Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASMARA542
2007-06-25 08:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

THE ERITREANS APPROACH EMBASSY ON DARFUR

Tags:  PREL ER SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4618
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHAE #0542/01 1760824
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250824Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8912
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1552
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1374
RUEPADJ/CJTF-HOA J2X CAMP LEMONIER DJ
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0653
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000542 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2017
TAGS: PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: THE ERITREANS APPROACH EMBASSY ON DARFUR

REF: ASMARA 522

Classified By: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000542

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2017
TAGS: PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: THE ERITREANS APPROACH EMBASSY ON DARFUR

REF: ASMARA 522

Classified By: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Following weeks of backchannel
communication, Poloff and Charge met June 19 with Abdallah
Jabir, one of the GSE's primary interlocutors on Sudan, and
Yemane Ghebrab, Political Chief for the People's Front for
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ),at their request to discuss
Darfur. Yemane noted the close relationship between the
Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and expressed the GSE's
wish that Sudan,s Government of National Unity (GNU) will
assign officially the Darfur portfolio to First Vice
President and SPLM leader, Salva Kiir. He also advocated for
stronger coordination by the multiple international and
regional parties engaged on Darfur in working with the
non-signatories, particularly those not currently present in
Asmara (SLM/Abdul Wahid; SLM/Abdul Shafi and JEM.) Yemane
remained evasive about how the Eritreans envision their role
in a UN/AU framework and in a future mediation; however he
did emphasize that the GSE views its efforts as falling under
the umbrella of a UN/AU initiative. While the GSE continues
to evade discussion on many specifics, this conversation
appears to be genuine interest on the part of the GSE to
develop better coordination with the international community
in resolving the issues of Darfur. End Summary.


2. (C) Yemane stated that the GSE sees the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) for Southern Sudan as the foundation
for any further agreements in Sudan. With the CPA as the
linchpin, the GSE wants the SPLM to play a larger role within
the GNU. Yemane insinuated that the non-signatories would
work better with the SPLM than with the National Congress
Party (NCP),despite historical tensions between the
Darfurians and the SPLM. Yemane described the current
Eritrean efforts as not merely supporting the (recently
postponed) SPLM-hosted conference, but more importantly, an
initiative to press the GNU to accept Salva Kiir and the SPLM
as the lead for Government of Sudan during negotiations on
Darfur.


3. (C) Yemane also spoke of the need to coordinate the
current international efforts, and said ) without offering
specifics ) that the Eritreans see their efforts as falling
under the UN/AU umbrella. He and Abdallah both expressed
concerns that if too many different actors approached Abdul
Wahid, Abdul Shafi and the JEM, these non-signatories may
develop an unhelpful sense of self-importance and expand
their already unrealistic demands. The GSE sees a clear need
for all intermediaries, including the UN/AU, Eritrea, SPLM,
Libya, Chad and the involved NGOs, to coordinate strategy in
the "pre-mediation" stage, particularly in dialogue with the
non-signatories not currently in Asmara. Abdallah further
suggested that with Abdul Wahid being problematic and Abdul
Shafi having nearly no military support, a means to include a
larger representation of the Fur within a Darfur dialogue
should be explored.


4. (C) When pressed about the Eritrean vision for a Darfur
mediation, specifically venue and GSE role, Yemane dodged
offering any details. He claimed such planning was premature
at this time and reiterated the need for coordination, with a
focus on bringing together the non-signatories to agree on a
common platform.


5. (C) Comment: Post welcomed the GSE's offer to
communicate more directly on issues of Darfur. The GSE
clearly has influence with the SPLM and several of the
non-signatory leaders, which could prove helpful in moving
forward to mediation. By approaching the Embassy after many
months of silence, the Eritreans seem to be acknowledging
that while they have influence over those non-signatories
presently in Asmara, the GSE cannot reach all of the
non-signatory parties on their own or through regional
partners only. Should we choose to respond to this opening,
the USG may have an opportunity to converge GSE efforts on
Darfur more transparently with the UN/AU initiative. While
post believes the GSE's request for greater coordination on
pre-mediation efforts to be sincere, we nonetheless recognize
that the GSE continues to hold its cards close to its chest,
and in the end, the GSE may hold very different ideas than

ASMARA 00000542 002 OF 002


ours about the process of a final mediation. End Comment.
MCINTYRE