Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASMARA860
2007-11-01 13:03:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

WELL-CONNECTED ERITREAN TALKS OF ERITREA'S

Tags:  PGOV PTER KPKO MOPS ASEC ER 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHAE #0860/01 3051303
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011303Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9222
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1490
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1667
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPADJ/CJTF-HOA J2X CAMP LEMONIER DJ
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000860 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPKO MOPS ASEC ER
SUBJECT: WELL-CONNECTED ERITREAN TALKS OF ERITREA'S
MILITARY PLANNING

Classified By: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000860

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPKO MOPS ASEC ER
SUBJECT: WELL-CONNECTED ERITREAN TALKS OF ERITREA'S
MILITARY PLANNING

Classified By: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Poloff met October 24 with a
well-connected Eritrean-American, and regular contact, who
passed second-hand information on the Government of the State
of Eritrea's (GSE) war planning efforts and military
strategy. According to him, the GSE anticipates that war
with Ethiopia is imminent and has constructed a military
strategy that will result in most of the war occurring within
Ethiopian territory with Eritrea utilizing a defensive
approach to protect Assab and Asmara. He also reported that
the GSE has discussed plans for surreptitious attacks on U.S.
interests in the region. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) COMMENT ON SOURCE: The local contact is a well
established Eritrean-American businessman (contact) who
initially reached out to Poloff approximately one year ago.
He told Poloff in their initial meeting, that he had been
close with previous Ambassadors and other Americans in the
Embassy; however, upon Ambassador DeLisi's arrival in Eritrea
over three years ago, he was warned by GSE officials to
significantly reduce his contact and visibility with the
Embassy. Over the past year, Poloff has met with him many
times and discussed domestic and regional issues. His
information has consistently been accurate and insightful.
He has a clear understanding of the operations of the
Eritrean military forces, and has alluded on several
occasions to relationships with several high-ranking military
officials, including the Minister of Defense Sebhat Efrem,
and with other GSE Ministers, such as Minister of Justice
Fowsiya Hashim. He has admitted to Poloff ties to the
Eritrean opposition, in particular to having a close
relationship with Mesfin Hagos, one of the leaders of the
Eritrean Democratic Alliance and former GSE Minister of
Defense. He acknowledges he desires the end of President
Isaias' rule and shared information with Poloff with the full

knowledge it would be disseminated within the U.S.
government. He did not name any of his sources. END COMMENT.


2. (S) In a 10/24 meeting and subsequent meeting on 10/31,
the contact told Poloff that the GSE anticipates that war
with Ethiopia is inevitable and will happen in the near
future, although speculated that December or January seemed
more likely. The contact believes the GSE, namely President
Isaias, is overconfident in his preparation, equipment and
capabilities and as such, President Isaias would initiate a
conflict. The contact alternatively noted, though, that with
tensions being high on the border, a misunderstanding could
kick off a military engagement. With the expectation that
war with Ethiopia is inevitable, the GSE has prepared a
four-part military strategy. First, the GSE is building up
troop and munitions to protect the port of Assab. Second,
the GSE is building up troops in the Debub region of Eritrea,
directly south of Asmara between Adi Keyh and Mendefera as
this is the easiest land approach to Asmara. The GSE will
intensify its defense of this area in order to prevent the
Ethiopians from taking Asmara. Third, the GSE would allow
the Ethiopians to enter Eritrea on the western border, just
west of Badme. According to the contact, in this scenario,
the GSE plans to throw the twelfth grade students studying at
Sawa (who have a limited amount of military training and are
not soldiers) at the invading Ethiopian forces in order to
slow them down, i.e. essentially using the students as human
shields. The GSE anticipates that an Ethiopian attack from
the west would not be successful, and would prove costly in
terms of time and soldiers. Even if successful, the
Ethiopians would face a difficult approach to Asmara from the
west with its vertical ascension of more than 2000 meters.
Fourth, the GSE plans to enlist the support of Ethiopian
opposition groups in the Tigre, Oromiya and the Ogaden
regions of Ethiopia ) for example, the Oromiya Liberation
Front (OLF),the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) )
to initiate guerilla activity within Ethiopia, and thereby
create multiple demands on Ethiopian military resources. In
addition, the contact observed that should the Ethiopians be
successful in an invasion of Eritrea, President Isaias and
his supporters would revert to guerilla warfare and return to
the field, with groups of his supporters scattered throughout

ASMARA 00000860 002 OF 002


Eritrea engaging in insurgent actions.


3. (S) The contact also stated that the GSE has engaged in
discussions about striking U.S. interests in the region;
however Minister of Defense, Sebhat Efrem has managed to
dissuade others from initiating serious and detailed planning
of any attack. According to the contact, the GSE was
exploring the possibility of conducting a covert,
guerilla-style action south of the Hamish Islands in the Red
Sea, such as targeting a U.S. vessel traveling through the
southern Red Sea. Upon completion of the covert mission, the
GSE would disavow any knowledge or responsibility for the act
and would seek to blame Al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks
operating in Yemen or Somalia. Motivation for this act by
the GSE would be to garner a personal victory for President
Isaias in his fight against the U.S. According to the
contact, the act would be merely vindictive and one to show
that the little guy can take on the superpower. When asked
if the GSE planned to trumpet its actions to others in the
region in an attempt to inflate its regional importance, the
contact speculated it was a possibility. The contact alleged
that while some in the GSE supported such an action, Minister
of Defense Sebhat Efrem urged caution, observing that the USG
would respond forcefully to such an incident if GSE
involvement became known. The contact stated that any formal
planning for such an attack had been halted, although, he
added that hard-line elements within President Isaias' regime
could be continuing private discussions about such an attack.



4. (S) In addition to confirming the GSE's continuing (and
known) support for the ONLF and the OLF, the contact also
asserted that the rumors of GSE material support to the Tamil
Tigers are true. According to the contact, the relationship
has been ongoing for several years and Yemane Ghebreab, Head
of Political Affairs for the the People's Front for Democracy
and Justice - Eritrea's sole political party - has served as
the chief GSE official on this issue. When asked, the
contact shared that nearly 10 years ago, in Asmara, the
contact and a friend ran into Yemane and several
representatives of the Tamil Tigers in a public setting.
Yemane introduced the Sri Lankans as representatives of the
Tamil Tigers. When the friend asked Yemane why he was with
Tamil Tigers representatives, Yemane replied "mind your own
business."


5. (S/NF) Comment: Post notes that we are unable to
independently corroborate much of what the Eritrean-American
reported. As to the military planning, the UN Mission to
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) has observed over the past few
months troop rotations and movements in Assab in Sector East
and in the Sector Central of the Temporary Security Zone
(TSZ). On the allegation of GSE discussions about targeting
U.S. interests in the region, this is the first and only
allegation to date that post has heard of the GSE holding
such discussions. As post does not know the context of the
meeting from the contact, if the allegation is true, the
discussions may indicate only hypothetical wargaming on the
part of the GSE leadership. Post cannot dismiss the
possibility though that more extremist, anti-U.S. elements in
the GSE might conceive these actions to be in Eritrea's
national interest, however foolhardy. End Comment.
MCINTYRE