ERITREA: HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES: INFORMATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000858

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT FOR KEN MCKUNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: PTER KVPR PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS ER
SUBJECT: ERITREA: HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES: INFORMATION
COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING

REF: SECSTATE 133921

Classified By: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) In response to reftel request for information
regarding host government practices on information
collection, screening and sharing, post provides the
following responses. Answers are keyed to headers provided
in reftel, paragraph 6. In addition, post advises that
bilateral relations between Eritrea and the United States are
at an all-time low. There is no bilateral cooperation on any
issue and the Government of the State of Eritrea routinely
refuses to discuss issues, policies or practices with post.
The GSE operates a single-party state and restricts civil
liberties and personal freedoms; there is no dissent in
Eritrea. The GSE routinely arrests and detains its own
citizens without judicial due process. Anyone considered a
threat to the current regime is at risk of detention. The
GSE governs without regard to its own laws and proclamations,
often implementing practices that have no foundation in law
or precedence. Power and decision-making stay in the hands of
only a few people, who operate without transparency.


2. (SBU) A. Watchlisting: The GSE does maintain a watchlist
of an unknown number of records administered by the Office of
National Security and the Immigration Office, both of which
are under the auspices of the Office of the President. Post
believes that the list contains names of both international
and Eritrean criminals, terrorists and those considered a
threat to Eritrea's national security. The information is
retained in a computer database that is reportedly centrally
maintained and updated. Post has no further details about
the watchlist.


B. (C) Traveler Information Collection: The GSE collects the
standard information upon arrival by air, land and sea into
Eritrea. There are no commercial domestic flights within
Eritrea. The Immigration Office, in collaboration with the
Office of National Security, collects the information. Post
does not know the GSE policies on information sharing; they
do not share routine information with the resident foreign
Missions. We believe that the GSE would only share
information if the regime believed such action to be in its
interest. Post believes the GSE collects the Passenger Name
Record (PNR) on all incoming flights and uses this
information for intelligence and law enforcement purposes.
The GSE is party to the general maritime and aviation
treaties. Post is unaware if the GSE has any existing
treaties to share PNR data.


C. (SBU) Border Control and Screening: Post is unaware if
the GSE uses software to screen travelers of security
interest. Post does not believe the GSE uses electronic
tracking systems. No computers are in evidence at the
immigration counters at the Asmara airport, the main point of
entry. The GSE does use the VIP lounge and other means to
allow individuals to enter Eritrea without proceeding through
the standard immigration procedures. In addition, post does
not know if the passengers of private planes are required to
proceed through immigration. Border control officials
operate under the command of the Office of National Security
and are directed by high-ranking officials. The border
control officials do have the authority to question any
individual who enters Eritrea based on suspicion or direct
command. Immigration officials will question individuals who
arrive in Eritrea without visas or permission to enter the
country. In some cases, Immigration would deny entry or
detain the individual, in other cases National Security would
detain the individual.


D. (SBU) Biometric Collection: There is no biometric
collection at the points of entries. The GSE does not
fingerprint travelers to Eritrea. The GSE does maintain an
extensive manual, rolled fingerprint collection of its
citizenry and others arrested by the police or military.
Post believes this fingerprint collection is not/not
computerized or digitized in any way and is maintained
predominantly by the police. Post does not know if the
fingerprint programs in place are NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or
RTID compliant, but believes they are not.


E. (SBU) Passports: The GSE issues machine-readable
passports, however these do not contain biometric
information. Replacement passports are usually full validity
issuance and do not appear to be different in any way from a
regularly issued passport. In a few instances, post observed
replacement passports issued for a limited validity, however

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these were unusual. Post is unaware of any special
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen
multiple times.


F. (C) Fraud Detection: The GSE has strict consequences for
the production of fraudulent documents and cooperates with
post on identifying fraudulent documents on an as-needed
basis. The cooperation is extremely limited. For example,
post has been unable to obtain meetings with police contacts
to discuss fraud. The GSE does not appear to be interested
in fraudulent school records and other such consular
documents. In Eritrea, it is easy to obtain a genuinely
issued document with false information, such as birth,
marriage and death certificates and some individuals have
obtained genuine passports with false information. The GSE
appears to be unconcerned with the ease of obtaining such
documents. The GSE also issues Eritrean diplomatic, official
and regular passports to non-Eritreans, including Somalis,
Sudanese and other whose political movements the GSE
supports. In the past this has included members of the
Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, Oromiya Liberation
Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement, Somali Council of
Islamic courts and others. This practice led the Egyptian
Goverment to require all Eritrean diplomatic passport holders
obtain visas prior to traveling to Egypt.


G. (SBU) Privacy and Data Security: Post does not the GSE's
policies concerning records related to the questioning,
detention or removal of individuals encountered at points of
entry into the country nor how those records are stored, and
for how long. Post does not know whether the GSE restricts
collection or use of sensitive data. The GSE has no
obligation to provide notice to the public on the
implementation of new databases of records. Post does not
believe there are any laws relating to security features for
government computer systems that hold personally identifying
information. Post does not believe there are any rules
covering an individual's ability to access data that homeland
security agencies hold about them. Moreover, if such rules
exist, Post does not believe the GSE would honor such laws.
A non-citizen/resident could ask the GSE for the data,
however as mentioned previously the GSE would not honor such
a request.

MCINTYRE