Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASMARA684
2007-08-15 13:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

ERITREA REFLECTS ON ARUSHA AND THE NEGOTIATIONS

Tags:  PREL SU ER 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHAE #0684/01 2271332
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151332Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9029
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1413
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1590
RUEPADJ/CJTF-HOA J2X CAMP LEMONIER DJ
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000684 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2017
TAGS: PREL SU ER
SUBJECT: ERITREA REFLECTS ON ARUSHA AND THE NEGOTIATIONS
FOR DARFUR


Classified By: CDA Holly C. Holzer, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000684

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2017
TAGS: PREL SU ER
SUBJECT: ERITREA REFLECTS ON ARUSHA AND THE NEGOTIATIONS
FOR DARFUR


Classified By: CDA Holly C. Holzer, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary. On August 13 Charge met with People's Front
for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) Political Chief and lead
Sudan interlocutor for Eritrea, Yemane Ghebreab, to discuss
the Eritrean views of the August 3 ) 6 meetings in Arusha.
Yemane described the meetings as having gone "very well" and
stressed the need to maintain the current momentum. Yemane
offered his assessment of some of the individual leaders and
movements, and commented on Libya's unhelpful role. While
Eritrea continues to see itself as a contender for hosting
the negotiations, Yemane elected not to promote the value of
Asmara as the location during the discussion. Despite this
meeting occurring in the days following the U.S. notification
of the closure of the Eritrean Consulate in Oakland, Yemane
made no comment on the USG action, an indicator perhaps the
Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) truly intends to
keep discussions on Sudan separate from bi-lateral issues.
End Summary.

--------------
REFLECTIONS ON THE ARUSHA
--------------

2. (C) Yemane repeatedly commented during the conversation
that the Arusha conference had gone "very well" and observed
that this was the "most progress in a very long while." He
relayed that the Eritreans, like others, stayed "on the
fringes8 of the conversation to allow the Darfurians to work
out their common platform and initial negotiating positions.
Yemane said he pushed for the negotiations to take place in
September but that the Darfurians had requested more time.
According to Yemane, the Darfurians agreed that the Dafur
Peace Agreement's Declaration of Principals were an
acceptable foundation for the talks. He did note that while
the Dafurians could start from there, they needed to "get to
the talks and find a way forward."


3. (C) Yemane stated that the main challenges for the
Darfurians is creating a unified platform and not losing
momentum. Only by ceasing what he called "internal
bickering" and finding what unites them will the Darfurians
be successful. He said that the movements may meet before
the negotiations to prepare themselves, but at this time

there are no formal plans to bring the Darfurians together.
He revealed that some members of the United Front for
Liberation and Development (aka Asmara Group) have returned
to Asmara, but individuals such as Yahia Abdallah and Khamis
Abdallah have not returned.

--------------
THE SPLM'S ROLE
--------------


4. (C) Yemane shared that the Eritreans have backed away from
a separate Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
conference for the Darfurians. According to him, the meeting
held in Juba after Arusha was, for now, sufficient. He did
not expect the SPLM to plan other meetings specifically for
the Darfurians, although he did mention that perhaps they
might do "something for the tribal leaders and civil
society." Yemane went on, stating that the SPLM now must
"focus on their role in the negotiating team as part of the
Government of National Unity (GNU)." In the past, Yemane
expressed that the Eritrean's wanted the SPLM to be the GNU's
primary interlocutor on Darfur, yet, when asked about this he
did not answer directly, speaking instead of the National
Congress Party's suspicion of the SPLM in the Darfur process.

--------------
REGIONAL PARTNERS AND VENUES
--------------

5. (C) Yemane did not openly press for the talks to be held
in Asmara. He clearly stated that he anticipated the talks
would be held in one of the three regional capitals )
Asmara, N'djamena or Tripoli. He further described Libya as
not "showing leadership." (Comment: According to Egyptian
colleagues in Asmara, the Eritreans are lobbying very hard
behind the scenes to build support for Eritrea to host the
negotiations. End Comment.)

--------------

ASMARA 00000684 002 OF 002


REACHING KHALIL AND ABDUL WAHID
--------------


6. (C) When asked about Khalil's (Justice and Equality
Movement) failure to come to Arusha, Yemane smugly remarked
he knew Khalil, despite his promises, would not come to
Arushu. He observed that Khalil "wants to make himself big"
and did not attend Arusha because "this is part of the games
he likes to play." He said that Khalil seems more interested
in the internal issues of JEM and its position rather than
adjusting to the reality of negotiations.


7. (C) As for Abdul Wahid, Yemane said he must continue to be
invited to talks but that no special accommodations should be
made for him. He commented, "If he comes, he comes. If he
shies away he becomes irrelevant. Don,t make him feel
indispensable." He further explained that Abdul Wahid,s
involvement now might be more trouble and that waiting until
later in the process would make Abdul Wahid more "manageable
and realistic."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------

8. (C) Comment: Yemane seemed more at ease and readily
revealed more about Eritrean positions on negotiations and
players than he had in previous conversations. Moreover, he
appeared almost enthusiastic about Arusha and the prospects
for negotiation. Eritrea clearly anticipates that the
negotiations will be held in the region, and while not openly
stated, they continue to maneuver to place Asmara at the top
of the list. Eritrea also seems to be backing away from
their previous pressuring of the NCP to have the SPLM take on
a leadership role in the Darfur negotiations and now is using
their influence over the SPLM to ensure that the SPLM is
organized and prepared for negotiations. Finally, despite
this conversation taking place in the aftermath of the
Oakland Consulate closure, the lack of comment by Yemane on
the subject indicates that GSE may truly understand that they
need the U.S. support ) or at least not enmity - in the
GSE's agenda for Darfur. At this point post believes the GSE
will not let poor bi-lateral relations derail their efforts
in Darfur or the peace process. End Comment.
HOLZER