the long term, a peaceful and stable Somalia was in the
GSE's best interest. Peace would only be possible when
Ethiopia withdrew its military forces, and these forces
should be withdrawn immediately. Ghebreab described U.S.
policy toward Somalia as "failed." He noted his willingness
to discuss further issues of Somalia in greater depth.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) In his first meeting with the Embassy since August,
Ghebreab offered no new insights or change in GSE thinking on
Sudan, the border or Somalia. However, he appeared more open
and engaged in this meeting than in those of recent past.
Ghebreab's repeated statements about his willingness to

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engage in further conversations on a range of policy issues
provides a hopeful opening, particularly in light of the new
Ambassador's approaching arrival, for more comprehensive and
constructive discussion with the PFDJ and the GSE in the
future. End Comment.
MCINTYRE